AUTHOR'S Notes; This is the second part of Chapter of my book about the bloody but failed war on drugs of the Duterte government. This part discusses the legal basis of those extrajudicial killings committed by the Duterte government. .
‘PROJECT DOUBLE BARREL’: THE LEGALIZATION
OF EJKS
DUTERTE’S war
on drugs officially started on July 1, 2016, or the day after Duterte was sworn
in as president. Gen. Ronald dela Rosa, whom Duterte named as chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), issued Command Memorandum Circular 16-2016
(or CMC), which specified the general guidelines, procedures, and tasks of
police offices, units, and stations in the conduct of the anti-illegal drugs
campaign plan under the “Project Double Barrel.” This was an elaborate project brandished
by the PNP leadership as supportive of “the barangay clearing strategy of the
government and the neutralization of illegal drug personalities nationwide.” It
immediately went full swing. In the statement of its purpose, the CMC used the
word “neutralization” of the people engaged in drug trade as its main
objective. This is noticeable because, in police parlance, “neutralization”
means killing or, at the very least, maiming social offenders.15
The CMC gave
a view of the national situation. It said:
”According to
the DDB's 2015 National Household Survey, there were around 1.8 million drug
users in the country [where] 38.36% of which are unemployed. As of February
2016, PDEA reported that 26.91% or 11,321 out of the country's 42,065 barangays
were ‘drug affected’ (mostly in urban areas), A barangay is said to be
drug-affected when there is a proven existence of drug user, pusher,
manufacturer, marijuana cultivator or other drug personalities regardless of number
in the area. On record, NCR has the highest rate of affectation with 92.96% of
the region's barangays, followed by CALABARZON at 49.28%. Based on PDEA's 2015
arrest data, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (90%) reportedly tops the
list of most abused illegal drugs, followed by marijuana and costly party drugs
like cocaine and ecstasy.
“The afore-cited
statistical data is indicative of the worsening drug problem that has
victimized mostly the underprivileged and impoverished sector of the society.
Although much has already been done and accomplished in the national campaign
to eradicate illegal drugs, yet the problem persists and it continues to breed
social ills. Apparently, in the quest to go after high level drug traffickers,
the government seems to have overlooked the worsening drug problem at the grassroots
level. The archipelagic set-up of the Philippines is exploited by traffickers
to transport illegal drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals
into the country. The international and local airports and seaports, mail and
parcel services and the vast expanse of coastline are being utilized as entry
and exit points.
“There are
three transnational drug organizations operating in the Philippines, namely: a.
The Chinese or Filipino-Chinese drug syndicates dominate the drug market in the
country. They facilitate production, manufacturing and bulk smuggling of
dangerous drugs in the country. These activities ensure the supply of drugs in
the market. Their activities are largely concentrated within their group, with
the inclusion of very few and well-selected locals; b. The African Drug
Syndicate (ADS) is responsible for smuggling drugs through the airports using
drug couriers/swallowers; and c. The Mexican-Sinaloa Drug Cartel is a new drug
group operating in the Philippines. They associated with the Chinese drug Group
to penetrate the Philippine market.”16
Saying the CMC
would be launched and implemented on the first day of office of
Director-General Ronald dela Rosa as the PNP chief, all police offices and
units were enjoined to conduct massive and simultaneous operations to generate
impact and public support. Project Double Barrel has two components: “Project
Tokhang” and “Project High Value Targets.” Project Tokhang is the lower barrel
approach, which was launched in all drug-affected barangays nationwide in
coordination with the local government units (LGUs) particularly in their anti-drug
abuse councils (ADACs), nongovernment organizations (NG0s), stakeholders, and
other law enforcement agencies. The Project Tokhang was described as “a
practical and realistic means of accelerating the drive against illegal drugs
in affected barangays. This concept involves the conduct of house to house
visitations to persuade suspected illegal drug personalities to stop their
illegal drug activities.”17
Project
Tokhang has five stages: first stage, collection and validation of information;
second stage, coordination; third stage, house to house visitation; fourth
stage, processing and documentation; and fifth stage, the monitoring and evaluation.
