Septuagenarian Notes: WAR ON DRUGS (Second of Three Parts)

 CHAPTER 1 - WAR ON DRUGS (Second of Three Parts)

‘PROJECT DOUBLE BARREL’: THE LEGALIZATION OF EJKS

DUTERTE’S war on drugs officially started on July 1, 2016, or the day after Duterte was sworn in as president. Gen. Ronald dela Rosa, whom Duterte named director-general of the Philippine National Police (PNP), issued Command Memorandum Circular 16-2016 (or CMC), which specified the general guidelines, procedures, and tasks of police offices, units, and stations in the conduct of the anti-illegal drugs campaign plan under the “Project Double Barrel.” This was an elaborate project brandished by the PNP leadership as supportive of “the barangay clearing strategy of the government and the neutralization of illegal drug personalities nationwide.” It immediately went full swing.

In the statement of its purpose, the CMC used the word “neutralization” of the people engaged in drug trade as its main objective. This is noticeable because, in police parlance, “neutralization” means killing or, at the very least, maiming social offenders.15 The CMC gave a view of the national situation. It said:

”According to the DDB's 2015 National Household Survey, there were around 1.8 million drug users in the country [where] 38.36% of which are unemployed. As of February 2016, PDEA reported that 26.91% or 11,321 out of the country's 42,065 barangays were ‘drug affected’ (mostly in urban areas), A barangay is said to be drug-affected when there is a proven existence of drug user, pusher, manufacturer, marijuana cultivator or other drug personalities regardless of number in the area. On record, NCR has the highest rate of affectation with 92.96% of the region's barangays, followed by CALABARZON at 49.28%. Based on PDEA's 2015 arrest data, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (90%) reportedly tops the list of most abused illegal drugs, followed by marijuana and costly party drugs like cocaine and ecstasy.

“The afore-cited statistical data is indicative of the worsening drug problem that has victimized mostly the underprivileged and impoverished sector of the society. Although much has already been done and accomplished in the national campaign to eradicate illegal drugs, yet the problem persists and it continues to breed social ills. Apparently, in the quest to go after high level drug traffickers, the government seems to have overlooked the worsening drug problem at the grassroots level. The archipelagic set-up of the Philippines is exploited by traffickers to transport illegal drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals into the country. The international and local airports and seaports, mail and parcel services and the vast expanse of coastline are being utilized as entry and exit points.

“There are three transnational drug organizations operating in the Philippines, namely: a. The Chinese or Filipino-Chinese drug syndicates dominate the drug market in the country. They facilitate production, manufacturing and bulk smuggling of dangerous drugs in the country. These activities ensure the supply of drugs in the market. Their activities are largely concentrated within their group, with the inclusion of very few and well-selected locals; b. The African Drug Syndicate (ADS) is responsible for smuggling drugs through the airports using drug couriers/swallowers; and c. The Mexican-Sinaloa Drug Cartel is a new drug group operating in the Philippines. They associated with the Chinese drug Group to penetrate the Philippine market.”16

Saying the CMC would be launched and implemented on the first day of office of Ronald dela Rosa as the PNP chief, all police offices and units were enjoined to conduct massive and simultaneous operations to generate impact and public support. Project Double Barrel has two components: “Project Tokhang” and “Project High Value Targets.” Project Tokhang is the lower barrel approach, which is launched in all drug-affected barangays nationwide in coordination with the local government units (LGUs) particularly in their anti-drug abuse councils (ADACs), nongovernment organizations (NG0s), stakeholders, and other law enforcement agencies. The Project Tokhang is described as “a practical and realistic means of accelerating the drive against illegal drugs in affected barangays. This concept involves the conduct of house to house visitations to persuade suspected illegal drug personalities to stop their illegal drug activities.”17

