A POST-DUTERTE AGENDA

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

Now, the question: What is the post-Duterte era agenda?

President Rodrigo Duterte himself has cultivated discussions of what has to be done in the event he is no longer the president. This issue has assumed importance, when he had admitted publicly that he was afflicted with certain illnesses and that he could probably die and fail to complete his six-year term of office.

Talks of his failing health were somehow exacerbated by public admission that he was taking Fentanyl, a powerful drug administered to cancer patients to ease physical pain. Moreover, he was pointing to either Vice President Leni Robredo or former senator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. as replacement.

Moreover, his failure to engage in any public appearance for the first week of 2017 had reinforced further widespread beliefs that he could be sick or suffering from an ailment that has prevented him to go public. Moreover, he was reported to have quietly sought treatment in an anti-cancer hospital in Guanzhou, China, triggering further discussions on the state of his health..

Let’s discuss the premises before going to the subject matter.

Succession mechanism

Article 6, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides the succession mechanism:

“In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.”

Although the 1987 Constitution clearly says the vice president takes if ever the president dies or suffers permanent disability, this constitutional provision has many gray areas too. It does not specify ways to declare the president’s permanent disability. It does not say which person or institution could declare him as permanently disabled.

Ecuadorean experience

But the country could be guided by precedents in other nations, particularly Ecuador, a medium-sized nation of 15 million people in South America.

On February 6, 1997, its Congress did the unprecedented by declaring Abdala Bucaram Ortiz as “mentally unfit,” replacing him with the vice president, and forcing him to seek asylum in Panama. The congressional initiative was swift and decisive as Bucaram, son of Lebanese immigrants, was president for only seven months. He was popularly elected in 1996, winning 21 of Ecuador’s 22 provinces.

Although the economic issues that bedeviled his presidency were factors for his dismissal, his series of comedic acts led the Ecuadorean Congress to dismiss him. Bucaram was perceived a mad man; he branded himself as “el loco” (crazy guy). In fact, when the Ecuadorean economy plummeted, Bucaram diverted the Ecuadoreans’ attention and did what he thought was best – by being himself.

He did not just cultivate his public image of an iconoclast, who challenged authorities and traditions, but overplayed it to become comic, who sought to entertain the Ecuadoreans, who, at that time, felt the economic pressures and were becoming dismayed by his lack of leadership. Amid the scandals and corruption charges, Bucaram released CD copies of his music entitled “A Crazy Man Who Loves” (“El Loco Que Ama” in Spanish). He shaved off his trademark moustache on live TV and later adopted the clipped moustache of Nazi Germany dictator Adolf Hitler.

Bucaram invited for lunch Lorena Bobbitt, the Ecuadorian American who gained notoriety for castrating her husband. He attended the World Banana Queen contest in Quito, grabbed the microphone and sang, as he was surrounded by scantily clad contestants. Bucaram mocked an ex-president by comparing him to a donkey. When asked for a public apology, Bucaram obliged but he did it to the donkeys.

The air of negativity and hatred that pervaded his presidency culminated in his dismissal, triggering a precedent that has become a new model for the rest of the world. Despite his tragic political fate, Bucaram managed to give the quote of all time: “They call me ‘Crazy Abdalá’, but madmen speak from the heart and see with their soul.”

It is inconceivable how the Philippine Congress would react just in case the President’s health declines to the point of permanent disability, rendering him incapable to discharge his functions as chief executive. In the absence of any enabling law on the constitutional provision on succession, it is likely that any act of Congress to declare him as permanently disabled could be challenged before the Supreme Court.

Extra-constitutional means

The emerging democracy movement could trigger new political upheavals, as democratic forces go to the streets anew to counter the authoritarian tendencies and the political forces that represent them. In its view, the current political leadership, as represented by Duterte and the PDP-Laban, is in alliance with political forces and families that represent and pursue an authoritarian agenda – the Arroyos and the Marcoses.

Depending on the political alliances and strength it could muster and its ability to address the burning issues, including the unabated extra judicial killings (EJKs), the democracy movement, as represented by various political forces that adhere to the restored democracy, could pose the biggest challenge to the Duterte government. It could trigger political upheavals that could lead to his removal from office.

This year could be a watershed year for Philippine democracy. Aside from impending death or permanent disability, at least three major political events, or their combination, have been identified as trigger mechanisms for a change of political leadership. These are: resignations of key Cabinet members; declaration of permanent disability by Congress; and withdrawal of support by the Armed Forces.

Coupled by the rising tide of political activism to be led by the pro-democracy movement composed mostly of millennials and the emergence of Vice President Leni Robredo as the new icon of democracy, the initiatives from the Executive Department, Congress, and the Armed Forces could lead to a political crisis of unimaginable proportions. It could later lead to the collapse of the government and its replacement by a new one.

