I’VE
DECIDED TO PUT THE FOUR-PART SERIES OF FERDINAND MARCOS’S POST-EDSA LIFE IN A
SINGLE WHOLE FOR EVERYBODY TO READ …
THE
LIFE OF FERDINAND MARCOS AFTER HIS DICTATORSHIP
By
Philip M. Lustre, Jr.
(First
of four part series)
N.B.
I was lucky to have borrowed a book authored by the late Col. Arturo
Aruiza re the post-EDSA life of Ferdinand Marcos. Col. Aruiza was the dictator’s
aide de camp for many years and saw many details in Marcos's colorful life. He detailed how a bunch of alleged supporters and con men
badgered the fallen dictator on his possible return to the Philippines. His
first-person account gives credence to assertion that Marcos had to deal with
shady characters in his frustrated bid to return to the Philippines and recover his lost throne at Malacanang and power.
As
told by people in the know, Col. Aruiza gathered every document and conceivable
piece of information to back up his narratives. Readers could not agree on his
impressions and conclusions, but his facts were straightforward and had a touch
of scholarship. When I read his book, I am convinced that Marcos was amply
punished by the kind of life he had as a political has-been. Where before he wielded power over the life and fate of many people - and the entire nation, Marcos,
in his exile in Hawaii, was essentially a plaything of fate. He was not in control of his circumstances. Nothing could be worse than being regarded a political leper in the community of nations. That was Marcos.
Ferdinand
E. Marcos
Malacanang
to Makiki
By
Arturo C. Aruiza
Published
by ACAruisa Enterprises,
490
pages, 1991
FERDINAND
Marcos’s fabled life as democratic president for seven years and dictator for
thirteen years was a far cry from what he had after his downfall. As president
and dictator, Marcos dealt with the best and brightest to exact favors, neutralize, or bring down his enemies, and maintain his
grip on political power - come hell or high water.
In
Makiki Heights in Hawaii, where he stayed as an exile – or a pathetic political
has-been - until his death in 1989, Marcos had to deal with the following:
•
first, unruly supporters and favor seekers, who hardly contributed for his much
ballyhooed return to the Philippines;
•
second, con men, mostly Americans and some Filipinos, who presented him with impressive and elaborate but unrealistic
plans for his return, but collected huge sums of money for plans that did not
materialize;
•
third, lawyers who represented him in cases in U.S. courts and collected
handsome lawyers’ fees; and
•
fourth, U.S. immigration and customs officials, who treated him and his family with sublime
and unmitigated condescension.
It
was a far cry from the life of pelf, power, and privilege which Marcos had at
his prime. As a fallen dictator, he was at the mercy of the vagaries and
vicissitudes of the political dynamics of his time, particularly his
waning years when he was a political exile in the United States.
As
his long-time military aide had admitted, Marcos never had it so bad until his
largely unforeseen downfall. Forlorn and decrepit, Marcos was helpless,
powerless, and witless to assert whatever legitimacy he was claiming to
the presidency. He was never in his cunning and sharp element unlike when he was in power.
Either
by omission or commission, Col. Arturo Aruiza, however, did not disclose how
Marcos plotted his return to the Philippines, including how he spent tons of
his loot to finance the reported acts of destabilization - or series of military coups and spate of protest
demonstrations - against the Cory Aquino government. It was something understandable but not necessarily forgivable.
Col.
Aruiza’s book took off on the high noon of February 22, 1986, when the dictator
called him to his room in Malacanang. He hardly had any inkling that a momentous,
historic political cataclysm was to start on that day, although he was
surprised when Marcos had ordered the cancellation of their weekend day-off.
He saw U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth and Philip Habib, U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s “trouble shooter, being ushered to the Study Room to meet the dictator.
He saw U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth and Philip Habib, U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s “trouble shooter, being ushered to the Study Room to meet the dictator.
Then,
he narrated major antecedents to the fateful four-day 1986 EDSA People
Power Revolution that led to the downfall of his hero and their subsequent
banishment from the Philippines to go on an exile in the U.S. state of
Hawaii. His recollections reflected a heavy dosage of rancor and bitterness, as
if the fallen dictator did not make mistakes to cause massive poverty for the Filipino people.
Showing
tu quoque arguments (literally “you too”), Col. Aquiza said the massive electoral cheating and
irregularities in the 1986 “snap” presidential polls could not be blamed on Marcos alone because even the camp of Corazon Aquino, the opposition candidate whom Marcos faced in the 1986 "snap" presidential elections, allegedly committed them. Moreover, watchdog Namfrel was not neutral and indeed partisan
to Ms. Aquino. He did not present proofs of cheating by the Cory Aquino camp.