Project Tokhang has five stages: first stage, collection and validation of information; second stage, coordination; third stage, house to house visitation; fourth stage, processing and documentation; and fifth stage, the monitoring and evaluation. The CMC said: “The collection and validation of information would be conducted in the first week of the first month of the President's term. All local police offices, units, stations and anti-illegal drugs units shall conduct validation to acquire specific information on suspected drug users and pushers in every affected barangays. The identity and criminal activities of each target must be properly documented and verified with all possible sources to equip the team with accurate and solid proofs when confronting suspects during house to house visitations.” How the collection and validation of information went on Duterte’s first week of the first month of his presidential term of office went was not known. There was no report whatsoever. The CMC said:

“THE coordination shall be made with the following government agencies, stakeholders, and non-government organizations prior to the conduct of actual house to house visitations to ensure success of the activity. All concerned local police offices, units, and stations would coordinate with the LGUs to provide support for the activity and ensure compliance of subordinate offices. The house to house visitation stage of suspected drug personalities would highlight Project Tokhang. The processing and documentation stage has the following components: first, all suspected drug personalities who shall voluntarily surrender shall be required to fill-out a voluntary surrender form; second, persons, who voluntarily surrendered shall be urged to subscribe under oath before a notary public, to be assisted by a counsel and witnessed by parents/guardians and/or barangay officials; all suspected drug personalities who shall voluntarily surrender themselves to the visiting team shall be referred/invited to the local police station for interview, documentation, and other alternative actions. Provided that they execute undertakings to cooperate by giving voluntary information regarding illegal drug activities; all suspected drug personalities who shall surrender any dangerous drugs or its derivatives and drug paraphernalia shall be processed accordingly. Provided that they execute undertakings to give voluntary information about any violations of specific provisions of RA 9165 as stated under Section 33.”

The CMC has provisions calling for what the PNP termed “internal cleansing,” which calls for “the arrest and prosecution of PNP personnel, [who, through the conduct of counter-intelligence operations, are found out] engaged in unlawful activities such as, but not limited to, illegal arrest, illegal detention, hulidap, bangketa/areglo" or case fixing, recycling of confiscated drugs, and planting of evidence, bungling of drug cases, or acting as protectors, coddlers, and financiers of drug personalities. It includes the continuous drug testing of all PNP personnel and filing of appropriate charges against those who would be found positive to ensure drug-free workplaces in all PNP Offices and further improve the image and credibility of the police in the anti-drug campaign. The CMC said the PNP Internal Cleansing would at the national level to be under the “functional supervision and authority” of the PNP director for intelligence.18

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‘INTERNAL CLEANSING’

EVEN before Duterte took his oath, mass violence started. When it was clear that Duterte was the 2016 presidential elections winner, his camp immediately intimated to the PNP corps of officers that Duterte was inclined to wage a bloody war against illegal drugs. No quarters were to be given to drug users, runners, pushers, and bigtime, or smalltime, importers and retailers. “That was an order” - this was how informants put it. By end-May, 2016, or in the waning days of the Benigno Aquino III administration, an upsurge in the number of summary executions was perceptible, as traditional media reported them. The number of the victims of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) went up when Duterte took his oath by June 30. It could be seen that certain PNP top officials jumped off the gun. They were competing to get noticed by Duterte. “May mga nagpasikat (Some people were showing off),” a barangay captain said.19

‘WHITE PAPER.’ An apocryphal January 31, 2017 “white paper” quoting unidentified active and retired police officers said Duterte’s drug war contained the following characteristics: first, it has the PNP as its main vehicle and it follows the “chain of command” system; second, it is essentially “state-sponsored” no matter how Duterte and his cohorts have denied it; third, it has employed unnamed vigilante groups to augment the groups of police officers officially assigned to do the job; and fourth, it is a program engaged in “social cleansing,” which was to get rid of the country of the unemployed and dregs of society, or what is called “lumpenproletariat.” Duterte’s war on drugs is the pursuit of extrajudicial killings (EJKs), according to the white paper entitled “Special Report: The State-Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines.” Moreover, the anti-drug war is unique in the sense it erases the distinction between drug users, pushers (retailers), and drug lords (producers and wholesalers). They are one and the same under him, although Duterte did not fully explain the loss of distinction.

