THE POST-EDSA LIFE OF FERDINAND MARCOS

I’VE DECIDED TO PUT THE FOUR-PART SERIES OF FERDINAND MARCOS’S POST-EDSA LIFE IN A SINGLE WHOLE FOR EVERYBODY TO READ …

THE LIFE OF FERDINAND MARCOS AFTER HIS DICTATORSHIP

By Philip M. Lustre, Jr.

(First of four part series)

N.B. I was lucky to have borrowed a book authored by the late Col. Arturo Aruiza re the post-EDSA life of Ferdinand Marcos. Col. Aruiza was the dictator’s aide de camp for many years and saw many details in Marcos's colorful life. He detailed how a bunch of alleged supporters and con men badgered the fallen dictator on his possible return to the Philippines. His first-person account gives credence to assertion that Marcos had to deal with shady characters in his frustrated bid to return to the Philippines and recover his lost throne at Malacanang and power.

As told by people in the know, Col. Aruiza gathered every document and conceivable piece of information to back up his narratives. Readers could not agree on his impressions and conclusions, but his facts were straightforward and had a touch of scholarship. When I read his book, I am convinced that Marcos was amply punished by the kind of life he had as a political has-been. Where before he wielded power over the life and fate of many people - and the entire nation, Marcos, in his exile in Hawaii, was essentially a plaything of fate. He was not in control of his circumstances. Nothing could be worse than being regarded a political leper in the community of nations. That was Marcos.

Ferdinand E. Marcos

Malacanang to Makiki

By Arturo C. Aruiza

Published by ACAruisa Enterprises,

490 pages, 1991

FERDINAND Marcos’s fabled life as democratic president for seven years and dictator for thirteen years was a far cry from what he had after his downfall. As president and dictator, Marcos dealt with the best and brightest to exact favors, neutralize, or bring down his enemies, and maintain his grip on political power - come hell or high water.

In Makiki Heights in Hawaii, where he stayed as an exile – or a pathetic political has-been - until his death in 1989, Marcos had to deal with the following:

• first, unruly supporters and favor seekers, who hardly contributed for his much ballyhooed return to the Philippines;

• second, con men, mostly Americans and some Filipinos, who presented  him with impressive and elaborate but unrealistic plans for his return, but collected huge sums of money for plans that did not materialize;

• third, lawyers who represented him in cases in U.S. courts and collected handsome lawyers’ fees; and

• fourth, U.S. immigration and customs officials, who treated him and his family with sublime and unmitigated condescension.

It was a far cry from the life of pelf, power, and privilege which Marcos had at his prime. As a fallen dictator, he was at the mercy of the vagaries and vicissitudes of the political dynamics of his time, particularly his waning years when he was a political exile in the United States.

As his long-time military aide had admitted, Marcos never had it so bad until his largely unforeseen downfall. Forlorn and decrepit, Marcos was helpless, powerless, and witless to assert whatever legitimacy he was claiming to the presidency. He was never in his cunning and sharp element unlike when he was in power.

Either by omission or commission, Col. Arturo Aruiza, however, did not disclose how Marcos plotted his return to the Philippines, including how he spent tons of his loot to finance the reported acts of destabilization - or series of military coups and spate of protest demonstrations - against the Cory Aquino government. It was something understandable but not necessarily forgivable.

Col. Aruiza’s book took off on the high noon of February 22, 1986, when the dictator called him to his room in Malacanang. He hardly had any inkling that a momentous, historic political cataclysm was to start on that day, although he was surprised when Marcos had ordered the cancellation of their weekend day-off. 

He saw U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth and Philip Habib, U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s “trouble shooter, being ushered to the Study Room to meet the dictator.

Then, he narrated major antecedents to the fateful four-day 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution that led to the downfall of his hero and their subsequent banishment from the Philippines to go on an exile in the U.S. state of Hawaii. His recollections reflected a heavy dosage of rancor and bitterness, as if the fallen dictator did not make mistakes to cause massive poverty for the Filipino people.