The CMC said: “The collection and validation of information would be conducted in
the first week of the first month of the President's term. All local police
offices, units, stations and anti-illegal drugs units shall conduct validation
to acquire specific information on suspected drug users and pushers in every
affected barangays. The identity and criminal activities of each target must be
properly documented and verified with all possible sources to equip the team
with accurate and solid proofs when confronting suspects during house to house
visitations.” How the collection and validation of information went on
Duterte’s first week of the first month of his presidential term of office went
was not known. There was no report whatsoever. The CMC said:
“THE coordination
shall be made with the following government agencies, stakeholders, and
non-government organizations prior to the conduct of actual house to house
visitations to ensure success of the activity. All concerned local police
offices, units, and stations would coordinate with the LGUs to provide support
for the activity and ensure compliance of subordinate offices. The house to house
visitation stage of suspected drug personalities would highlight Project Tokhang.
The processing and documentation stage has the following components: first, all
suspected drug personalities who shall voluntarily surrender shall be required
to fill-out a voluntary surrender form; second, persons, who voluntarily
surrendered shall be urged to subscribe under oath before a notary public, to
be assisted by a counsel and witnessed by parents/guardians and/or barangay officials;
all suspected drug personalities who shall voluntarily surrender themselves to
the visiting team shall be referred/invited to the local police station for
interview, documentation, and other alternative actions. Provided that they
execute undertakings to cooperate by giving voluntary information regarding
illegal drug activities; all suspected drug personalities who shall surrender
any dangerous drugs or its derivatives and drug paraphernalia shall be
processed accordingly. Provided that they execute undertakings to give
voluntary information about any violations of specific provisions of RA 9165 as
stated under Section 33.”
The CMC has
provisions calling for what the PNP termed “internal cleansing,” which called
for “the arrest and prosecution of PNP personnel, [who, through the conduct of
counter-intelligence operations, are found out] engaged in unlawful activities
such as, but not limited to, illegal arrest, illegal detention, hulidap,
bangketa/areglo" or case fixing, recycling of confiscated drugs, and
planting of evidence, bungling of drug cases, or acting as protectors,
coddlers, and financiers of drug personalities. It includes the continuous drug
testing of all PNP personnel and filing of appropriate charges against those
who would be found positive to ensure drug-free workplaces in all PNP Offices
and further improve the image and credibility of the police in the anti-drug
campaign. The CMC said the PNP Internal Cleansing would at the national level to
be under the “functional supervision and authority” of the PNP director for intelligence.18
***
‘INTERNAL CLEANSING’
Even before
Duterte took his oath, mass violence started. When it was clear that Duterte
was the 2016 presidential elections winner, his camp immediately intimated to
the PNP corps of officers that Duterte was inclined to wage a bloody war
against illegal drugs. No quarters were to be given to drug users, runners,
pushers, and bigtime, or smalltime, importers and retailers. “That was an
order” - this was how informants put it. By end-May, 2016, or in the waning
days of the Benigno Aquino III administration, an upsurge in the number of
summary executions was perceptible, as traditional media reported them. The
number of the victims of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) went up when Duterte
took his oath by June 30. It could be seen that certain PNP top officials jumped
off the gun. They were competing to get noticed by Duterte. “May mga nagpapasikat
(Some people were showing off),” a barangay captain said.18
‘WHITE PAPER.’ An apocryphal January 31, 2017 “white
paper” quoting unidentified active and retired police officers said Duterte’s
drug war contained the following characteristics: first, it has the PNP as its main
vehicle and it follows the “chain of command” system; second, it is essentially
“state-sponsored” no matter how Duterte and his cohorts have denied it; third, it
has employed unnamed vigilante groups to augment the groups of police officers officially
assigned to do the job; and fourth, it is a program engaged in “social
cleansing,” which was to get rid of the country of the unemployed and dregs of
society, or what is called “lumpenproletariat.” Duterte’s war on drugs is the
pursuit of extrajudicial killings (EJKs), according to the white paper entitled
“Special Report: The State-Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in the