Col. Aruiza vented an unusual dosage of umbrage to Washington, which according to him openly sided with Mrs. Aquino, not Marcos. In his limited view, both Marcos and Cory Aquino's camps cheated in the elections. Hence, it could not be blamed solely on Marcos but Mrs. Aquino as well. Still, no proof of Cory Aquino's alleged cheating was presented.
Col. Aruiza vented an unusual dosage of umbrage to Washington, which according to him openly sided with Mrs. Aquino, not Marcos. In his limited view, both Marcos and Cory Aquino's camps cheated in the elections. Hence, it could not be blamed solely on Marcos but Mrs. Aquino as well. Still, no proof of Cory Aquino's alleged cheating was presented.
Marcos,
Habib, and Bosworth, in their fateful meeting at noon of Feb. 22, 1986, could
not help but review the conduct and outcome of the Feb. 7, 1986 presidential
elections, where Marcos was proclaimed “winner” by the Batasang Pambansa, the
rubber stamp legislature during the latter part of the Marcos dictatorship.
They
later discussed on the touchy subject of Gen. Fabian Ver, Armed Forces Chief
of Staff and head of the dreaded nationwide intelligence network created by
Marcos to neutralize his political enemies. As usual, Marcos resisted
the pressures of the two U.S. officials, who expressed the desire of the Reagan
administration to retire Ver and replace him with somebody else.
Col.
Aruiza said: “We on the staff wondered why the president stubbornly retained,
at such peril to him. Not only Ver was an overstaying general, but he was also
an ineffectual one. He was spread too thin, burdened with too many
responsibilities. He carried too many titles, ran too many offices, none of
them well, and together with his sons, was the object of bitterness in some
sectors of the Armed Forces.”
Ver
appeared during their meeting, prompting Marcos to excuse himself to meet him.
Upon return to the two officials, Marcos informed them of an impending coup,
but Habib and Bosworth, according to Col. Aruiza, “hardly reacted." The two
officials “remained impassive,” hinting that they knew beforehand the planned
coup by a military faction reputedly loyal to defense minister Juan Ponce
Enrile and the Reform the Armed Forces Movement of Col. Gregorio Honasan.
The meeting with Habib ended without any conclusion.
Col.
Aruiza discussed the coup plot, which Col. Irwin Ver, one of the three military
sons of Gen. Ver, discovered sometime in December, 1985. The young Ver confided
the coup plot to his father on Feb. 16, 1986, after which they saw Marcos to
inform him. It forced Marcos to augment the Palace security by assigning units
of the Philippine Army to its defense perimeter.
The
issue of overstaying generals nagged the Marcos dictatorship. By extending the
tenure of favored military generals every six months, the Reform the Armed Forces
Movement (RAM) surfaced. Even Col. Aruiza did not agree to the unilateral
extension of their military tenure because it showed that Marcos did not trust
the younger guys to take their place. Marcos, in his interview with Honolulu
Advertiser on July 29, 1986, expressed regret, saying he should have followed
advice of the visiting U.S. officials.
Ver
was not only perceived as favored but ineffective, according to the former
military aide. Ver influenced greatly the promotions and assignments of
officers, indicating Marcos’s loss of control over the military, he said. In
brief, he was a major factor in determining whether the careers of military
officers would prosper or stagnate. “Extension was the rule, not exemption,” he
said.
Col.
Aruiza said: “Martial law gave the military a taste of civilian power and they
liked it. Marcos paid more attention to them than to the local officials. Most
officers took to the good life quickly and naturally.”
Citing
another antecedent to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, Col. Aruiza cited
the visit sometime in October, 1985 of Sen. Paul Laxalt, who succeeded to exact
from Marcos a commitment to hold “snap” presidential elections mainly to defuse
the growing tension in the Philippines because it was perceived to have a president
without any mandate from the Filipino people.
Where
stream of U.S. officials, including CIA chief William Casey, had earlier failed
to convince Marcos to call for presidential elections, Laxalt successfully
convinced Marcos to call one, not because he bargained hard, but because he
entertained Marcos. He touched on the dictator’s weakness: war memories. Laxalt
was a soldier, who saw action in southern Philippines in the last world war.
Col.
Aruiza said: “Laxalt touched on the president’s own war record and his guerilla
past, and I could see Marcos glow with Laxalt’s overtures. Laxalt ran down his
own list of friends in Washington that he said the president could depend upon.
I could tell the president was melting before Laxalt’s reassurances, his seeming
frankness, and his sense of humor. By bringing up his war memories, Laxalt held
the president’s attention.”
Incidentally,
Paul Laxalt was the same senator, who advised Marcos by telephone on the early
morning of February 25, 1986 “to cut and cut cleanly” to indicate the Reagan
administration’s withdrawal of support to his dictatorship.