New democratic agenda

The new democratic agenda in a post-Duterte era could mean the pursuit of the following:

1.      Creation of a new commission to investigate the spate of extrajudicial killings, identify the responsible people, and recommend their criminal prosecution and other moves to prevent their escape from the bar of justice;

2.    Redirection of the country’s foreign policy to acknowledge, adhere, and implement those international and bilateral agreements, of which the Philippines is a signatory, and other binding decisions by international bodies;

3.    Redirection of the anti-drug war to complete adherence to the rule of law and due process, complete rejection of EJKs and other means regarded as fascistic, and reeducation of all law enforcement agencies on democratic ideals; and

4.    Reeducation of the Filipino people on the contending ideals and values the forces of democracy and authoritarianism represent.

The new post-Duterte era government could also work on the following objectives:

1.      A new offensive on economic diplomacy to regain the economic losses, which include foreign entities that have withheld their participation and entry into the Philippine market;

2.    Reinstitution of the anti-corruption campaign of the Aquino administration and re-imposition of the anti-corruption values and ideals that have been sidelined by the unrestrained focus on the anti-drug war;

3.    Reorganization of the entire government to erase all vestiges of authoritarianism and the values its represents;

4.    Pursuit of a foreign relations offensive to regain support of major allies like the United States and European Union without prejudice to moves to strength of ties with China and Russia;

5.     Pursuit of a new campaign to “demarcosify” Philippine society by explaining to the Filipino people the Marcos legacy, which includes massive human rights violations, crony capitalism, and massive plunder of the national coffers.

INTRODUCING JOSE MANUEL I. DIOKNO, LAWYER OF SEN. LEILA DE LIMA

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

Jose Manuel Diokno, lawyer of embattled Sen. Leila de Lelima,  was thirteen years old when he started joining his father Jose, the illustrious lawmaker, human rights advocate, and nationalist, in court hearings of the latter’s clients, mostly political activists and poor citizens.

Jose Manuel, or Chel, sat at the back of his father, watching the courtroom drama and listening to vigorous exchanges of arguments among litigating lawyers, or absorbing depressing testimonies from respondents.

Chel Diokno did not see the world winking at him as a pubescent kid. On the contrary, he saw a world of oppression and destitution. This education in his formative years proved pivotal in his career choice.

It did not take long for Chel Diokno to help his father in the latter’s law practice, mainly for pro bono clients.

Soon, the pubescent paralegal visited various jails, conducted interviews with jailed clients and witnesses, prepared and wrote their testimonies as background materials, and helped his father in building up cases for them.

Even his father was surprised on his extraordinary enthusiasm.

No, the former senator never thought Chel would become a lawyer someday. Neither did he encourage the kid to take up law. Nor did he give any financial reward for his self starting kid.

This happened at the height of the repressive martial law, or soon after the dictator Ferdinand Marcos released his father from nearly two years of imprisonment.

That was the time, when the nation was silenced into submission by the spate of arrests and detention of the dictator’s political enemies, whom the autocrat collectively labelled as “enemies of the State.”

After completing his undergraduate course at the University of the Philippines, Chel Diokno entered the UP College of Law with the resolve to follow his father’s footsteps to become not just an ordinary lawyer, but a human rights lawyer too.

He was already in law school, when the 1983 assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. shook the world for its noontime drama and naked display of power.

Apprehensive that his son would be involved in the unmitigated political dynamics of those days, Ka Pepe sent Chel to the United States to finish his law degree there.

He did it at the Northern Illinois University. Soon, he passed the U.S. Bar examinations. He returned to the country after the fateful 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution that toppled the oppressive Marcos dictatorship.

Chel Diokno passed the Bar examinations here and attended to his father, whose health was already failing during those days.

Despite completing his law degree in the U.S., Chel said he passed the local Bar examinations because the two countries have basically the same legal principles.

After his father’s death in 1987, Chel took over his father’s law office and did litigation works, mostly human rights cases.

While Chel appears low key compared to his outspoken father, who never hesitated to speak out his mind on every burning issue of the day, he does not lack the intensity or the passion to push for his human rights agenda.

Soon, he is deep into human rights, an advocacy which he feels proud to inherit from his father.

De La Salle University, of which Ka Pepe was one of its outstanding alumni, offered Chel Diokno to become the founding dean of its law school in 2010.

According to Chel, the De La Salle brothers urged him to form a law school with a strong foundation on human rights. It was an offer which was difficult to refuse.

Under his leadership as its founding law dean, the law school has come out with a curriculum that seeks to develop the litigation skills of prospective lawyers.

Veering away from the other law schools’ emphasis on book knowledge, the new law school seeks to develop legal writing skills among their students.

Also, their students, upon reaching third year, have to provide mandatory legal aid services to poor litigants. This is part of their on-the-job training, Chel said.

DLSU is the first law school to do it. Moreover, DLSU law students can choose to major in any of the three areas: human rights law, corporation law; and environmental law.

Chel Diokno said he accepted the post of a law dean, when the DLSU brothers had assured him a free hand to develop its law curriculum.

In fact, they told him they wanted a law school deeply oriented in human rights. He said he has specific instructions to develop a law school with a strong sense of values and ethics.

It has been a challenge, which, like a typical passionate yet compassionate Chel Diokno, would never run away.