Philippines.” Moreover, the anti-drug war is unique in the sense it erases the
distinction between drug users, pushers (retailers), and drug lords (producers
and wholesalers). They are one and the same under him, although Duterte did not
fully explain the loss of distinction.19
The first six
months of the Duterte government saw the immediate creation of a system for the
war on drugs. The white paper mentioned the augmentation of the police
anti-illegal drug force by elements from Mindanao to form an almost company-sized
police force, whose job is to engage in liquidation missions of suspects in the
drug trade. The white paper discussed the creation of a mechanism of the “reward
system” for law enforcers and vigilante groups engaged in EJKs. It could be
surmised that the PNP has become the virtual “death squad” of Duterte, although
certain police officers argued that the PNP was just implementing the
presidential mandate. It could be surmised too that certain police officers
were not comfortable to become part of Duterte’s death squad. They do not like
to be known as butchers of the people they have sworn to serve. Whether or not
they are in the minority is not known because they did not openly raise howls,
as the war on drugs progressed. Some police officials were said to have applied
and went into schooling to avoid involvement in the war against drugs. 20
At that time,
thousands of suspected drug users, runners, pushers, and traders were summarily
killed nationwide. Two months after Rodrigo Duterte swore in as president on
noon of June 30, 2016, it was clear the war on drugs would continue as planned.
Like attack dogs unleashed by their masters from their chains, police officers,
in groups, or in combination with vigilante groups, aggressively went into
killing sprees in the depressed communities of Metro Manila and other provinces.
In many instances, police officers barged into the victims’ homes even in the
wee hours of the morning, ordering household members to get out of the house
and killing outright suspects right in their homes. In other instances, they
took – or kidnapped - the persons of interest out of their homes, tortured, and
shot them with their hand guns or assault weapons elsewhere. They hardly had
arrest or search warrants. In their reports, police officers offered the
narrative that the victims fought back, or in the vernacular, “nanlaban,” endangering
or harming the arresting police officers. Their alibis could not be proven
though except those antiquated, worn out .38 handguns, which were presumably
thrown by police officers into their bodies ostensibly to prove their alibis.21
Quoting official
records culled from a “source” at the PNP Directorate for Operations, the white
paper, entitled “Special Report: The State Sponsored Extrajudicial Killings in
the Philippines,” said the death toll reached 6,273 persons, of whom 2.224
persons were “suspected drug personalities killed in police operations,” while
4,049 were victims of vigilante killings, or “death under investigation.“ Why
the number of vigilante killings was far larger than legitimate police
operations was not explained, although it could be surmised that a number of
EJKs was not reported officially. It said:
“For the
first seven months of the ‘war on drugs,’ the monthly death toll averages 896,
while the daily average of death tally was around 30. The average death toll in
police operations for 210 days (7 x 30 days) is 11 persons. In effect, the PNP
is claiming that the deadly armed encounters for 210 days (7 months) registered
a daily death toll of 10 killed drug suspects.
“As to the
alleged [vigilante killings/deaths under investigation], there is a death daily
toll average of 19 persons. The total daily death total for [local police
operations] and [vigilante killings/deaths under investigation] is (19+11) = 30
persons killed in a span in less than 7 months.”
***
HOW THEY DID IT
The white
paper of unknown authorship could be regarded as “very revealing” for its
audacity and profundity because it narrated how police officers did the war on
drugs, specifically the summary executions or extrajudicial killings (EJKs). As
part of the war on drug infrastructure, the PNP had come out with its own
standard operating procedure on its summary executions of its targets. The
following unedited text has to be drawn out of the white paper for accuracy:
The standard
and typical carrying out of An EJK Operation by a Police Station/Community
Precinct of the five (5) Police Districts of National Capital Region Police
Office (NCRPO) is a cycle replicated nationwide in all Police Regional Offices
(PRO)/Provincial Police Offices (PPO) and City/Municipality Police Offices,
down to Police Community Precincts (PCP). This cycle is outlined below:
The Station
Commander, in his capacity as head of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug Task Group
(SAIDTG) will preside at a tactical briefing by his PCP Commanders. This is a
weekly assessment on the progress of the war on drugs thru EJK.