Laxalt, in brief, functioned as the virtual pallbearer of gloom and doom. In his 1985 meeting with Marcos, Laxalt secured a letter from Marcos addressed to Reagan, assuring him he would call presidential elections.
Laxalt, in brief, functioned as the virtual pallbearer of gloom and doom. In his 1985 meeting with Marcos, Laxalt secured a letter from Marcos addressed to Reagan, assuring him he would call presidential elections.
(Second
of a four-part series)
COL.
Arturo Aruiza, the loyal, dependable, and honest military aide-de-camp of
the fallen dictator Ferdinand Marcos could not contain bitterness in his
memoirs. The explanation is simple: Marcos was a loser and Col. Aruiza belonged
to the losing camp.
Hence, his book contains details that justified the losses inflicted by the political enemies of Marcos and the Filipino people, who, in their exercise of their sovereign right, kicked Marcos and his ilk out of Malacanang and sent them to a political exile to some parts known and unknown.
Hence, his book contains details that justified the losses inflicted by the political enemies of Marcos and the Filipino people, who, in their exercise of their sovereign right, kicked Marcos and his ilk out of Malacanang and sent them to a political exile to some parts known and unknown.
Col.
Aruiza’s political theory was Washington, particularly the people in the
State Department, had conspired with the political opposition then led by
Corazon Aquino, widow of the martyr Benigno Aquino Jr. The antecedents that led
to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution saw the heavy hand of Washington,
whose officials took turns to pressure Marcos to take the route to restore
democracy.
He
was bitter about Washington’s intervention, although he never took time to
explain that Washington’s interventionist policy those days was largely a
function of Marcos’s refusal to restore democracy. Marcos continued to rule
with an iron hand without a mandate from the Filipino people. The February 7,
1986 “snap” presidential elections could have provided him the mandate to
showcase to the entire world that he enjoyed the popular support of the
Filipino people. As history showed, it did not happen though.
The
Marcos legacy is comprised of three major issues: first, centralized
corruption, where the dictator received fat, under-the-table commissions from foreign proponents of big state projects; second, crony capitalism, where a stable of friends and
cronies cornered agricultural and service monopolies; and third, massive human
rights violations, where tens of thousands of political activists,
opposition leaders, religious and community workers, youth leaders, peasant and
labor leaders, civil society workers, among others were arrested and detained
without charges, tortured, and summarily executed. In a number of cases, they
had disappeared without any trace and explanation until today.
Col.
Aruiza hardly mentioned the Marcos legacy in his book. Neither did he ever say
that Marcos had overstayed in power and the snap presidential electoral
process was just another step to perpetuate himself in power. Neither did he
ever put the blame on his boss, who virtually touched the nerve of history
because he never wanted to leave Malacanang for the rest of his life.
Philip
Habib, President Ronald Reagan “troubleshooter,” and U.S. Ambassador to the
Philippines Stephen Bosworth reacted impassively in their meeting on the noon
of Feb. 22, 1986 with Ferdinand Marcos, who dutifully informed them of an
impending coup.
Truth was, they knew of the coup by the group of defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, and a faction of the military. According to Col. Aruiza, no less than Honasan informed the U.S. Embassy officials of the planned military coup, which was to be initiated on Feb. 15, 1986, but had to be postponed to Feb. 22.
Truth was, they knew of the coup by the group of defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, and a faction of the military. According to Col. Aruiza, no less than Honasan informed the U.S. Embassy officials of the planned military coup, which was to be initiated on Feb. 15, 1986, but had to be postponed to Feb. 22.
Honasan
did it to obtain support of the U.S. government, according to the former
military aide. Hence, U.S. officials even to the highest levels knew that a
coup was brewing.
In fact, Habib was quoted as saying: ”Something is going to happen.” That was after he finished his meeting with Marcos and was about to leave for Washington on the night of Feb. 22, 1986, Col. Aruiza said.
In fact, Habib was quoted as saying: ”Something is going to happen.” That was after he finished his meeting with Marcos and was about to leave for Washington on the night of Feb. 22, 1986, Col. Aruiza said.
The
truth, according to the military aide, was that Washington rejected “extraconstitutional means” to obtain power. Washington would only give its
political support if the coup was an “enlightened self-defense.” No less than a
key U.S. Embassy official stated Washington’s position in a talk with Honasan
and two other RAM officials. Hence, the operative phrase was "enlightened
self-defense."
The
military aide gave credence that the Feb. 22, 1986 early morning arrest of the
security men of then Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin was the single spark that
prompted Enrile and the RAM-led military faction to retreat and hold out at the
defense building in Camp Aguinaldo on the night of the same day.