The first six months of the Duterte government saw the immediate creation of a system for the war on drugs. The white paper mentioned the augmentation of the police anti-illegal drug force by elements from Mindanao to form an almost company-sized police force, whose job is to engage in liquidation missions of suspects in the drug trade. The white paper discussed the creation of a mechanism of the “reward system” for law enforcers and vigilante groups engaged in EJKs. It could be surmised that the PNP has become the virtual “death squad” of Duterte, although certain police officers argued that the PNP was just implementing the presidential mandate. It could be surmised too that certain police officers were not comfortable to become part of Duterte’s death squad. They do not like to be known as butchers of the people they have sworn to serve. Whether or not they are in the minority is not known because they did not openly raise howls, as the war on drugs progressed. Some police officials were said to have applied and went into schooling to avoid involvement in the war against drugs.20

At that time, thousands of suspected drug users, runners, pushers, and traders were summarily killed nationwide. Two months after Rodrigo Duterte swore in as president on noon of June 30, 2016, it was clear the war on drugs would continue as planned. Like attack dogs unleashed by their masters from their chains, police officers, in groups, or in combination with vigilante groups, aggressively went into killing sprees in the depressed communities of Metro Manila and other provinces. In many instances, police officers barged into the victims’ homes even in the wee hours of the morning, ordering household members to get out of the house and killing outright suspects right in their homes. In other instances, they took – or kidnapped - the persons of interest out of their homes, tortured, and shot them with their handguns or assault weapons elsewhere. They hardly had arrest or search warrants. In their reports, police officers offered the narrative that the victims fought back, or in the vernacular, “nanlaban,” endangering or harming the arresting police officers. Their alibis could not be proven though except those antiquated, worn out .38 handguns, which were presumably thrown by police officers into their bodies ostensibly to prove their alibis.21

Quoting official records culled from a “source” at the PNP Directorate for Operations, the white paper, entitled “Special Report: The State Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines,” said the death toll reached 6,273 persons, of whom 2.224 persons were “suspected drug personalities killed in police operations,” while 4,049 were victims of vigilante killings, or “death under investigation.“ Why the number of vigilante killings was far larger than legitimate police operations was not explained, although it could be surmised that a number of EJKs was not reported officially. It said:

“For the first seven months of the ‘war on drugs,’ the monthly death toll averaged 896, while the daily average of death tally was around 30. The average death toll in police operations for 210 days (7 x 30 days) is 11 persons. In effect, the PNP is claiming that the deadly armed encounters for 210 days (7 months) registered a daily death toll of 10 killed drug suspects.

“As to the alleged [vigilante killings/deaths under investigation], there is a death daily toll average of 19 persons. The total daily death total for [local police operations] and [vigilante killings/deaths under investigation] is (19+11) = 30 persons killed in a span in less than 7 months.”   

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HOW THEY DID IT

THE white paper could be regarded as “very revealing” for its audacity and profundity because it narrated how police officers did the war on drugs, specifically the summary executions or what we call from the human rights parlance, extrajudicial killings (EJKs). As part of the war on drug infrastructure, the PNP had come out with its own standard operating procedure on its summary executions of its targets. The following unedited text has to be drawn out of the white paper for accuracy:

The standard and typical carrying out of An EJK Operation by a Police Station/Community Precinct of the five (5) Police Districts of National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) is a cycle replicated nationwide in all Police Regional Offices (PRO)/Provincial Police Offices (PPO) and City/Municipality Police Offices, down to Police Community Precincts (PCP). This cycle is outlined below:

The Station Commander, in his capacity as head of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Task Group (SAIDTG) will preside at a tactical briefing by his PCP Commanders. This is a weekly assessment on the progress of the war on drugs through EJK.

The stage for target selection for EJK implementation uses, as reference, the surrenderers’ datasbase.

•           Tactical coordination of the EJK Team with the Barangay Chairman, who is the Chairman of the Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Council (BADAC).

•           Tracing, locating, and casing of the target house.

•           Determination of the actual hit on the target.

•           The Station Chief/PCP Commander coordinates with the BADAC’s Chairman for the shutdown of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance and the switching off of street lamps.