The stage for
target selection for EJK implementation uses, as reference, the surrenderers’
data base.
·
Tactical
coordination of the EJK Team with the Barangay Chairman, who is the Chairman of
the Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Council (BADAC).
·
Tracing,
locating, and casing of the target house.
·
Determination
of the actual hit on the target.
·
The
Station Chief/PCP Commander coordinates with the BADAC’s Chairman for the
shutdown of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance and the switching off
of street lamps.
·
The
Hit team, which is regularly composed of four (4) assassins, executes the target
suspects.
·
The
return to the Station and the verbal reporting to the Station Chief or PCP
Commander.
·
As
directed, to satisfy the protocol requirements, Homicide Investigators will
bring the gunshot victims to the hospital.
·
The
Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team performs a scripted forensic
investigation of the crime scene in case the victim is allegedly falling under
the category of DUI.
In the case
of scripted LPO, the cycle is similar. Double planting of evidences is done to
make it appear that the drug suspect resisted arrest and fired back. A small
quantity of shabu and a Cal. 38 homemade gun are the usual ‘resistance killing’
evidences” (sic).
In the case
of EJK of DUI type, there are three (3) variations of execution:
·
The
Riding in Tandem – Hit Team will assassinate the target victim while their
vehicle is in motion.
·
An
EJK Team, with mask, and hooded with black bonnet, will barge into the house of
the target and open fire.
·
An
EJK Abduction Team will grab the target victim if he/she is a retailer or
distributor. After interrogation with torture, the victim is summarily
executed. The corpse is dumped at a selected site. In all, Police Districts of
the NCRPO, the so-called “Firer” is designated to kill the drug suspect. The
Firer, whether he or she is riding on a motor bike or is a member of an
abduction team, is usually given half of the EJK payment.
NAGGING QUESTION. The nagging question is whether or not the
PNP, as an institution, has accepted Duterte’s war on drugs and registered any
opposition or warning about its illegal character. Officially, the answer is
yes. But there appeared to be more than what meets the eyes. Although the rumor
mill has kept on grinding yarns of speculations and interpretations, the 20-page
white paper, entitled “Special Report: the State-Sponsored Extrajudicial
Killings in the Philippines,” gave indications that the war on drugs had a
different dimension that was not openly disclosed. The alleged involvement of
the communist-led National Democratic Front (NDF) was neither known nor openly
discussed.22
Incidentally,
Duterte pitched on several occasions the possible inclusion and involvement of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the war on drugs. The AFP gave an icy
reception to Duterte’s advances. It somehow managed to strike a middle ground
by its counterproposal to involve itself in data gathering or providing his
office with intelligence information. Although it did not make its position
public, the AFP was categorical to say “no” on what Duterte wanted. Except to
provide intelligence information, it would not involve itself in the war
against drugs. The AFP, as an institution, knows its mandate. Any inclusion or involvement
in the anti-drug war is not part of its mandate. The anti-drug campaign is
essentially a police issue, which is better left to the PNP. The AFP had
learned its lesson during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. It did not want
to bite more than it could chew.
On September
21, 1972, the AFP supported the martial law declaration by the emerging
dictator in Ferdinand Marcos on an essentially single issue: the alleged threat
to national security by the then newly reorganized Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the New People’s Army. The outlawed NPA was
then composed of a few squads from the remnants of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya sa
Bayan (HMB) and had insufficient and outdated firearms. The AFP support for
martial law was ironically dismal, as it showed acquiescence to 13 years of
Marcos dictatorship. The communist threat was not that big for the AFP to bear
and support the martial law government of Marcos, which later metamorphosed
into an abusive, corrupt, and plundering dictatorship.