Enrile and RAM regarded the arrest of Ongpin’s security men, mostly RAM members, as a development that indicated the coup plan was compromised. According to Col. Aruiza the truth was the Ver faction knew of the coup plan as early as December, 1985, although it was only disclosed to Marcos on Feb. 15, 1986.
Enrile and RAM regarded the arrest of Ongpin’s security men, mostly RAM members, as a development that indicated the coup plan was compromised. According to Col. Aruiza the truth was the Ver faction knew of the coup plan as early as December, 1985, although it was only disclosed to Marcos on Feb. 15, 1986.
Ongpin
and Ver never saw eye-to-eye. Those days, Ongpin was the most powerful economic
manager. Marcos trusted him. Marcos recruited him from the private sector to
comprise the technocratic team that ran the Philippine economy. The other
technocrat was Prime Minister and concurrent Finance Minister Cesar Virata.
Those days, Ongpin managed the so-called “Binondo Central Bank,” the parallel underground market that controlled foreign exchange trading. It was described as a “necessary evil,” as Chinese Filipino businessmen were allowed to trade dollar earnings at a higher rate.
Those days, Ongpin managed the so-called “Binondo Central Bank,” the parallel underground market that controlled foreign exchange trading. It was described as a “necessary evil,” as Chinese Filipino businessmen were allowed to trade dollar earnings at a higher rate.
Ongpin
had a man arrested when he learned that the latter paid a “friendly fee” of
P300,000 to Edna Camcam, Ver’s alleged "special friend." According to Col.
Aruiza, Ver called Ongpin several times to facilitate his release, but Ongpin
ignored his calls. Hence, Ongpin felt frantic when Ver ordered the arrest of
his security men, who were doing early morning exercises. Despite Ongpin’s
protest, Ver did not order their release.
According
to Col. Aruiza, the Palace learned that Enrile and AFP vice chief of staff Lt.
Gen. Fidel Ramos were holed up in Camp Aguinaldo only by 6:30 pm of Feb. 22,
1986. By all standards, Malacanang got it quite late. But he said the breakaway
of the two officials was largely a function of the enmity between Enrile and
Imelda and Ramos and Ver.
(Let
me provide my own recollection because I was among the journalists, who covered
the breakaway of Enrile and Ramos. It was quite unusual that Malacanang learned
of this major development late in the day. Journalists – local and foreign –
had the information as early as 2 pm. Upon learning it in mid-afternoon, we
rushed to Camp Aguinaldo and waited there for three or four hours for
developments. In a separate blog, I said that Ver’s men knew of the development
in late afternoon, but withheld telling him because he and Imelda
Marcos were attending as sponsors of the wedding of Philip Piccio, son of Major General
Vicente Piccio, the Philippine Air Force chief, in Camp Villamor in Pasay
City.)
Describing
the coup plot that later became a mutiny, Col Aruiza said: “This was not a plot
of short standing, recently hatched, born from impulse, but one of long and
precipitate planning , carefully nurtured and perfected , springing from mixed
motives, some noble, some dark. The plot failed, but promptly resurfaced as the
unplanned mutiny, with the same cast, and this would entangle the lives of its
principals, returning to haunt all of its conspirators, giving them no peace,
and many of those who celebrated the fall of Marcos would end up embittered,
regretting EDSA.”
At
one point, Col. Aruiza discussed the dictator’s illness, which was then a
tightly guarded secret. He had a long history of kidney failure, which started
when Marcos contracted malaria, while allegedly doing guerilla works in 1944. According
to him, Marcos treated himself with crude extract of cinchona bark and
quinacrine (anti-malarial) tablets, which was a deadly combination. Marcos
paid dearly with his damaged kidneys.
Henceforth, Marcos, because of his failing kidneys, had problems with his blood pressure. He had to resort to dialysis treatment.
Henceforth, Marcos, because of his failing kidneys, had problems with his blood pressure. He had to resort to dialysis treatment.
Col.
Aruiza said Marcos was literally dying “bit by bit, day by day,” although he
was indeed adroit to hide his real health condition. Twice in his foreign
visits, he went on water skiing, projecting that he was not ill at all.
He confirmed that Marcos had two kidney transplants. The first transplant took place on August 7, 1983 with Bongbong Marcos as donor. But his body rejected it and on Nov. 26, 1984, Marcos had the second kidney transplant with an unidentified relative as donor.
He confirmed that Marcos had two kidney transplants. The first transplant took place on August 7, 1983 with Bongbong Marcos as donor. But his body rejected it and on Nov. 26, 1984, Marcos had the second kidney transplant with an unidentified relative as donor.