•           The Hit team, which is regularly composed of four (4) assassins, executes the target suspects.

•           The return to the Station and the verbal reporting to the Station Chief or PCP Commander.

•           As directed, to satisfy the protocol requirements, Homicide Investigators will bring the gunshot victims to the hospital.

•           The Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team performs a scripted forensic investigation of the crime scene in case the victim is allegedly falling under the category of DUI.

In the case of scripted LPO, the cycle is similar. Double planting of evidence is done to make it appear that the drug suspect resisted arrest and fired back. A small quantity of shabu and a Cal. 38 homemade gun are the usual ‘resistance killing’ evidences” (sic).

In the case of EJK of DUI type, there are three (3) variations of execution:

•           The Riding in Tandem – Hit Team will assassinate the target victim while their vehicle is in motion.

•           An EJK Team, with mask, and hooded with black bonnet, will barge into the house of the target and open fire.

•           An EJK Abduction Team will grab the target victim if he/she is a retailer or distributor. After interrogation with torture, the victim is summarily executed. The corpse is dumped at a selected site. In all, Police Districts of the NCRPO, the so-called “Firer” is designated to kill the drug suspect. The Firer, whether he or she is riding on a motor bike or is a member of an abduction team, is usually given half of the EJK payment.

NAGGING QUESTION. The nagging question is whether or not the PNP, as an institution, has accepted Duterte’s war on drugs and registered any opposition or warning about its illegal character. Officially, the answer is yes. But there appeared to be more than what meets the eyes. Although the rumor mill has kept on grinding yarns of speculations and interpretations, the 20-page white paper, entitled “Special Report: the State-Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines,” gave indications that the war on drugs had a different dimension that was not openly disclosed. The alleged involvement of the communist-led National Democratic Front (NDF) was neither known nor openly discussed.22

Incidentally, Duterte pitched on several occasions the possible inclusion and involvement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the war on drugs. The AFP gave an icy reception to Duterte’s advances. It somehow managed to strike a middle ground by its counterproposal to involve itself in data gathering or providing his office with intelligence information. Although it did not make its position public, the AFP was categorical to say “no” on what Duterte wanted. Except to provide intelligence information, it would not involve itself in the war against drugs. The AFP, as an institution, knows its mandate. Any inclusion or involvement in the anti-drug war is not part of its mandate. The anti-drug campaign is essentially a police issue, which is better left to the PNP. The AFP had learned its lesson during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. It did not want to bite more than it could chew.

On September 21, 1972, the AFP supported the martial law declaration by the emerging dictator sFerdinand Marcos on an essentially single issue: the alleged threat to national security by the then newly reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People’s Army. The outlawed NPA was then composed of a few squads from the remnants of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya sa Bayan (HMB) and had an insufficient number of outdated firearms. The AFP support for martial law was ironically dismal, as it showed acquiescence to 13 years of the Marcos dictatorship. The communist threat was not that big for the AFP to bear and support the martial law government of Marcos, which later metamorphosed into an abusive, corrupt, and plundering dictatorship.

CLARITY OF THOUGHT. The PNP understood Duterte had exaggerated the magnitude and dimension of the illegal drug issue to get elected into office and obtain the people’s mandate to launch the brutal war against drugs and its users, pushers, and wholesalers. It knew Project Double Barrel and its two components, Oplan Tokhang and Oplan High Value Targets, were only good on paper but unsustainable in the long run. They were hardly implemented on the basis of their original mandate and objectives. But many police officials persisted to support Duterte – both fully and halfheartedly. They could not be blamed, but they were watchful of Duterte’s actual intentions and on what he was doing.

Although drug users, pushers, and other persons involved in drug trade were identified early in the anti-drug campaign and told to mend their ways, a number of persons, who surrendered voluntarily before their barangay officials, were later slain to indicate bad faith, deceit, and duplicity of purposes. A number underwent rehabilitation as mandated by the existing anti-drugs laws, but they were nonetheless summarily executed. Why and how these summary executions happened was a matter of conjecture.23 Oplan Tokhang was clear on rehabilitation and monitoring of drug users. Certain persons in the know said in confidence that the anti-drug war, even on its early stage, was just unsustainable. Duterte himself did not exactly know what to do. He was not gifted with the clarity of thought, they surmised, especially on its end game.