Showing tu quoque arguments (literally “you too”), Col. Aquiza said the massive electoral cheating and irregularities in the 1986 “snap” presidential polls could not be blamed on Marcos alone because even the camp of Corazon Aquino, the opposition candidate whom Marcos faced in the 1986 "snap" presidential elections, allegedly committed them. Moreover, watchdog Namfrel was not neutral and indeed partisan to Ms. Aquino. He did not present proofs of cheating by the Cory Aquino camp.

Col. Aruiza vented an unusual dosage of umbrage to Washington, which according to him openly sided with Mrs. Aquino, not Marcos. In his limited view, both Marcos and Cory Aquino's camps cheated in the elections. Hence, it could not be blamed solely on Marcos but Mrs. Aquino as well. Still, no proof of Cory Aquino's alleged cheating was presented.

Marcos, Habib, and Bosworth, in their fateful meeting at noon of Feb. 22, 1986, could not help but review the conduct and outcome of the Feb. 7, 1986 presidential elections, where Marcos was proclaimed “winner” by the Batasang Pambansa, the rubber stamp legislature during the latter part of the Marcos dictatorship.

They later discussed on the touchy subject of Gen. Fabian Ver, Armed Forces Chief of Staff and head of the dreaded nationwide intelligence network created by Marcos to neutralize his political enemies. As usual, Marcos resisted the pressures of the two U.S. officials, who expressed the desire of the Reagan administration to retire Ver and replace him with somebody else.

Col. Aruiza said: “We on the staff wondered why the president stubbornly retained, at such peril to him. Not only Ver was an overstaying general, but he was also an ineffectual one. He was spread too thin, burdened with too many responsibilities. He carried too many titles, ran too many offices, none of them well, and together with his sons, was the object of bitterness in some sectors of the Armed Forces.”

Ver appeared during their meeting, prompting Marcos to excuse himself to meet him. Upon return to the two officials, Marcos informed them of an impending coup, but Habib and Bosworth, according to Col. Aruiza, “hardly reacted." The two officials “remained impassive,” hinting that they knew beforehand the planned coup by a military faction reputedly loyal to defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Reform the Armed Forces Movement of Col. Gregorio Honasan. The meeting with Habib ended without any conclusion.

Col. Aruiza discussed the coup plot, which Col. Irwin Ver, one of the three military sons of Gen. Ver, discovered sometime in December, 1985. The young Ver confided the coup plot to his father on Feb. 16, 1986, after which they saw Marcos to inform him. It forced Marcos to augment the Palace security by assigning units of the Philippine Army to its defense perimeter.

The issue of overstaying generals nagged the Marcos dictatorship. By extending the tenure of favored military generals every six months, the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) surfaced. Even Col. Aruiza did not agree to the unilateral extension of their military tenure because it showed that Marcos did not trust the younger guys to take their place. Marcos, in his interview with Honolulu Advertiser on July 29, 1986, expressed regret, saying he should have followed advice of the visiting U.S. officials.

Ver was not only perceived as favored but ineffective, according to the former military aide. Ver influenced greatly the promotions and assignments of officers, indicating Marcos’s loss of control over the military, he said. In brief, he was a major factor in determining whether the careers of military officers would prosper or stagnate. “Extension was the rule, not exemption,” he said.

Col. Aruiza said: “Martial law gave the military a taste of civilian power and they liked it. Marcos paid more attention to them than to the local officials. Most officers took to the good life quickly and naturally.”

Citing another antecedent to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, Col. Aruiza cited the visit sometime in October, 1985 of Sen. Paul Laxalt, who succeeded to exact from Marcos a commitment to hold “snap” presidential elections mainly to defuse the growing tension in the Philippines because it was perceived to have a president without any mandate from the Filipino people.

Where stream of U.S. officials, including CIA chief William Casey, had earlier failed to convince Marcos to call for presidential elections, Laxalt successfully convinced Marcos to call one, not because he bargained hard, but because he entertained Marcos. He touched on the dictator’s weakness: war memories. Laxalt was a soldier, who saw action in southern Philippines in the last world war.