Fast
track to Feb. 25, 1986: Ferdinand Marcos and his family, with their fate
written on the palm of their hands, spent the day packing for a journey they
had yet to know. They knew they were to leave Malacanang. They knew they were
losing in the power game. But that was another story.
(Third
of a four-part series)
IN
the fog of any ongoing war, revolution, rebellion or any political cataclysm,
fortunes could change abruptly. There is no definitive template to succeed or
lose in the battle for the heart and mind of the people. Any momentous event
just cascades to its rightful and sweeping conclusion. This happened in the
four-day 1986 EDSA People Revolution.
Allies
and friends, whom he nurtured during his ill-fated dictatorship, suddenly
turned their backs on him. The mass exodus of military leaders, political allies,
and other key people led to his downfall. Col. Aruiza did not blame Marcos; he
was a loyal flunkey.
He predictably, albeit bitterly, put the blame on the conspiracy of Washington, whose top officials worked furiously on his downfall, the political opposition led by Corazon Aquino, and disloyal allies.
He predictably, albeit bitterly, put the blame on the conspiracy of Washington, whose top officials worked furiously on his downfall, the political opposition led by Corazon Aquino, and disloyal allies.
When
the clock struck midnight of Feb. 25, 1986, the political fate of Marcos was
almost sealed. His grip to power was slipping fast. As the foregone loser,
Marcos would have to leave Malacanang. No matter how he tried, Marcos could
hardly salvage a last minute deal. All cards were stacked against him.
According
to Col. Aruiza, Marcos at that time was no longer the same Marcos he knew
before. He was no longer the aggressive, audacious, and cunning Marcos, who
left nothing to chance. Sick and tired, Marcos lost his will to fight.
The doctors, who later treated Marcos in his exile in Hawaii, attributed the loss of his will to fight to his consumption of Prednisone, a steroid that affected his brain functions, Col. Aquiza said.
The doctors, who later treated Marcos in his exile in Hawaii, attributed the loss of his will to fight to his consumption of Prednisone, a steroid that affected his brain functions, Col. Aquiza said.
Although
Marcos still took his oath of office on the late morning of Feb. 25, 1986 (Cory
Aquino took her oath an hour earlier), the post-Marcos era could be said to
have started on that day. Col. Aruiza described the atmosphere of his
oath-taking as sad, indicating a lost battle. It was the last time Marcos saw
his ailing mother Josefa in life.
Soon
after he oath-taking, the Marcoses started packing whatever they could to
prepare for their exile. Sportsman Tomas Manotoc, Imee Marcos’s husband at that
time (he's now an ex), coordinated with U.S. Embassy officials. Imelda Marcos gave envelopes
containing cash to a number of Malacanang staff and soldiers, who were to be
left behind.
Presidential
Security Command officials, who were to go with the Marcoses, bade last minute goodbyes to their families. For his part, Col. Aruiza likewise talked to his
wife and kids. He likewise collected various paper and documents he had kept
for years, including Marcos’s speeches.
But
he did not forget the poignant scene, when Marcos quietly took a last glance of
his room and Malacanang hallway before he was about to board one of the four
helicopters the U.S. Embassy had dispatched for them. Malacanang staff workers
were weeping, while soldiers gave him salutes he could not return.
On
Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Aruiza said: “On the boat landing stood Gen. Ver and his
favorite son. Col. Irwin Ver, both now in civilian clothes, I wondered briefly
why they were in civvies when the rest of us were in crumpled fatigues and bush
jackets. They stuck together, whispering. No one approached them. The elder Ver
had not once issued a single command that would have benefited or relieved us
during the crisis.
“Hovering
nearby was Brig. Gen. Santiago Barangan, Ver’s durable deputy. From the very
start, Barangan had not been much of help since he did not know what was really
going on or what the plans were. His eyes were now glued to the boxes of money
piled on the floor of Heroes Hall. He assured me that our guns and ammo were
had already been sent to the North, following a previous plan.
“I
asked him what he would do once we had crossed the river. His unperturbed reply
was that he would not resist. He would soon turn over the responsibility of
protecting the Palace and the compound to the rebel officers and men. In the
absence of an order from Marcos and Ver, this was what Barangan thought the
best course of action: survival.”
Col.
Aruiza claimed Barangan was later hounded by his men, who asked for the part of
the money he allegedly spirited away. Two boxes of money in the compartment of
Barangan’s car used for transporting boxes from Malacanang to the waiting
helicopters were not given despite Barangan’s denial.
A
total of 55 people boarded the four helicopters and left on the night of Feb.
25, 1986. Hardly had they left, hordes of people entered Malacanang. The Marcos
party went to Clark Air Base. Marcos took time to clarify with U.S officials
their final destination the next morning. Until that evening, the official
destination was Laoag City in Ilocos Norte.