POSTSCRIPT TO EDSA REVOLUTION: MILITARY UPRISING BREEDS POWERFUL REFORMIST BLOC, HISTORICAL REVISIONS

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

(N. B. I wrote this article exactly three years ago mainly to present a perspective on the aftermath of the historic 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. Actually, attempts to revise our history is not new. It has been a secret cottage industry in our country. Please read.) 

THE transition to constitutional democracy from dictatorship, which Ferdinand Marcos euphemistically called “constitutional authoritarianism,” did not happen smoothly.

The reformist faction in the Armed Forces of the Philippines had developed into a bloc that put obstacles for a smooth transition.

Because of its role in the historic and bloodless uprising that dismantled the Marcos dictatorship, the reformist bloc, or the Reform the Armed Forces, or RAM, had emerged to exercise veto power in the new Cory Aquino – Doy Laurel power bloc.

It became a bloc within a bloc in the power structure.

Amid the public euphoria that followed the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, which has become a template for nonviolent, bloodless uprisings to topple dictatorships, reformist military leaders became celebrities.

Within the power structure, reformist leaders provided opinions to form part of the inputs in decision-making.

The reformist bloc, once a secret group of soldiers engaged in surreptitious coup plots, emerged powerful. Its offices at the back of the Ministry of National Defense building in Camp Aguinaldo became the seat and symbol of its power and influence.

But the reformist bloc had developed what could be described a “monster attitude," believing that since it was instrumental in putting Mrs. Aquino to power, it had the “right” to take it back.

In the ensuing incessant squabbling and power struggle, Cory Aquino had to argue that it was the people, who put her in power, not the reformist bloc.

She had to clarify countless times that her power - or mandate - did not come from the results of the inconclusive Feb. 7 “snap” presidential elections or the reformist-led but ill-fated anti-Marcos, RAM-led coup d’etat, which did not push through, but from the nonviolent, people-backed military uprising (not the reformist bloc’s alone), or the EDSA People Power Revolution.

The people shouted her name, not just Juan Ponce Enrile's and Fidel Ramos’s. They did not object when she took her oath of office as president towards the end of the fateful four-day EDSA Revolution.

Even Enrile and Ramos admitted that Cory Aquino was the legitimate winner in the “snap” polls. It was the reason their faction committed to support her presidency.

Even Enrile admitted that before he and Ramos attended Cory Aquino’s oathtaking at Club Filipino, he had to refuse the last minute but desperate efforts by Marcos to strike a deal to create a military-backed junta.

Instead he worked to facilitate instead Cory Aquino’s ascendancy to power. “She is the legitimate president,” he said.

In short, Cory Aquino’s assumption to power was not a product of negotiations by self proclaimed power brokers. Neither did she become president because something fluke happened.

She had to assert every now and then that it was a mandate given her by the sovereign people in a bloodless military uprising which, until now, continues to fascinate not just a few nations, but the whole world as well.

It has been a cause for extreme annoyance that certain quarters have been coming out lately with revisions of the EDSA Revolution.

Although their exact motives remain unclear, they have been trying to inject details that distort the EDSA Revolution, as if it did not exactly mean to empower Cory Aquino.

Why they keep on spewing those unverifiable details late in the day, when major political players are either dead or senile, is a matter of conjecture.

By the way, the sources of those loose talks remain hidden from the public view.

One of the recent revisions – or outright distortion – came from a newspaper columnist, who alleged that it was agreed in a meeting between the Cory and her group and Enrile and Ramos on day three of the EDSA Revolution that she would be president for a maximum of two years, after which she would give way to a new government and constitution.

As told by some revisionists, Cory Aquino, as transition president for two years, would just oversee the dismantling of the dictatorial structures, after which she would give way to a restored democracy to be headed by a new president.

As if to give some importance to a not-so-important figure, the revisionists peddled the line that everything changed when Cory Aquino listened to Peping Cojuangco.

It was a subtle way to promote the discredited line that Cory was naive to listen to brother Peping, who was never reputed to possess political brilliance.

Because Cory listened to Peping, she stayed in power for the next six years, so the thinking goes. This is an outright lie.

As a journalist, I covered the political beat for quite a while. But I did not hear that canard that she would be a transition president for two years.

Had those political players reached an agreement for a transition president with a fixed two-year term limit, I would assume they would put that agreement into writing with all the parties affixing their signatures to the veracity and authenticity of that accord.

But after all those years, I have yet to see any written pact – fake or genuine. The fact that it has come out too late in the day gives the impression that it was more an afterthought, or a wish, but never a fact, or a historical reality.

Had the political players reached that accord, I would candidly say that the reformist bloc would not lead or take active part in the series of bloody military coups that followed the EDSA Revolution.

Instead, their leaders would just wait for the alleged two-year transition period to end and cast its luck in the next elections.

I do not see any reason for the military reformers to alter unnecessarily the political equation and gamble away the lives of their leaders, members, and valuable resources.

Moreover, I did not hear Enrile or any of those reformers invoking this two-year transition presidency during or even after Cory Aquino’s six-year tenure of office. Enrile, noted for his ferocity in public debates, would surely invoke the two-year transition.