Col. Aruiza said: “Laxalt touched on the president’s own war record and his guerilla past, and I could see Marcos glow with Laxalt’s overtures. Laxalt ran down his own list of friends in Washington that he said the president could depend upon. I could tell the president was melting before Laxalt’s reassurances, his seeming frankness, and his sense of humor. By bringing up his war memories, Laxalt held the president’s attention.”

Incidentally, Paul Laxalt was the same senator, who advised Marcos by telephone on the early morning of February 25, 1986 “to cut and cut cleanly” to indicate the Reagan administration’s withdrawal of support to his dictatorship. 

Laxalt, in brief, functioned as the virtual pallbearer of gloom and doom. In his 1985 meeting with Marcos, Laxalt secured a letter from Marcos addressed to Reagan, assuring him he would call presidential elections.

(Second of a four-part series)

COL. Arturo Aruiza, the loyal, dependable, and honest military aide-de-camp of the fallen dictator Ferdinand Marcos could not contain bitterness in his memoirs. The explanation is simple: Marcos was a loser and Col. Aruiza belonged to the losing camp. 

Hence, his book contains details that justified the losses inflicted by the political enemies of Marcos and the Filipino people, who, in their exercise of their sovereign right, kicked Marcos and his ilk out of Malacanang and sent them to a political exile to some parts known and unknown.

Col. Aruiza’s political theory was Washington, particularly the people in the State Department, had conspired with the political opposition then led by Corazon Aquino, widow of the martyr Benigno Aquino Jr. The antecedents that led to the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution saw the heavy hand of Washington, whose officials took turns to pressure Marcos to take the route to restore democracy.

He was bitter about Washington’s intervention, although he never took time to explain that Washington’s interventionist policy those days was largely a function of Marcos’s refusal to restore democracy. Marcos continued to rule with an iron hand without a mandate from the Filipino people. The February 7, 1986 “snap” presidential elections could have provided him the mandate to showcase to the entire world that he enjoyed the popular support of the Filipino people. As history showed, it did not happen though.

The Marcos legacy is comprised of three major issues: first, centralized corruption, where the dictator received fat, under-the-table commissions from foreign proponents of big state projects; second, crony capitalism, where a stable of friends and cronies cornered agricultural and service monopolies; and third, massive human rights violations, where tens of thousands of political activists, opposition leaders, religious and community workers, youth leaders, peasant and labor leaders, civil society workers, among others were arrested and detained without charges, tortured, and summarily executed. In a number of cases, they had disappeared without any trace and explanation until today.

Col. Aruiza hardly mentioned the Marcos legacy in his book. Neither did he ever say that Marcos had overstayed in power and the snap presidential electoral process was just another step to perpetuate himself in power. Neither did he ever put the blame on his boss, who virtually touched the nerve of history because he never wanted to leave Malacanang for the rest of his life.

Philip Habib, President Ronald Reagan “troubleshooter,” and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth reacted impassively in their meeting on the noon of Feb. 22, 1986 with Ferdinand Marcos, who dutifully informed them of an impending coup. 

Truth was, they knew of the coup by the group of defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan, and a faction of the military. According to Col. Aruiza, no less than Honasan informed the U.S. Embassy officials of the planned military coup, which was to be initiated on Feb. 15, 1986, but had to be postponed to Feb. 22.

Honasan did it to obtain support of the U.S. government, according to the former military aide. Hence, U.S. officials even to the highest levels knew that a coup was brewing. 

In fact, Habib was quoted as saying: ”Something is going to happen.” That was after he finished his meeting with Marcos and was about to leave for Washington on the night of Feb. 22, 1986, Col. Aruiza said.

The truth, according to the military aide, was that Washington rejected “extraconstitutional means” to obtain power. Washington would only give its political support if the coup was an “enlightened self-defense.” No less than a key U.S. Embassy official stated Washington’s position in a talk with Honasan and two other RAM officials. Hence, the operative phrase was "enlightened self-defense."