The white paper alleged that a faction within Duterte’s coalition attempted to take advantage of Duterte’s lack of initiative to put down the complete details on how to proceed with the anti-drug war. It took a direction far different from its original intent. It discussed lengthily the inclusion of a program, which certain alleged members (or former members) of the communist-led National Democratic Front (NDF) had included in the war on the anti-drugs project. It was their way to hijack the war on drugs to the NDF’s favor.

A month after Duterte was sworn in, the Kilusang Pagbabago (KP), a new political party formed purportedly “to protect the new president,” was launched by a group of political leaders led by then Cabinet Secretary Leoncio Evasco Jr. It was conceived to be a mass movement that originated from the top, the Office of the President, to blossom into a grassroots-based political party below. Although it was supposed to have been launched on Aug. 13, 2016, not much was heard about it. But the Dec. 5, 2016 report of rappler.com led with this paragraph: “President Rodrigo Duterte’s most trusted ally, Cabinet Secretary Leoncio ‘Jun’ Evasco Jr, is going around the country to launch a nationwide mass movement – Kilusang Pagbabago (KP).” It could be surmised that KP, which was on the drawing board since August, did not take off immediately, pushing its launching toward the end of 2016.24

The news report said KP was “growing fast” as it drew huge crowds in its launching in Cebu and Cavite. Its organizers thought of organizing a KP unit in each barangay. Conceptually, it was envisioned to become the political vehicle to bring government services down to the ground. But its bigger role, it appeared, was to form a critical mass to protect Duterte, as he was supposed to pursue radical reforms, according to the rappler.com report citing a document on its creation and objectives. The KP mentioned possible destabilization plots if ever Duterte pursued “reforms” but it did not give details. In fact, KP had singled out certain police and military generals supposedly involved in illegal drug trade as enemies, giving rise to the perception of its anti-military and police bias.

KP AS ‘BROWNSHIRTS.’ There were supporters, who wanted to strengthen Dueterte’s hold to power by having a mass-based political party, while other supporters believed that KP would only bring the Duterte government closer to the Left. This was the tug-of-war during the early weeks of Duterte’s presidency. The more acceptable assessment was the planned creation of an army of supporters, or a “mass movement,” whose members could be easily converted into the equivalent of the S.A. or “Brownshirts” of the old Nazi German regime. Given Duterte’s penchant to use thugs in his war on drugs in Davao City, it could be surmised too that Evasco’s faction in the ruling coalition could have thought to create an army within the army with KP as the political vehicle to form its core of members.

Rodrigo Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections partly with the help of the Left – both the Legal left, which has the alphabet soup of Left-leaning organizations like Bayan, a mass organization, Bayan Muna Party List, Gabriela, Anakpawis, Kabataan, among others, and the outlawed extreme Left led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), its military arm, and the National Democratic Front (NDF), its political arm. Although on official level the Left supported Grace Poe, who landed third after Duterte and Mar Roxas, the Liberal Party candidate, the Left, especially those based in Mindanao, supported Duterte instead of Poe. In brief, it played simultaneously two political cards in 2016.

Although it was not official and nothing indeed was written on stone, it could be said that Duterte was in alliance with the Left. This could be deduced from the appointments of certain officials, who were closely associated with the Legal Left like Judy Taguiwalo as secretary of the Department of Social Works and Services (DSWD), who later resigned in disgust with Duterte’s public policies, Rafael Mariano, as secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), who met the same fate as Taguiwalo, and lesser mortals like Liza Maza and Terry Ridon. Evasco was said to be personally identified with Duterte because he was once the latter’s chief of staff when he was the mayor of Davao City. Evasco was reported powerful because he had the initial effective control of at least 16 state agencies. But just like the other Left-leaning Cabinet members, Evasco was eased out of the Cabinet only to be reappointed in an inconsequential office, which was as a presidential adviser on government reorganization ostensibly to streamline processes in 2020.