But he never did it for the simple reason that it never existed at all. The reformist bloc, in a display of its newfound power, opted to launch a series of debilitating coups, plunging the country into instability.

Historical revisionism is a bane that affects not just third world countries like ours but even established democracies. Until now, Germany has its band of historical revisionists, who mock historical realities and instead present historical distortions or misinterpretations as alternatives.

The Holocaust, which killed nearly six million Jews, for instance, is a case in point. For those revisionists, the Holocaust did not happen at all. 

Adolf Hitler was not a rabid anti-Semitic dictator, but a saint, according to those revisionists. They have been aptly rejected. Even Germans take them as crackpots.

How shall we treat those revisionists? It’s simple. All we have to do is to ignore them completely and treat them as if they do not exist. Let them grow tired. Let them dissipate their resources.

When ignored, they would just leave us alone. No buts, ifs, and whys... or even why nots...

THE GENIUS OF CARDINAL SIN

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

When ranged against those dime-a-dozen Catholic and non-Catholic prelates and ministers dabbling in Philippine politics, the late Jaime Cardinal Sin casts an incomparable shadow to the extent that not one of them would approximate his greatness.

These current-day religious leaders are many times inferior to Sin, who showed to the world how a religious leader could influence a poor, deeply polarized society.

Sin was a genius; although a religious leader, Sin knew his politics. He was at the right place at the right time, as he spoke with unmatchable firmness that even dictator Ferdinand Marcos could not ignore.

He was not as theologically brilliant as his contemporaries like Popes Francis, Benedict XVI, or John Paul II, but he proved to be the biggest thorn of the Marcos dictatorship, which the Catholic prelate viewed with disdain.

Sin’s unparalleled contributions, specifically the country’s return to democracy from dictatorship, had stemmed from two factors: the policy of “critical collaboration,” which he pursued without letup during his prelature at the Archdiocese of Manila, the biggest in the country, and his unquestionable integrity.

When he became the Archbishop of Manila in 1974, Sin laid out his policy of critical collaboration, where he expressed his desire for the Church to peacefully coexist with the Marcos dictatorship but reserve its right to criticize the many issues like wanton human rights violations and its perpetuation in power without any semblance of legitimacy.

Sin’s critical collaboration policy was carefully couched along euphemistic and pragmatic terms. But, as history show, his policy was largely criticism than collaboration.

Although it was not new and since he borrowed it from his colleagues in South America, who had troubles with dictatorial regimes there, Sin effectively used this policy. Marcos was never comfortable with him and the Church policy.

The dictator used every means to co-opt Sin to his side, but the Manila prelate never gave him the satisfaction to support his dictatorship. It was a tantalizing success, as shown by the dictator’s dramatic ouster in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution.

I once covered a meeting of the Rotary Club of Manila, where Sin spoke as its guest speaker. Before those businessmen, Sin uttered a pronouncement that shook Marcos.

“It is the Church, which would sound the bell for their doom,” Sin in what was his way to denounce the dictatorship. That was in 1983, or weeks after the August 21, 1983 assassination of martyred Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr.

Sin was also credited for brokering the Cory Aquino – Doy Laurel ticket that gave Marcos the political nightmare in 1986.

Without Sin working on the background for the Cory-Doy ticket, Marcos could have won handily in 1986 “snap” presidential elections, as Doy Laurel was bent to run as the third presidential candidate to weaken Cory’s chances as the opposition candidate to face Marcos.

Sin’s sense of perfect timing, or the ability to discern when to speak the right things at the right time, was tested during the nascent stage of the EDSA Revolution in 1986.

Without Sin’s urgent call for the Filipino people to go and support the rebel forces led by Johnny Enrile and Fidel Ramos, it would be inconceivable if the world would ever witness the near bloodless EDSA People Power Revolution. Most likely, Marcos could have obliterated the rebel forces holed in Camps Aguinaldo and Crame.

Without Sin’s frantic call for the people to express their solidarity with the rebel forces, the military uprising at EDSA could have been a mere footnote in history.

Sin’s call was decisive to allow the people to participate in what could be described as the biggest political upheaval in the country’s modern history.

Sin’s attraction as a political player deeply respected by every political leader stemmed deeply from his unquestioned sense of integrity.

No, he never kowtowed to Marcos in exchange for some pieces of gold or silver. No, he was never sweet with Imelda, who represented the other half of the conjugal dictatorship. Sin was never part of the dictatorship, but instead chose to fight it.

He was far different from those noisy bishops, who practically sold their souls to the devil in exchange for Mitsubishi vehicles. Sin did his way quietly, but effectively.

ANG HULING ARAW NI FERDINAND MARCOS SA MALACANANG

Ni Philip M. Lustre Jr.

PAUNANG SALITA: Lubhang kasuka-suka ang patuloy na pangangalandakan ni Bongbong Marcos at ilang tagasunod na pinakamahusay na naging pangulo ng bansa ang namayapang diktador na si Ferdinand Marcos..