The military aide gave credence that the Feb. 22, 1986 early morning arrest of the security men of then Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin was the single spark that prompted Enrile and the RAM-led military faction to retreat and hold out at the defense building in Camp Aguinaldo on the night of the same day. 

Enrile and RAM regarded the arrest of Ongpin’s security men, mostly RAM members, as a development that indicated the coup plan was compromised. According to Col. Aruiza the truth was the Ver faction knew of the coup plan as early as December, 1985, although it was only disclosed to Marcos on Feb. 15, 1986.

Ongpin and Ver never saw eye-to-eye. Those days, Ongpin was the most powerful economic manager. Marcos trusted him. Marcos recruited him from the private sector to comprise the technocratic team that ran the Philippine economy. The other technocrat was Prime Minister and concurrent Finance Minister Cesar Virata. 

Those days, Ongpin managed the so-called “Binondo Central Bank,” the parallel underground market that controlled foreign exchange trading. It was described as a “necessary evil,” as Chinese Filipino businessmen were allowed to trade dollar earnings at a higher rate.

Ongpin had a man arrested when he learned that the latter paid a “friendly fee” of P300,000 to Edna Camcam, Ver’s alleged "special friend." According to Col. Aruiza, Ver called Ongpin several times to facilitate his release, but Ongpin ignored his calls. Hence, Ongpin felt frantic when Ver ordered the arrest of his security men, who were doing early morning exercises. Despite Ongpin’s protest, Ver did not order their release.

According to Col. Aruiza, the Palace learned that Enrile and AFP vice chief of staff Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos were holed up in Camp Aguinaldo only by 6:30 pm of Feb. 22, 1986. By all standards, Malacanang got it quite late. But he said the breakaway of the two officials was largely a function of the enmity between Enrile and Imelda and Ramos and Ver.

(Let me provide my own recollection because I was among the journalists, who covered the breakaway of Enrile and Ramos. It was quite unusual that Malacanang learned of this major development late in the day. Journalists – local and foreign – had the information as early as 2 pm. Upon learning it in mid-afternoon, we rushed to Camp Aguinaldo and waited there for three or four hours for developments. In a separate blog, I said that Ver’s men knew of the development in late afternoon, but withheld telling him because he and Imelda Marcos were attending as sponsors of the wedding of Philip Piccio, son of Major General Vicente Piccio, the Philippine Air Force chief, in Camp Villamor in Pasay City.)

Describing the coup plot that later became a mutiny, Col Aruiza said: “This was not a plot of short standing, recently hatched, born from impulse, but one of long and precipitate planning , carefully nurtured and perfected , springing from mixed motives, some noble, some dark. The plot failed, but promptly resurfaced as the unplanned mutiny, with the same cast, and this would entangle the lives of its principals, returning to haunt all of its conspirators, giving them no peace, and many of those who celebrated the fall of Marcos would end up embittered, regretting EDSA.”

At one point, Col. Aruiza discussed the dictator’s illness, which was then a tightly guarded secret. He had a long history of kidney failure, which started when Marcos contracted malaria, while allegedly doing guerilla works in 1944. According to him, Marcos treated himself with crude extract of cinchona bark and quinacrine (anti-malarial) tablets, which was a deadly combination. Marcos paid dearly with his damaged kidneys. 

Henceforth, Marcos, because of his failing kidneys, had problems with his blood pressure. He had to resort to dialysis treatment.

Col. Aruiza said Marcos was literally dying “bit by bit, day by day,” although he was indeed adroit to hide his real health condition. Twice in his foreign visits, he went on water skiing, projecting that he was not ill at all. 

He confirmed that Marcos had two kidney transplants. The first transplant took place on August 7, 1983 with Bongbong Marcos as donor. But his body rejected it and on Nov. 26, 1984, Marcos had the second kidney transplant with an unidentified relative as donor.

Fast track to Feb. 25, 1986: Ferdinand Marcos and his family, with their fate written on the palm of their hands, spent the day packing for a journey they had yet to know. They knew they were to leave Malacanang. They knew they were losing in the power game. But that was another story.