CLARITY OF THOUGHT. The PNP understood Duterte had exaggerated
the magnitude and dimension of the illegal drug issue to get elected into
office and obtain the people’s mandate to launch the brutal war against drugs
and its users, pushers, and wholesalers. It knew Project Double Barrel and its
two components, Oplan Tokhang and Oplan High Value Targets, were only good on
paper but unsustainable in the long run. They were hardly implemented on the
basis of their original mandate and objectives. But many police officials
persisted to support Duterte – both fully and halfheartedly. They could not be
blamed, but they were watchful of Duterte’s actual intentions and on what he
was doing.
Although drug
users, pushers, and other persons involved in drug trade were identified early
in the anti-drug campaign and told to mend their ways, a number of persons, who
surrendered voluntarily before their barangay officials, were later slain to
indicate bad faith and duplicity of purposes. A number underwent rehabilitation
as mandated by the existing anti-drugs laws, but they were nonetheless summarily
executed. Why and how these summary executions happened was a matter of
conjecture.23 Oplan Tokhang is clear on rehabilitation and monitoring of drug
users. Certain persons in the know said in confidence that the anti-drug war,
even on its early stage, was just unsustainable. Duterte himself did not exactly
know what to do. He was not gifted with the clarity of thought, they surmised
especially on its end game.
The white
paper alleged that a faction within Duterte’s coalition attempted to take
advantage of Duterte’s lack of initiative to put down the complete details on
how to proceed with the anti-drug war. It took a direction far different from
its original intent. It discussed lengthily the inclusion of a program, which certain
alleged members (or former members) of the communist-led National Democratic
Front (NDF) had included in the war on the anti-drugs project. It was their way
to highjack the war on drugs to the NDF’s favor.
A month after
Duterte was sworn in, the Kilusang Pagbabago (KP), a new political party formed
purportedly “to protect the new president,” was launched by a group of political
leaders led by then Cabinet Secretary Leoncio Evasco Jr. It was conceived to be
a mass movement that originated from the top, the Office of the President, to
blossom into a grassroots-based political party below. Although it was supposed
to have been launched on Aug. 13, 2016, not much was heard about it. But the
Dec. 5, 2016 report of rappler.com
led with this paragraph: “President Rodrigo Duterte’s most trusted ally,
Cabinet Secretary Leoncio ‘Jun’ Evasco Jr, is going around the country to
launch a nationwide mass movement – Kilusang Pagbabago (KP).” It could be
surmised that KP, which was on the drawing board since August, did not take off
immediately, pushing its launching toward the end of 2016.24
The news
report said KP was “growing fast” as it drew huge crowds in its launching in
Cebu and Cavite. Its organizers thought of organizing a KP unit in each
barangay. Conceptually, it was envisioned to become the political vehicle to
bring government services down to the ground. But its bigger role, it appeared,
was to form a critical mass to protect Duterte, as he was supposed to pursue
radical reforms, according to the rappler.com
report citing a document on its creation and objectives. The KP mentioned
possible destabilization plots if ever Duterte pursued “reforms” but it did not
give details. In fact, KP had singled out certain police and military generals
supposedly involved in illegal drug trade as enemies, giving rise to the
perception of its anti-military and police bias.
KP as ‘Brownshirts.’
There were supporters, who wanted to strengthen Dueterte’s hold to power by
having a mass-based political party, while other supporters believed that KP
would only bring the Duterte government closer to the Left. This was the
tug-of-war during the early weeks of Duterte’s presidency. The more acceptable
assessment was the planned creation of an army of supporters, or a “mass
movement,” whose members could be easily converted into the equivalent of the
S.A. or “Brownshirts” of the old Nazi German regime. Given Duterte’s penchant
to use thugs in his war on drugs in Davao City, it could be surmised too that
Evasco’s faction in the ruling coalition could have thought to create an army
within the army with KP as the political vehicle to form its core of members.