According
to Col. Aruiza, the Americans assured Marcos they would fly them to Laoag City
using a “fixed wing” aircraft at around 8 am the following day. They told him
to get a good rest. But they were soon roused from their sleep by U.S.
officials, who told them that NPA rebels had surrounded Clark Air Base. They
later learned that armed men led by Brig. Gen. Antonio Palafox wanted “to
extricate” the Marcos party from Clark.
Travel
plans changed on that night. Cory Aquino, the newly installed president, told
U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth she wanted the Marcoses out
of the country. When Marcos learned they would be flown out of the country, he
insisted to be flown to Laoag City so that he could form his “interim government.”
Col.
Aruiza conceded this was an issue which the Cory Aquino government foresaw. It did
not like the prospect of seeing the Marcoses regrouping in the country and
posing a threat to the newly established government. Flying them out of the
country was a controversy that later hounded the U.S. government because
according to Col. Aruiza, Marcos never wanted to leave the Philippines. He just
wanted to be flown to Laoag City.
A
U.S. Air Force plane took the Marcos party to Guam. Then, it went to Hickam
Base in Honolulu, the final destination. This was the time the Marcos party was
in the words of Col. Aruiza “humiliated.” They were asked to surrender their
weapons in what appeared to be an effort to disarm them. Later, they were asked
to surrender their passports. Before, they traveled using their diplomatic
passports, but they were all canceled by the new government.
The
original party composed of 55 persons grew to 92 in Hickam Base, when the Ver
family joined the trip to exile. Moreover, the family of crony Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr. likewise joined. The former military aide could not help but
marvel at the Ver family since they were the largest - 26 persons – to have
joined the trip to Hickam Base.
Col.
Aruiza did not forget to mince words about the key Marcos people, who had led
to them to their despicable situation. Gen. Ver, for instance, was so used to
receive orders from Marcos to the point he could not handle a crisis situation.
Moreover, he handled many positions in the Marcos government, spreading him quite
thinly.
He
also took his ire on Conrado Benitez, nicknamed Jolly, Imelda Marcos’s
controversial deputy at the human settlements ministry and favorite. Jolly
Benitez joined the Marcos party in their exile in Honolulu.
Col. Aruiza said: “People began to speculate on whether he was secretly employed by the CIA to destabilize the Marcos administration, since every project he proposed, which Mrs. Marcos promptly took up, almost always ended up a fiasco, in a blaze of publicity, the money is evaporating and nothing much to show for it, except reams of newspaper copy.
Col. Aruiza said: “People began to speculate on whether he was secretly employed by the CIA to destabilize the Marcos administration, since every project he proposed, which Mrs. Marcos promptly took up, almost always ended up a fiasco, in a blaze of publicity, the money is evaporating and nothing much to show for it, except reams of newspaper copy.
“But
nothing could seem to dislodge Benitez from Mrs. Marcos’s where he was firmly
implanted.
“They
were so inseparable that gossip began to circulate about a possible romantic
dalliance, but nothing could be farther from the truth and more absurd. What
they shared was something deadlier than a dalliance, partnership that spelled
disaster for the president and the country.
“A
man who had made sycophancy an art, Benitez filled Mrs. Marcos’s head with all
sorts of notions, including the one that compelled her to hold audiences in
captive thrall while she discussed weighty subjects, drawing holds on a
blackboard to explain the mysteries of the stratosphere.”
Inside
the Palace, Col. Aruiza said Benitez was despised and called names, of which
“Rasputin” and “panderer” stuck. The hatred stemmed mainly from the way Benitez
openly bragged that he “controlled” Mrs. Marcos’s mind.
The
Marcos party arrived in Honolulu on the late morning of February 26, 1986,
Honolulu time. Reality soon dawned on the Marcos party when the U.S. customs
authorities employed strict customs policies and practices on their luggage and
other cargoes they brought with them.
Col. Aruiza claimed that they had brought with them P61 million of unspent campaign funds, but only P25 million reached Hickam, as two duffel bags disappeared on U.S. Embassy, when the captain of the boat carrying luggage and money was asked to go to there.
Col. Aruiza claimed that they had brought with them P61 million of unspent campaign funds, but only P25 million reached Hickam, as two duffel bags disappeared on U.S. Embassy, when the captain of the boat carrying luggage and money was asked to go to there.
In
the dictator’s view, according to Col. Aruiza, the Americans hoodwinked Marcos
by telling him they would take him to Ilocos but virtually “kidnapped” him when
he was brought to Honolulu against his will. This was the particular line the
Marcoses have been peddling until now.