Pinakamahusay? Kung pinakamahusay siya bilang pangulo, bakit pinatalsik ng sambayanang Filipino sa Himagsikang EDSA si Ferdinand Sr.?

Bakit tumalilis sa Malacanang ng kara-karaka at nagmistulang isang talunang aso na nakabahag ang buntot sa dalawang huling paa?

Kung pinakamahusay siyang pangulo, bakit isinuka ng kasaysayan si Marcos at nagmukhang isang ketongin na pinandirihan sa pandaigdigang pamayanan (international community)?

At bakit sila ang patuloy na iginigiit na pinakamahusay na pangulo si Marcos at hindi man lamang bigyang katugunan ang ginawang paghuhusga ng kasaysayan sa diktador?

Maraming kabataan ang hindi ganap na nakakaalam o nakakaunawa kung bakit isinumpa ng kasaysayan si Ferdinand Marcos Sr. Marami ang hindi nakaalam kung paano umugit ang huling araw nila sa Palasyo ng Malacanang.

Hayaan ninyong aking ilahad ang kuwento ng kanilang pagkatalo at biglang paglisan sa Malacanang.

Ang aking ilalahad ay hindi isang eksena sa pelikulang “Titanic” kung saan ang barko ay papalubog. Nagkataon lamang na pamilyar ang mga eksena kung saan nagmistulang mga dagang tumatalon sa lumulubog na barko ang mga ilang piling karakter.

Hangad ng lathalaing ito na maunawaan ng mga kabataan ang mga pangyayari sa huling araw ng diktador sa Malacanang. Bahagi ito ng mga alaala ng naganap na EDSA People Power Revolution noong 1986.

Kahit natapos na ang masaysayang himagsikan, patuloy akong nakakatanggap ng mga detalye at piling impormasyon tungkol sa apat na araw ng himagsikan ng taongbayan sa EDSA at ang pagtatapos nito.

Isa sa pinakamahalagang yugto ng kasaysayan ang huling araw ng pamilyang Marcos sa Malacañang. Nangyari ito noong ika-25 ng Pebrero, 1986. Sa araw na ito, nawalan ng pag-asa, sigla, at kapangyarihan si Ferdinand Marcos, ang diktador ng namuno sa Filipinas sa loob ng 20 taon.

Nalusaw ang base ng kaniyang kapangyarihan, lalo na ang militar. Lumipat sa kalabang rebeldeng puwersa ang maraming lider militar.

Kahit na palaging sumusuporta kay Marcos ang pangulo ng Estados Unidos, nagbago ng tono si Ronald Reagan sa payo ng U.S. State Department at U.S. Ambassador sa Filipinas na si Stephen Bosworth.

Nakakabalisa ang hindi ganap na pagbabanggit sa kuwento ng EDSA People Revolution ang apat na araw na himagsikan, lalo na ang pinakahuling araw. Hindi ito katulad ng mga huling araw ni Adolf Hitler na naging tema ng ilang pelikula.

Habang aking tinitipon, binabawi, at nagbabalik tanaw ang ilang mga alaala, talata, at panayam sa ilang tao na may kinalaman sa mga Marcos, aking natutuklasan ang mga bagong detalye na ngayon lamang lumutang sa publiko. Nagbibigay ito ng kasiyahan sa isang mamamahayag na katulad ko. Hindi nalalayo ang isang mamamahayag sa isang pantas, o iskolar.

Ito ang aking kuwento:)

HINDI NAKATULOG si Ferdinand Marcos sa makasaysayang gabi ng Pebrero 25, 1986. Nang tumunog ang orasan bilang hudyat ng pagsapit ng hatinggabi, naramdaman niyang paunti-unting nawawala ang kaniyang kapangyarihan bilang diktador.

Ito ay dahil patuloy na sumakabilang panig ang mga pulutong ng lider militar sa rebeldeng kampo nina Juan Ponce Enrile at Fidel Ramos, ang dalawang lider na nagsagawa ng hindi maisip na pagtalikod sa pamahalaan ni Marcos tatlong araw ang nakakalipas.

Nagtungo ang maraming opisyales ng militar sa Camp Crame upang sumumpa ng suporta sa kampo nina JPE-FVR. Ang ibang opisyales nama'y nanatili sa kani-kanilang kampo, areas of responsibility, at command posts.

Hindi kinakailangan na pumunta sila sa Camp Crame; nasa panig na sila ng mga rebelde.

Tahimik na nakipag-usap ang puwersang rebelde para sa maramihang paglipat ng lider militar na hindi pa kaanib sa rebeldeng hanay.

Sa kanilang pagsapi sa puwersang rebelde, tangi nilang ginawa ang hindi pagsunod sa mga iniutos ni Marcos at ang kaniyang kapanalig na tulad ni AFP chief of staff Gen. Fabian Ver at ilang opisyales na nananatiling tapat kay Marcos.

Nagmistulang isang hari na walang kaharian si Marcos.

Isang palaisipan kung gumagana pa ng maayos sa kasagsagan ng himagsikan ng EDSA ang kinasisindakang intelligence network na binuo ni Ver at kaniyang tapat na kapanalig sa panahon ng pamahalaang batas militar. Sa totoo lang, hindi na ito naging mabisa sa mga yugtong iyon.