It could be surmised that the police and military establishments distrusted Evasco, who was identified as a former member of the central committee of the CPP. As a CPP member, Evasco was being viewed as an institutional enemy because the PNP and AFP are engaged in armed struggle with communist guerillas. In short, Evasco, despite his elaborate plans to create a grassroots party for Duterte, did not get the trust and confidence of the PNP and AFP. They took him for an “enemy,” who should be defanged and weakened.

PROGRAM WITHIN A PROGRAM. The white paper discussed Evasco’s plan to create a program within the program against drugs. According to the white paper, Evasco’s program was considered “the broad intelligence network of EJK” dubbed the MASA MASID, which stood for Mamamayang Ayaw sa Anomalya, Mamamayang Ayaw sa Ilegal na Droga (Citizens against Anomalies, Citizens Against Illegal Drugs). Drafted and completed in July, 2016 by Evasco and Undersecretary Joselito Libres Jr., whom, the white paper said, were once members of the CPP Central Committee, the highest policy-making body in the outlawed CPP, the MASA MASID program sought to become the “watchdog” of the Kilusang Pagbabago, the mass-based party.

The KP’s concept paper contained at least five component programs, which sought to strengthen the Duterte government. A component was the “defender of the Republic” program, which sought to defend Duterte from “destabilization threats and calamities to ensure delivery of services for communities and sectors.” Another component was the propaganda scheme program to project Duterte as the “educator” when it comes to changes. The third component part was essentially political, as it sought to change to a federal form the current unitary government. The fifth component centers on effective delivery of social services.

But it was in the fourth component that identified KP as the “watchdog,” which the police and military establishments did not feel comfortable. Under this component, the KP would be the vanguard against crime, drugs and corruption through monitoring, documentation, and advocacy. These things were essentially PNP’s job. The white paper said this component could be aptly transformed into the “intelligence arm of the National Democratic Front,” of which Evasco was identified as a key leader. It said:

“Indeed, the MASA MASID has a vast network of informants [on] the national scale. It functions as a spy agency jointly established and operated by the CPP/NPA/NDF, DILG, and the hoodwinked civic organizations. It could be compared to a modern Gestapo providing data to the savage ‘war on drugs’ with state-sponsored EJK.

“The principal source of President Duterte’s ‘Drug List’ is undoubtedly the MASA MASID. PRRD has repeatedly announced that the [number of] drug addicts [is] approaching a prevalence level of almost four million. This is in contrast to the official data of 1.8 million drug users and pushers of the Dangerous Drug Board (DDB/Philippine Drug Enforcement agency (PDEA).

“There is a gap of 2.2 million between President Duterte’s list of 4 million addicts and the DDB/PDEA estimates of 1.8 million.”

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‘SOCIAL CLEANSING’

THE white paper said that while the spate of drug-related summary executions or extrajudicial killings (EJKs) was “state sponsored” as indicated by the presidential directives on the war against drugs, it was also a form of “social cleansing.” It did not define what it meant by social cleansing except to say that the anti-drug war was essentially “a form of mass murder.” It said:

“Because the PNP is a structured government bureau under the Executive Department, the criminal liability in relation to carrying out of EJK is quite obvious and could be applied from the top echelon of the national political leadership down to the lowest level of the PNP, the Police Community Precincts (PCP).

“The EJK could also be considered a form of mass murder. The latter is the act of murdering people, typically, simultaneously or over a relatively short period of time and in close proximity. The continued daily occurrence of EJK incidents on a nationwide scale clearly indicates the general features of mass murder.”

The punchline, which was delivered before the actual filing of the first information against Duterte at an international forum: “International legal experts studying the ‘War on Drugs’ have specific opinions that [President Rodrigo Roa Duterte] could be tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC).” It was a statement of prescience on the part of the unidentified police officers and military officials behind the white paper because three months later, the first information was filed before the ICC. (to be continued)