(Third of a four-part series)

IN the fog of any ongoing war, revolution, rebellion or any political cataclysm, fortunes could change abruptly. There is no definitive template to succeed or lose in the battle for the heart and mind of the people. Any momentous event just cascades to its rightful and sweeping conclusion. This happened in the four-day 1986 EDSA People Revolution.

Allies and friends, whom he nurtured during his ill-fated dictatorship, suddenly turned their backs on him. The mass exodus of military leaders, political allies, and other key people led to his downfall. Col. Aruiza did not blame Marcos; he was a loyal flunkey. 

He predictably, albeit bitterly, put the blame on the conspiracy of Washington, whose top officials worked furiously on his downfall, the political opposition led by Corazon Aquino, and disloyal allies.

When the clock struck midnight of Feb. 25, 1986, the political fate of Marcos was almost sealed. His grip to power was slipping fast. As the foregone loser, Marcos would have to leave Malacanang. No matter how he tried, Marcos could hardly salvage a last minute deal. All cards were stacked against him.

According to Col. Aruiza, Marcos at that time was no longer the same Marcos he knew before. He was no longer the aggressive, audacious, and cunning Marcos, who left nothing to chance. Sick and tired, Marcos lost his will to fight. 

The doctors, who later treated Marcos in his exile in Hawaii, attributed the loss of his will to fight to his consumption of Prednisone, a steroid that affected his brain functions, Col. Aquiza said.

Although Marcos still took his oath of office on the late morning of Feb. 25, 1986 (Cory Aquino took her oath an hour earlier), the post-Marcos era could be said to have started on that day. Col. Aruiza described the atmosphere of his oath-taking as sad, indicating a lost battle. It was the last time Marcos saw his ailing mother Josefa in life.

Soon after he oath-taking, the Marcoses started packing whatever they could to prepare for their exile. Sportsman Tomas Manotoc, Imee Marcos’s husband at that time (he's now an ex), coordinated with U.S. Embassy officials. Imelda Marcos gave envelopes containing cash to a number of Malacanang staff and soldiers, who were to be left behind.

Presidential Security Command officials, who were to go with the Marcoses, bade last minute goodbyes to their families. For his part, Col. Aruiza likewise talked to his wife and kids. He likewise collected various paper and documents he had kept for years, including Marcos’s speeches.

But he did not forget the poignant scene, when Marcos quietly took a last glance of his room and Malacanang hallway before he was about to board one of the four helicopters the U.S. Embassy had dispatched for them. Malacanang staff workers were weeping, while soldiers gave him salutes he could not return.

On Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Aruiza said: “On the boat landing stood Gen. Ver and his favorite son. Col. Irwin Ver, both now in civilian clothes, I wondered briefly why they were in civvies when the rest of us were in crumpled fatigues and bush jackets. They stuck together, whispering. No one approached them. The elder Ver had not once issued a single command that would have benefited or relieved us during the crisis.

“Hovering nearby was Brig. Gen. Santiago Barangan, Ver’s durable deputy. From the very start, Barangan had not been much of help since he did not know what was really going on or what the plans were. His eyes were now glued to the boxes of money piled on the floor of Heroes Hall. He assured me that our guns and ammo were had already been sent to the North, following a previous plan.

“I asked him what he would do once we had crossed the river. His unperturbed reply was that he would not resist. He would soon turn over the responsibility of protecting the Palace and the compound to the rebel officers and men. In the absence of an order from Marcos and Ver, this was what Barangan thought the best course of action: survival.”

Col. Aruiza claimed Barangan was later hounded by his men, who asked for the part of the money he allegedly spirited away. Two boxes of money in the compartment of Barangan’s car used for transporting boxes from Malacanang to the waiting helicopters were not given despite Barangan’s denial.

A total of 55 people boarded the four helicopters and left on the night of Feb. 25, 1986. Hardly had they left, hordes of people entered Malacanang. The Marcos party went to Clark Air Base. Marcos took time to clarify with U.S officials their final destination the next morning. Until that evening, the official destination was Laoag City in Ilocos Norte.