Walang sapat na impormasyong nakalap na maaaring pagbasehan nina Marcos at Ver sa kanilang mga desisyon. Kumikilos sila ng maling mali.

Malungkot at mapanglaw ang dalawa ngunit hindi dahil sa kapaguran sa nakalipas na tatlong araw kundi dahil nararamdaman na nila ang parating na katapusan.

Inumpisahan ni Marcos ang araw na nakikipagtalo kay Ver at ang anak niyang si Ferdinand Jr., o Bongbong, na nakaunipormeng fatigue upang ipakita ang kaniyang kahandaan na lumusob sa digmaan. Pinagtatalunan nila ang napipintong paglusob sa puwersang rebelde na nagkukuta noon sa Camp Crame.

Ipinagtutulakan ni Ver at Bongbong kay Marcos ang pagbibigay ng kaniyang huling utos upang tuluyang mapasabog ng mga papaunting puwersahang loyalista ang Camp Crame, Hindi nila alintana ang mga daan-daang libong sibilyan na nagkakanlong sa mga rebelde doon.

Ngunit patuloy na tumatanggi sa kanilang bawat pagtatangka ang diktador na patuloy naman ang pagsama ng kaniyang kalusugan dahil sa matinding kapaguran.

Kahapon lamang, nagkaroon ng puwersang panghimpapawid ang mga rebelde nang sumapi sa kanila ang mga piloto na pinamumunuan ni Col. Antonio Sotelo.

Pinaputukan ng mga rebelde ang Malacañang upang bigyang babala si Marcos na mayroon na silang lakas panghimpapawid.

Ginugol ni Unang Ginang Imelda Marcos ang unang dalawa o tatlong oras ng ika-25 ng Pebrero na palabas-masok sa pribadong sambahan upang magdasal sa pag-aakalang mahihingi niya sa mga santo sa kalangitan ang pagpapaalis sa mga daan-daang libong tao na nagtipon sa EDSA at maging sa ibang lansangan sa paligid ng Camp Crame at Camp Aguinaldo.

Naririnig niya ang mainit na palitan ng mga katwiran sa pagitan ng kaniyang asawa, Ver, at Bongbong sa loob ng silid ng diktador, bagaman nararamdaman niyang pagod na siya upang humalo pa sa walang kabuluhang pag-uusap.

Tanging si Ver at Bongbong lamang ang may lakas na ituloy ang laban at bigyan ng utos ang mga tropang loyalista na pagwatak-watakin ang mga taong nagtipon sa kahabaan ng EDSA.

Ngunit walang nakinig sa kanilang order. Wala kahit isa sa mga natitirang heneral na tapat kay Marcos ang nakakaisip na magagawa niya ang kanilang ipinag-uutos.

Nang sumapit ang ikatlo ng madaling araw, tinawagan ni Marcos si U.S. Sen. Paul Laxalt, isang mambabatas na Republican na kasapi sa bipartisan group ng mga mambabatas na Amerikano na nagmasid sa nakalipas ng biglaang halalang pampanguluhan noong Pebrero 7, 1986.

Ipinahayag ni Laxalt ang mungkahing solusyon ni Reagan upang matapos ang krisis pulitikal. Ito ang pakikibahagi niya ng kapangyarihan (powersharing) kay Cory Aquino. Ngunit walang sigla si Marcos na tanggapin ang ganitong mungkahi.

Tahasang binigyan ni Marcos si Laxalt ng totohanang sitwasyon na natatalo ang puwersang loyalista sa nagaganap na krisis.
Tinapos ni Laxalt ang pakikipag-usap bagaman sinabi niya na babalikan ang diktador matapos niyang makipag-usap kay Reagan.

Ganap na ikalima ng umaga (Philippine time) ng bumalik si Laxalt sa telepono upang kausapin si Marcos na kara-karakang nagtanong kung nagbago ng isip ang itinuturing niyang kabigan na si Reagan hinggil sa pagtrato sa kaniyang pamahalaan.

Kinalap ng mga iskolar ang maikli ngunit masidhing palitan ng pangungusap na nagpapakita lamang ang nakakaawang kalagayan ng pabagsak na diktador.

"Hinihingi na ba ni Pangulong Reagan na ako’y bumaba na sa poder? (Is President Reagan asking me to step down?)" ang tanong ni Marcos kay Laxalt.

"Wala sa ganiyang posisyon si Pangulong Reagan upang humingi ng ganyang kahilingan (President Reagan is not in a position to make that kind of demand)," ang sagot ni Laxalt.

"Senador, anong tingin mo? Dapat na ba akong bumaba? (Senator, what do you think? Should I step down?)"

"Ginoong Pangulo, hindi ako natatali sa mga diplomatikong pagbabawal. Ako’y nagsasalita para sa ganang akin lamang. Sa tingin ko dapat ka ng umalis. At umalis ka ng mahinahon. Dumating na ang oras, (Mr. President, I’m not bound by diplomatic restraint. I am only talking for myself. I think you should cut. And cut cleanly. The time has come.)” ani Laxalt na nagsalita ng may kahalong tono ng kapangyarihan at pagkaawa.