Hardly
the Marcoses had settled in Honolulu when the first case was filed by the
Aquino government against them. It was about the recovery of the Philippine
money which the Marcos party took with them to Honolulu. It did not take long
for the Marcoses to hire the first lawyer.
They have somewhat anticipated a flurry of court cases against them while in exile in Honolulu. Col. Aruiza could not forget Marcos paying $1 million to a law firm with a balance of $900,000 in 1986.
They have somewhat anticipated a flurry of court cases against them while in exile in Honolulu. Col. Aruiza could not forget Marcos paying $1 million to a law firm with a balance of $900,000 in 1986.
(Last
of a four-part series)
FERDINAND
Marcos, his family, and key lieutenants and cronies ran like a bunch of
defeated dogs with their proverbial tails at their back. Had
the Americans failed to help them to escape the people’s wrath on the balmy
night of February 25, 1986, they would have been dead meat. But fate did not go
to the extreme on that memorable night. They later escaped to go on exile in
Hawaii.
The
U.S. government immediately gave Ferdinand Marcos the “distinguished visitor”
status upon his arrival in Honolulu. It was a title as hollow as one could
imagine because it did not give him outright special privileges. It merely
conferred legitimacy to his prolonged stay on the U.S. soil.
The
Marcoses were first billeted in Hickam Base, the military camp ran by the U.S.
Air Force. Col. Arturo Aruiza, the ex-dictator’s military camp, would not
forget the stream of Filipino visitors, who, after passing the sniffing dogs, breached
the barricade at Hickam Base so that they could pay a visit to the Marcoses.
These
included Frankie Teodoro and son, Tomas; Remedios Ramos, wife of architect
Jorge Ramos and daughter Georgina; radio host Rod Navarro; lawyer Juan T.
David; youth leader Alex Villalon (quite old to qualify as youth leader); Capt.
Adelio Cruz of the MIA Limousine Service; Cocoy Romualdez and family; Joan
Benitez, Jolly Benitez’s second wife after Betty Bantug, who perished in a car
accident in Tagaytay City; Ambassador J. V. Cruz; Marcos loyalist Jose Lazo,
who formed a group called “Bolo Brigade” to support Marcos’s comeback to power;
and journalist Sol Vanzi, who cooked food for the Marcoses.
Several
curious things happened during their sojourn there. During their stay at Hickam
Base, a certain Dr. Ross, a purported representative of Ghana, a country in
western Africa, went to Marcos to offer him a sanctuary there. Gemmo Trinidad,
who also doubled as spokesman, went to Ghana, but returned “downhearted”
because Ghana had no modern telecommunications and medical facilities. “It
would be dangerous for Marcos to be ill in Ghana,” Col. Aruiza wrote.
At
the height of the EDSA People Power Revolution, Singapore, through its ambassador
to the Philippines, offered political sanctuary to Marcos only to say a month
later, i.e. after they landed in Honolulu, that the offer no longer stood. It
was somewhat a slap on his face, although Col. Aruiza did not discuss their
disappointment.
Col.
Aruiza discussed their early days at Hickam Base as specific moments for
reflection, as they tried to recall the circumstances and reasons for the
downfall. There were many “buts” and “if only,” and of course, the
barrendipitous “why not?” (Barrendity is the opposite of serendipity, which
means a pleasant discovery.)
Imelda
Marcos tried to look what could be the other side saying the people’s
revolution was a “blessing in disguise” because they could concentrate on
Marcos’s illness and that they were simply undergoing what she ridiculously
referred as “period of purification.” But Col. Aruiza said their concern was
not just the health of Marcos, but his legal problems as well, which were
piling up one after the other.
In
the end, Marcos decided to return to the Philippines. “He would negotiate for
his return to the Philippines, either directly or through the intercession of
another country. Already, he was uneasy about the American government’s plans
for him. He distrusted the man around Reagan, principally those in the State
Department,” Col. Aruiza said.
It
was a plan that somehow backfired, as Marcos became a magnet for con men, who
presented him with elaborate plans for his return to the Philippines. These con
men, who presented impeccable – and impressive, but fake – credentials, somehow
convinced Marcos that adopting their plans would enable him to get back to
power. As con men, they just milked Marcos.
Col.
Aruiza recalled how Marcos confided him many details, including the legal suits
brought against him in the U.S. and his plan to leave Honolulu for another
country. He said Marcos planned to leave to Panama, but then president Manuel
Noriega wanted a weekly payment of P350,000 as surcharge “on top of an unspecified
amount which could run to millions of dollars.”
They
did not stay long as a group in Hickam Base, according to Col. Aruiza. That
party that left Manila on the fateful night of Feb. 25, 1986 left Marcos to go
their separate ways. Unaccustomed to the boredom of a political exile, they
went and stay on various parts and places – known and unknown. Among them was
Fe Roa Gimenez, Imelda’s confidante, who left without failing to steal a part
of the Marcos loot.