Rodrigo
Duterte won the 2016 presidential elections partly with the help of the Left –
both the Legal left, which has the alphabet soup of Left-leaning organizations
like Bayan, a mass organization, Bayan Muna Party List, Gabriela, Anakpawis, Kabataan,
among others, and the outlawed extreme Left led by the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), its military arm, and the
National Democratic Front (NDF), its political arm. Although on official level
the Left supported Grace Poe, who landed third after Duterte and Mar Roxas, the
Liberal Party candidate, the Left, especially those based in Mindanao,
supported Duterte instead of Poe. In brief, it played simultaneously two political
cards in 2016.
Although it
was not official and nothing indeed was written on stone, it could be said that
Duterte was in alliance with the Left. This could be deduced from the
appointments of certain officials, who were closely associated with the Legal Left
like Judy Taguiwalo as secretary of the Department of Social Works and Services
(DSWD), who later resigned in disgust with Duterte’s public policies, Rafael
Mariano, as secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), who met the
same fate as Taguiwalo’s, and lesser mortals like Liza Maza and Terry Ridon. Evasco
was said to be personally identified with Duterte because he was once the
latter’s chief of staff when he was the mayor of Davao City. Evasco was
reported powerful because he had the initial effective control of at least 16
state agencies. But just like the other Left-leaning Cabinet members, Evasco
was eased out of the Cabinet only to be reappointed in an inconsequential
office, which was as a presidential adviser on government reorganization ostensibly
to streamline processes in 2020.
It could be
surmised that the police and military establishments distrusted Evasco, who was
identified as a former member of the central committee of the CPP. As a CPP
member, Evasco was being viewed as an institutional enemy because the PNP and
AFP are engaged in armed struggle with communist guerillas. In short, Evasco,
despite his elaborate plans to create a grassroots party for Duterte, did not
get the trust and confidence of the PNP and AFP. They took him for an “enemy,”
who should be defanged and weakened.
The white
paper discussed Evasco’s plan to create a program within the program against
drugs. According to the white paper, Evasco’s program was considered “the broad
intelligence network of EJK” dubbed the MASA MASID, which stood for Mamamayang Ayaw
sa Anomalya, Mamamayang Ayaw sa Ilegal na Droga (Citizens against Anomalies,
Citizens Against Illegal Drugs). Drafted and completed in July, 2016 by Evasco
and Undersecretary Joselito Libres Jr., whom, the white paper said, were once members
of the CPP Central Committee, the highest policy-making body in the outlawed CPP,
the MASA MASID program sought to become the “watchdog” of the Kilusang
Pagbabago, the mass-based party.
The KP’s
concept paper contained at least five component programs, which sought to
strengthen the Duterte government. A component was the “defender of the
Republic” program, which sought to defend Duterte from “destabilization threats
and calamities to ensure delivery of services for communities and sectors.” Another
component was the propaganda scheme program to project Duterte as the
“educator” when it comes to changes. The third component part was essentially
political, as it sought to change to a federal form the current unitary
government. The fifth component centers on effective delivery of social
services.
But it was in
the component program that identified KP as the “watchdog,” which the police
and military establishments did not feel comfortable. Under this component, the
KP would be the vanguard against crime, drugs and corruption through
monitoring, documentation, and advocacy. These things were essentially PNP’s
job. The white paper said this component could be aptly transformed into the “intelligence
arm of the National Democratic Front,” of which Evasco was identified as a key
leader. It said:
“Indeed, the
MASA MASID has a vast network of informants [on] the national scale. It
functions as a spy agency jointly established and operated by the CPP/NPA/NDF,
DILG, and the hoodwinked civic organizations. It could be compared to a modern
Gestapo providing data to the savage ‘war on drugs’ with state-sponsored EJK.
“The
principal source of President Duterte’s ‘Drug List’ is undoubtedly the MASA
MASID. PRRD has repeatedly announced that the [number of] drug addicts [is]
approaching a prevalence level of almost 4 million. This is in contrast to the
official data of 1.8 million drug users and pushers of the Dangerous Drug Board
(DDB/Philippine Drug Enforcement agency (PDEA).