According to Col. Aruiza, the Americans assured Marcos they would fly them to Laoag City using a “fixed wing” aircraft at around 8 am the following day. They told him to get a good rest. But they were soon roused from their sleep by U.S. officials, who told them that NPA rebels had surrounded Clark Air Base. They later learned that armed men led by Brig. Gen. Antonio Palafox wanted “to extricate” the Marcos party from Clark.

Travel plans changed on that night. Cory Aquino, the newly installed president, told U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Stephen Bosworth she wanted the Marcoses out of the country. When Marcos learned they would be flown out of the country, he insisted to be flown to Laoag City so that he could form his “interim government.”

Col. Aruiza conceded this was an issue which the Cory Aquino government foresaw. It did not like the prospect of seeing the Marcoses regrouping in the country and posing a threat to the newly established government. Flying them out of the country was a controversy that later hounded the U.S. government because according to Col. Aruiza, Marcos never wanted to leave the Philippines. He just wanted to be flown to Laoag City.

A U.S. Air Force plane took the Marcos party to Guam. Then, it went to Hickam Base in Honolulu, the final destination. This was the time the Marcos party was in the words of Col. Aruiza “humiliated.” They were asked to surrender their weapons in what appeared to be an effort to disarm them. Later, they were asked to surrender their passports. Before, they traveled using their diplomatic passports, but they were all canceled by the new government.

The original party composed of 55 persons grew to 92 in Hickam Base, when the Ver family joined the trip to exile. Moreover, the family of crony Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. likewise joined. The former military aide could not help but marvel at the Ver family since they were the largest - 26 persons – to have joined the trip to Hickam Base.

Col. Aruiza did not forget to mince words about the key Marcos people, who had led to them to their despicable situation. Gen. Ver, for instance, was so used to receive orders from Marcos to the point he could not handle a crisis situation. Moreover, he handled many positions in the Marcos government, spreading him quite thinly.

He also took his ire on Conrado Benitez, nicknamed Jolly, Imelda Marcos’s controversial deputy at the human settlements ministry and favorite. Jolly Benitez joined the Marcos party in their exile in Honolulu. 

Col. Aruiza said: “People began to speculate on whether he was secretly employed by the CIA to destabilize the Marcos administration, since every project he proposed, which Mrs. Marcos promptly took up, almost always ended up a fiasco, in a blaze of publicity, the money is evaporating and nothing much to show for it, except reams of newspaper copy.

“But nothing could seem to dislodge Benitez from Mrs. Marcos’s where he was firmly implanted.

“They were so inseparable that gossip began to circulate about a possible romantic dalliance, but nothing could be farther from the truth and more absurd. What they shared was something deadlier than a dalliance, partnership that spelled disaster for the president and the country.

“A man who had made sycophancy an art, Benitez filled Mrs. Marcos’s head with all sorts of notions, including the one that compelled her to hold audiences in captive thrall while she discussed weighty subjects, drawing holds on a blackboard to explain the mysteries of the stratosphere.”

Inside the Palace, Col. Aruiza said Benitez was despised and called names, of which “Rasputin” and “panderer” stuck. The hatred stemmed mainly from the way Benitez openly bragged that he “controlled” Mrs. Marcos’s mind.

The Marcos party arrived in Honolulu on the late morning of February 26, 1986, Honolulu time. Reality soon dawned on the Marcos party when the U.S. customs authorities employed strict customs policies and practices on their luggage and other cargoes they brought with them. 

Col. Aruiza claimed that they had brought with them P61 million of unspent campaign funds, but only P25 million reached Hickam, as two duffel bags disappeared on U.S. Embassy, when the captain of the boat carrying luggage and money was asked to go to there.

In the dictator’s view, according to Col. Aruiza, the Americans hoodwinked Marcos by telling him they would take him to Ilocos but virtually “kidnapped” him when he was brought to Honolulu against his will. This was the particular line the Marcoses have been peddling until now.

Hardly the Marcoses had settled in Honolulu when the first case was filed by the Aquino government against them. It was about the recovery of the Philippine money which the Marcos party took with them to Honolulu. It did not take long for the Marcoses to hire the first lawyer. 