Hindi nagsalita si Marcos ng halos dalawang minuto na ikinabahala naman ni Laxalt.

"Ginoong Panglulo nandiyan ka pa ba? (Mr. President, are you still there?)"

"Ako’y bigong-bigo (I am very, very disappointed)," ani Marcos.

Sa mga oras na iyon, ang pakiramdam ng napipintong pagkatalo ang nagbigay kaalaman sa kaniya na kinakailangan na niyang umalis ng Malacañang sa isang hindi maayos na paglisan.

Hinarap ni Marcos ang mga natitiras oras sa Palasyo na kalakip ang hatol sa palad ng kaniyang naghihingalong kamay. Ito ay isang totohanan at hindi mababaligtad na pagkatalo, bagaman gumawa ng ilang hakbang si Marcos para makakuha ng ilang pampalubag-loob.

Ngunit tapos na ang lahat. Kahit ano pa ang kaniyang gawin upang magkaroon ng ilang pampalubag-loob ay magpapatagal lamang sa kaniyang paghihirap.

Nawalan rin ng pag-asa ang lumuluhang si Imelda.

Sa huling pagtatangka na maisalba ang sitwasyon, personal niyang tinawagan si U.S. First Lady Nancy Reagan upang itanong ang intensyon ng Estados Unidos sa Filipinas. Ngunit hindi makapagbigay ang huli ng anumang malinaw na komitment at nagsabi pang kakausapin niya ang kaniyang asawa.

Tinawagan rin ni Marcos si Labor Minister Blas Ople na nandoon sa Washington sa isang misyong diplomatiko na kumbinsihin ang mga opisyales ng Estados Unidos sa “tagumpay” ng nakalipas ng halalang pampanguluhan.

Ngunit nagbigay lamang ang huli ng isang hindi magandang ulat. Sa oras na iyon, nagsimulang mag-impake ang mga Marcos ng anumang mayroon sila at dapat dalhin sa paglisan nila sa Malacañang.

Sa mga oras na iyon, nagising na si Chief Justice Ramon Aquino at ang asawa na si Carolina Griño Aquino upang maghanda sa panunumpa ni Marcos sa Malacañang, kung saan doon rin sila natulog.

Dahil sa nakakabahalang sitwasyon, hiningi ni Marcos sa kaniyang mga tauhan sa hapon ng Pebrero 24 na sunduin si CJ Aquino at asawa mula sa kanilang tirahan sa Maynila.

Sapagkat kostumbre sa mga nakaraang inagurasyon ng mga nahalal na pangulo, ang punong hukom ng Korte Suprema ang nakatakdang magpasumpa sa bago o muling nahalal na pangulo.

Tanging si Marcos ang muling nahalal na pangulo sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng 1935.

Kinumbinsi ni Marcos si Aquino na magbigay ng panunumpa. Ngunit dahil sa magulong sitwasyon, kinakailangang matulog ni Aquno at asawa niya sa Palasyo upang makasiguro na nandoon sila sa araw ng panunumpa.

Maliban sa Unyon Sobyet na sa dakong huli ay naguho sa mahigit na isang dosenang hiwa-hiwalay ng republika, nagpahayag ang karamihan sa mga bansang pinamumunuan ng Pransiya at mahigit isang dosenang bansa sa Europa na hindi sila magpapadala ng sugo o kinatawan sa panunumpa ni Marcos sa Malacañang.

Sinabi nila na nabahiran ng pandaraya ang pagwawagi ni Marcos sa nakaraang halalan at inaming hindi nila dadaluhan ang nakatakdang panunumpa ni Marcos.

Nauna ng isang hakbang ang Pransiya nang ipahayag ng gobyerno nito ilang minuto matapos makapanumpa si Cory Aquno sa naturang araw rin na napagpasyahan na kilalanin ang pagiging lehitimo ng pamahalaan ni Cory Aquino.

Gayunpaman, nagpasya si Marcos na ituloy ang kaniyang sariling panunumpa. Sinabi ng kaniyang isipang nakalublob sa letra ng batas na kakailanganin niya ang panunumpa upang ganap na maangkin ang panguluhan. Ramdam niya na nahalaga iyon kahit na palabas lamang.

At sa pagsapit ng bukang liwayway, dali-daling nagmobilisa ang daan-daang loyalista ni Marcos mula sa mga dukhang komunidad ng Maynila, partikular ang Tundo, Paco, at Santa Ana — at Quezon City. Sumakay sila ng mga inarkilang dyip at pumunta sa Malacañang upang magsilbing saksi.

Sa ganap na alas-nuwebe ng umaga, napuno ang pook tipunan ng Malacañang ng mahigit tatlong libong loyalista ni Marcos na pawang nakasuot ng shorts, sando, tsinelas at mumurahing gomang sapatos.

Binigyan sila ng ng mga puting white T-shirts na may nakasulat na “Marcos pa rin” at malilit ng bandila na may kaparehong kalatas.