After
a month at Hickam Base, the Marcoses transferred to a three room apartment on
the eastern edge of Honolulu, where hordes of Honolulu-based Marcos loyalists
pestered them. Newly named Honolulu-based consul general Tomas “Buddy” Gomez
III proved to a thorn on their necks, as he kept on tracking them there.
Col.
Aruiza did not lose sight of the people, who took advantage of the Marcoses. He
narrated how he saw Mrs. Nguyen Cao Ky, wife of the fallen vice president of
South Vietnam, who hurriedly left the Marcoses’ apartment, bringing with her a
black case that contained Imelda’s jewelry worth $2 million. Mr. Cao Ky
disappeared and they never saw her again. She was said to have reached the
mainland.
(It
was not clear who was the Mrs. Cao Ky. The former vice president had two wives.
– PL)
Because
of the numerous law suits he had to face in the U.S., Marcos had considered
several proposals for him to go elsewhere, some of which were ridiculous. The
King of Tonga, a country in South Pacific, offered his country on the condition
that Marcos would build the airport and new hotels. Paraguay, a country in
South America, likewise offered on the condition that he would invest his loot
there. Marcos did not bite, according to his military aide.
Marcos
considered an offer from an agent of the Mexican government named Jesse Monroy, who negotiated with him for his transfer to Mexico. But Col. Aruiza
said U.S officials bullied Monroy, forcing him to terminate talks for the transfer of
the fallen dictator. Marcos tried to find out Spain as a destination, but it
was no dice for him.
By
mid-June 1986, Gen. Fabian Ver, the fallen AFP chief of staff who was largely
blamed for the downfall, left for an unnamed Asian city (it was later
identified as Singapore - PL). It was the first time that he had left Marcos. “A few
of us nursed the romantic notion that Ver left to prepare for Marcos’s return
and we believed this for a long time, until we realized that Ver had left to
look out for himself,” Col. Aruiza said.
Orlando
Dulay, a retired Phil Constabulary colonel, a former member of Batasang
Pambansa and governor of Quirino, brought two American friends, who were
working for the CIA. – Col. Roberto Steele and Gen. Lee Dicker. According to
Col. Aruiza. Dulay was proposing that the purported CIA agents would work for his
return to the Philippines for a fee of P180,000. No less than a State
Department official confirmed to Col. Aruiza that the two American agents were
con men.
Marcos
later transferred to the house in the Makiki Heights, where he stayed until
his death in 1989.
Col. Aruiza said the con men were not limited to Americans. Even Filipinos exacted money from the fallen dictator. Two retired army colonels proposed to work for Marcos return to power in exchange for P400 million. He did not bite, Col. Aruiza said, adding that the two con men even sowed intrigues, when they told that Col. Aruiza was working for the CIA by informing Fidel Ramos of the goings on in Honolulu.
Col. Aruiza said the con men were not limited to Americans. Even Filipinos exacted money from the fallen dictator. Two retired army colonels proposed to work for Marcos return to power in exchange for P400 million. He did not bite, Col. Aruiza said, adding that the two con men even sowed intrigues, when they told that Col. Aruiza was working for the CIA by informing Fidel Ramos of the goings on in Honolulu.
A
con man named Richard Hirchfeld imitated the voice of Muhammad Ali, who was in
Manila for the 1975 “Thrilla in Manila,” where he fought Jose Frazier. The con
man claimed he was being instructed by Ali to work for his return to the
Philippines.
He and his associate Richard Chastain claimed they could work for the return of Marcos by working with AFP guys, buying firearms, and facilitating a loan of $25 million from a Saudi Arabian prince.
He and his associate Richard Chastain claimed they could work for the return of Marcos by working with AFP guys, buying firearms, and facilitating a loan of $25 million from a Saudi Arabian prince.
Col.
Aruiza did not lose sight to name the actors and actresses who visited Marcos:
Sharon Cuneta and her mother Elaine; Leroy Salvador and younger sister Alona;
producer Vic del Rosario and wife Mina Aragon; Vivian Velez; and singers Becca
Godinez, Cecilia Azarcon, Florante, and Hajji Alejandro.
Chichay, Bert Marcelo, Herbert Bautista, and Lirio Vital likewise visited Marcos in 1987. Regular fixtures were Marichu Maceda, Imelda Papin, and also concert singer Ida Ong.
Chichay, Bert Marcelo, Herbert Bautista, and Lirio Vital likewise visited Marcos in 1987. Regular fixtures were Marichu Maceda, Imelda Papin, and also concert singer Ida Ong.