They have somewhat anticipated a flurry of court cases against them while in exile in Honolulu. Col. Aruiza could not forget Marcos paying $1 million to a law firm with a balance of $900,000 in 1986.

(Last of a four-part series)

FERDINAND Marcos, his family, and key lieutenants and cronies ran like a bunch of defeated dogs with their proverbial tails at their back. Had the Americans failed to help them to escape the people’s wrath on the balmy night of February 25, 1986, they would have been dead meat. But fate did not go to the extreme on that memorable night. They later escaped to go on exile in Hawaii.

The U.S. government immediately gave Ferdinand Marcos the “distinguished visitor” status upon his arrival in Honolulu. It was a title as hollow as one could imagine because it did not give him outright special privileges. It merely conferred legitimacy to his prolonged stay on the U.S. soil.

The Marcoses were first billeted in Hickam Base, the military camp ran by the U.S. Air Force. Col. Arturo Aruiza, the ex-dictator’s military camp, would not forget the stream of Filipino visitors, who, after passing the sniffing dogs, breached the barricade at Hickam Base so that they could pay a visit to the Marcoses.

These included Frankie Teodoro and son, Tomas; Remedios Ramos, wife of architect Jorge Ramos and daughter Georgina; radio host Rod Navarro; lawyer Juan T. David; youth leader Alex Villalon (quite old to qualify as youth leader); Capt. Adelio Cruz of the MIA Limousine Service; Cocoy Romualdez and family; Joan Benitez, Jolly Benitez’s second wife after Betty Bantug, who perished in a car accident in Tagaytay City; Ambassador J. V. Cruz; Marcos loyalist Jose Lazo, who formed a group called “Bolo Brigade” to support Marcos’s comeback to power; and journalist Sol Vanzi, who cooked food for the Marcoses.

Several curious things happened during their sojourn there. During their stay at Hickam Base, a certain Dr. Ross, a purported representative of Ghana, a country in western Africa, went to Marcos to offer him a sanctuary there. Gemmo Trinidad, who also doubled as spokesman, went to Ghana, but returned “downhearted” because Ghana had no modern telecommunications and medical facilities. “It would be dangerous for Marcos to be ill in Ghana,” Col. Aruiza wrote.

At the height of the EDSA People Power Revolution, Singapore, through its ambassador to the Philippines, offered political sanctuary to Marcos only to say a month later, i.e. after they landed in Honolulu, that the offer no longer stood. It was somewhat a slap on his face, although Col. Aruiza did not discuss their disappointment.

Col. Aruiza discussed their early days at Hickam Base as specific moments for reflection, as they tried to recall the circumstances and reasons for the downfall. There were many “buts” and “if only,” and of course, the barrendipitous “why not?” (Barrendity is the opposite of serendipity, which means a pleasant discovery.)

Imelda Marcos tried to look what could be the other side saying the people’s revolution was a “blessing in disguise” because they could concentrate on Marcos’s illness and that they were simply undergoing what she ridiculously referred as “period of purification.” But Col. Aruiza said their concern was not just the health of Marcos, but his legal problems as well, which were piling up one after the other.

In the end, Marcos decided to return to the Philippines. “He would negotiate for his return to the Philippines, either directly or through the intercession of another country. Already, he was uneasy about the American government’s plans for him. He distrusted the man around Reagan, principally those in the State Department,” Col. Aruiza said.

It was a plan that somehow backfired, as Marcos became a magnet for con men, who presented him with elaborate plans for his return to the Philippines. These con men, who presented impeccable – and impressive, but fake – credentials, somehow convinced Marcos that adopting their plans would enable him to get back to power. As con men, they just milked Marcos.

Col. Aruiza recalled how Marcos confided him many details, including the legal suits brought against him in the U.S. and his plan to leave Honolulu for another country. He said Marcos planned to leave to Panama, but then president Manuel Noriega wanted a weekly payment of P350,000 as surcharge “on top of an unspecified amount which could run to millions of dollars.”