“There is a
gap of 2.2 million between President Duterte’s list of 4 million addicts and
the DDB/PDEA estimates of 1.8 million.”
***
‘SOCIAL CLEANSING’
The white
paper said that while the spate of drug-related summary executions or
extrajudicial killings (EJKs) is “state sponsored” as indicated by the
presidential directives on the war against drugs, it is also a form of “social
cleansing.” It did not define what it meant by social cleansing except to say
that the anti-drug war was essentially “a form of mass murder.” It said:
“Because the
PNP is a structured government bureau under the Executive Department, the
criminal liability in relation to carrying out of EJK is quite obvious and
could be applied from the top echelon of the national political leadership down
to the lowest level of the PNP, the Police Community Precincts (PCP).
“The EJK
could also be considered a form of mass murder. The latter is the act of
murdering people, typically, simultaneously or over a relatively short period
of time and in close proximity. The continued daily occurrence of EJK incidents
on a nationwide scale clearly indicates the general features of mass murder.”
The
punchline, which was delivered before the actual filing of the first
information against Duterte at an international forum:
“International
legal experts studying the ‘War on Drugs’ have specific opinions that
[President Rodrigo Roa Duterte] could be tried at the International Criminal
Court (ICC).”
It was a
statement of prescience on the part of the unidentified police officers and
military officials behind the white paper because three months later, the first
information was filed before the ICC.
DUTERTE’S LINKS WITH NDF. The white paper made some serious
allegations about the reported Duterte’s links with the NDF. Citing a report of what it described a
“credible source,” which had “access” with NDF-Mindanao, it said Duterte was
“inducted as a member of the NDF’s National Council.” It alleged it was Evasco,
who brokered Duterte’s entry into the NDF in July, 2010. At that time, Duterte
was mayor of Davao City.25
The white
paper alleged:
“The
induction of Duterte in the NDF National Council was effected during the NDF’s
12th National Conference held at the Conference Hall of the
Brokenshire Hospital in Davao City.
“The NDF
Conference, while in session, is the acknowledged policy-making body of the
NDF, with the Party (CPP) dominating the NDF and in-charge of directing and
controlling the political and military struggle to overthrow or take over the
state and to seize political power. The
NDF is defined, according to its Constitution, as an alliance of all patriotic
and progressive organizations adhering to its Constitution and Program. It
fosters unity among the allied organizations. This definition clearly commits deception,
since the majority of members of NDF governing organs are actually CPP members.
Moreover, in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory, any national democratic person or
organization, to be accredited as such, has to accept the leadership of the
Marxist-Leninist Party (the Communist Party of the Philippines) and the
latter’s absolute control over the people’s army (the NPA).”
It was
believed that the white paper had acknowledged what could be described a de facto
coalition between the Duterte government and the CPP-NPA-NDF. How the
militarist faction within the Duterte government has outmaneuvered the leftist
faction in the first three years of his government could be viewed as a lesson
in political dynamics and behavior, or a subject for future research works.
Nonetheless, it could be perceived that both the left and right wing factions
within the Duterte government had attempted to use Duterte’s war on drugs to advance
their respective political agenda In the ensuing political dynamics, the
military faction has appeared to have gained the advantage, as Duterte himself
eased out the perceived leftwing elements in his government, effectively ending
the tactical coalition between his government and the NDF. The rightwing elements
had effectively brought Duterte to its fold.26
***
HUMILIATION AND VIOLENCE
The war on
drugs, which Rodrigo Duterte had unleashed, took a big bang on the first day of
his incumbency. Days passed without any report of persons, who were killed in
alleged violent encounters and police operations – or rubouts, plain and simple.
A Filipino scholar argued that the anti-drug war was premised on humiliation
and violence. It was no different from the same anti-drug war, which Duterte
used in Davao City as its erstwhile mayor. Hong-Kong-based Andres Reyes, a
former journalist, said in a published article on the early years of his
presidency:
“Duterte’s
message in his war on drugs is clear: Criminals can be humiliated and killed in
order to protect law-abiding and God-fearing Filipinos.”