They did not stay long as a group in Hickam Base, according to Col. Aruiza. That party that left Manila on the fateful night of Feb. 25, 1986 left Marcos to go their separate ways. Unaccustomed to the boredom of a political exile, they went and stay on various parts and places – known and unknown. Among them was Fe Roa Gimenez, Imelda’s confidante, who left without failing to steal a part of the Marcos loot.

After a month at Hickam Base, the Marcoses transferred to a three room apartment on the eastern edge of Honolulu, where hordes of Honolulu-based Marcos loyalists pestered them. Newly named Honolulu-based consul general Tomas “Buddy” Gomez III proved to a thorn on their necks, as he kept on tracking them there.

Col. Aruiza did not lose sight of the people, who took advantage of the Marcoses. He narrated how he saw Mrs. Nguyen Cao Ky, wife of the fallen vice president of South Vietnam, who hurriedly left the Marcoses’ apartment, bringing with her a black case that contained Imelda’s jewelry worth $2 million. Mr. Cao Ky disappeared and they never saw her again. She was said to have reached the mainland.

(It was not clear who was the Mrs. Cao Ky. The former vice president had two wives. – PL)

Because of the numerous law suits he had to face in the U.S., Marcos had considered several proposals for him to go elsewhere, some of which were ridiculous. The King of Tonga, a country in South Pacific, offered his country on the condition that Marcos would build the airport and new hotels. Paraguay, a country in South America, likewise offered on the condition that he would invest his loot there. Marcos did not bite, according to his military aide.

Marcos considered an offer from an agent of the Mexican government named Jesse Monroy, who negotiated with him for his transfer to Mexico. But Col. Aruiza said U.S officials bullied Monroy, forcing him to terminate talks for the transfer of the fallen dictator. Marcos tried to find out Spain as a destination, but it was no dice for him.

By mid-June 1986, Gen. Fabian Ver, the fallen AFP chief of staff who was largely blamed for the downfall, left for an unnamed Asian city (it was later identified as Singapore - PL). It was the first time that he had left Marcos. “A few of us nursed the romantic notion that Ver left to prepare for Marcos’s return and we believed this for a long time, until we realized that Ver had left to look out for himself,” Col. Aruiza said.

Orlando Dulay, a retired Phil Constabulary colonel, a former member of Batasang Pambansa and governor of Quirino, brought two American friends, who were working for the CIA. – Col. Roberto Steele and Gen. Lee Dicker. According to Col. Aruiza. Dulay was proposing that the purported CIA agents would work for his return to the Philippines for a fee of P180,000. No less than a State Department official confirmed to Col. Aruiza that the two American agents were con men.

Marcos later transferred to the house in the Makiki Heights, where he stayed until his death in 1989. 

Col. Aruiza said the con men were not limited to Americans. Even Filipinos exacted money from the fallen dictator. Two retired army colonels proposed to work for Marcos return to power in exchange for P400 million. He did not bite, Col. Aruiza said, adding that the two con men even sowed intrigues, when they told that Col. Aruiza was working for the CIA by informing Fidel Ramos of the goings on in Honolulu.

A con man named Richard Hirchfeld imitated the voice of Muhammad Ali, who was in Manila for the 1975 “Thrilla in Manila,” where he fought Jose Frazier. The con man claimed he was being instructed by Ali to work for his return to the Philippines. 

He and his associate Richard Chastain claimed they could work for the return of Marcos by working with AFP guys, buying firearms, and facilitating a loan of $25 million from a Saudi Arabian prince.

Col. Aruiza did not lose sight to name the actors and actresses who visited Marcos: Sharon Cuneta and her mother Elaine; Leroy Salvador and younger sister Alona; producer Vic del Rosario and wife Mina Aragon; Vivian Velez; and singers Becca Godinez, Cecilia Azarcon, Florante, and Hajji Alejandro. 

Chichay, Bert Marcelo, Herbert Bautista, and Lirio Vital likewise visited Marcos in 1987. Regular fixtures were Marichu Maceda, Imelda Papin, and also concert singer Ida Ong.