Reyes said Duterte
came out with a list containing names of users and pushers purportedly to shame
and humiliate those involved in drug trade. He said:
“This is the
same method Duterte used in Davao City when he revealed the names of suspected
drug dealers and users in radio and television shows, telling them to stop
their illegal activities. The police would then visit the houses of persons on
the list, known in Cebuano as “Tokhang” (tok-tok [knock], hangyo [request]).
The police and the military would then speak to the person and his family
members and warn them to stop selling and using drugs. This was, and is, often
a prelude to killings. In Davao, many of those killed in police operations and
vigilante killings were persons on the list. Why should they be killed? Duterte
implies drug addicts are not human and criminals have no place in society. The
police, using entrapment operations, search the houses of suspects and question
them for ignoring their warnings. If the suspected individuals fight with the
policemen or “nanlaban”, they can be killed in the process.”
In his
article, Reyes advanced the thesis that in Duterte’s war on drugs, the victims’
bodies were “political artifacts” sought to embody and deliver what he
described “the message of violence.” He said:
“The
individuals who were humiliated and killed in Duterte’s war on drugs were
alleged criminals who were neither investigated nor convicted for the crimes
they were supposed to have committed. The ‘spectacle’ in the war on drugs is
distinct because the violence inflicted on the body of criminals is perpetrated
by both state and non-state actors. The supposed criminals were punished by the
state’s coercive apparatus (the police and the military) and … (vigilantes and
hired killers) before their guilt was established. The sovereign in the
Philippine political system is the people, who are personified by Duterte as
the chief executive. Therefore, there is political value in this spectacle in
punishing criminals, by humiliating and killing them, and this punishment
outside the ordinary legal process has political meaning to it. A common
feature in the practice of punishing criminals is the use of the body as
material to impose discipline as well as a vehicle to carry political
messages.”
According to
Reyes, the humiliation and violent deaths of drug criminals were designed to elicit
“credible threats” to the public. Hence, those who violated the law have
actually been punished. The killing of criminals in police operations, public
spaces, and in their homes makes Duterte’s threats “very real,” deterring violators
of the law. The humiliation of supposed criminals by labeling their bodies to
say they are criminals could be interpreted as “objectification of the body.” Reyes
said:
“It reduces
the body to an object as a vehicle to carry political messages. In the war on
drugs, this is done first, through official listing of drug dealers, users and
criminals, and revealing their names in public; and second, by encouraging
their killing, and then humiliating those friends and relatives left behind by
placing placards identifying them as criminals who deserved to have been
killed.”
According to
Reyes, this phenomenon, citing a scholar, is a form of violence that lead to
what is termed the “commodification of the body by turning it into political
text.” He said:
“Those who
lived at the margin – the poor, and the criminals whom Duterte calls living in
‘low-lives’ – have their bodies made into text by placing placards on them and
parading them in public and on marking their corpses when they are killed.”
Citing
another scholar, Reyes described the use of the body as a “spectacle of
violence.” This leads to the concept of the “politicization of life,” citing
Duterte’s penchant to declare whose life has and does not have value. He said:
“The
Philippine president divides Filipinos into two groups: the drug dealers,
addicts and criminals – who are seen as violent law breakers, dangers to social
welfare and obstructions to economic development – and law-abiding and God-fearing
persons, who are viewed as victims of violence, the human resources for
economic development, and the basis of the well-being of future generations.
Duterte has been explicit about the need to eliminate the first group in order
to protect the second.”
Reyes cited
Nazi Germany’s experience in which the Nazi regime decided on the extermination
of the Jews, and the incurably ill, adding that the moment “a political decision
is reached, mass killings of those whose lives are now declared to have no
value, become inevitable.” Reyes said:
“Duterte is
popular because of the clarity of his message about who can be killed: drug
lords, drug addicts and criminals, preferably men, habitual criminals and drug
addicts who repeatedly went into rehabilitation but were never cured.”
***
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