Naghihiyawan sila ng "Marcos pa rin" at "batas militar" na animo’y naging mantra ng bumabagsak na pamahalaan.

Sa panulukan naman ng Nagtahan Bridge at J.P. Laurel, nagtipon ang daan-daang makakaliwang aktibista na nagmukhang kagigising lamang mula sa kanilang mahimbing na pagkakatulog.

Napagtanto nila na hindi nila basta i-boykot ang tipanan ng mamamayang Filipino sa tadhana.

Napagtanto nila na hindi sila dapat manatiling isang kumpol ng mga nakakapesteng sampay bakod.

Nagtipon sila doon upang igiit ang kanilang sariling paraan upang patalsikin si Marcos sa Malacañang. Muntik na silang nagpang-abot ng mga loyalista ni Marcos.

Bago sumapit ang alas-onse ng umaga, nanumpa si Cory Aquino sa makasaysayang Club Filipino sa Greenhills, San Juan City upang magsilbing hudyat na pormal siyang magsisilbi bilang pangulo ng bansa.

Nang sumapit ang alas-onse ng umaga, pinayagang pumasok ang mahigit 500 loyalista ni Marcos sa loob mismo ng Malacañang ceremonial hall, habang ang iba nama’y nanatili sa labas, o pook tipunan.

Tsinelas at gomang sapatos ang suot ng ilan. Naninigarilyo naman ang iba sa tuwirang paglabag sa pagbabawal sa paninigarilyo.

Nakasuot si Imelda ng kaniyang sariling terno, habang nakasuot naman ng pormal na damit ang mga supling na Imee at Irene at ang kani-kanilang asawa.

Hindi kagyat na nakita si Bongbong bagaman lumitaw na nakasuot ng unipormeng combat fatigue habang umawit si Marcos at Imelda sa harap ng mga loyalista sa balkonahe ng Malacañang ilang minuto matapos ang panunumpa.

Kasama sa mga loyalista ni Marcos na nagpuntahan sa Palasyo noong araw na iyon ang aking kamag-anak na kasapi sa Iglesia Ni Cristo na sinabihan ng kanilang lider na sumama sa paglusob sa Malacañang.

Nagmistulang isang ahente ang kanilang lider na nangako ng libreng pagkain at sasakyan at P300 "appearance fee" kada taong pupunta sa Palasyo. Ngunit dahil sa nakakakabahalang sitwasyon, nawala ang kanilang lider, ngunit muli itong lumitaw kinagabihan upang iibigay ang P150 sa bawat taong pumunta. Walang paliwanag sa kulang na P150.

Sinabi niya sa akin na umalis sila ng ala-una ng tanghali matapos makatanggap sila ng ulat tungkol sa napipintong paglusob ng mga rebelde sa Malacañang.

Pinangasiwaan ni Punong Mahistrado Ramon Aquino ang panunumpa ni Marcos.

Ngunit sa sandaling inilatag ni Marcos ang kanilang kaliwang kamay sa isang sipi ng Banal na Bibliya at itaas ang kanang kamay upang umpisahan ang panunumpa, isang sundalong sharpshooter ang umasinta sa transmitter ng tatlong TV networks at binaril ito ng walang mintis o pagsablay upang tapusin ang sabay-sabay na pagsasapahimpapawid ng tatlong TV networks.

Biglang nawala ang sabay-sabay ang pagsasahimpapawid ng panunumpa ni Marcos.

Ngunit ipinagpatuloy ni Marcos ang panunumpa na parang walang anumang nangyari.

Pagkatapos, nagsalita siya sa harap ng pulutong ng mga loyalista sa balkonahe upang bigyan ang taong bayan ng isang sulyap ng isang nakakalungkot na larawan ng diktador na pabagsak mula sa kapangyarihan.

Hindi nagpakita si Arturo Tolentino, ang bise presidenteng kandidato na kasama ni Marcos, Prime Minister Cesar Virata, at mahigit sa kalahati ng mga Gabinete niya, at halos lahat na kasapi sa diplomatic corps, o mga ambassador ng iba’t-ibang bansa.

Ipinakita ng hindi nila pagdalo sa Malacanang na nagmistulang isang barkong papalubog ang gobyerno ni Marcos.

Nagkaroon pa ng kapal ng apog o lakas ng loob ang ilang kasapi ng Batasang Pambansa na kabilang sa Kilusang Bagong Lipunan ni Marcos katulad ni Jose Zubiri ang dumalo sa panunumpa ni Cory Aquino sa Club Filipino upang magmistulang mga unang daga na tumalon mula sa lumulubog na barko.

Napagtanto ni Punong Mahistrado Ramon Aquino at asawang Carolina na patalo na nga si Marcos sa labanang pulitikal. Nakatanggap rin sila ng babala ng nakatakdang paglusob ng mga rebelde sa Malacanang. At kagyat silang tumalilis matapos ang panunumpa ni Marcos.

Nakita ng ilang saksi ang mag-asawa na naglalakad sa dako ng Singian Clinic sa kahabaan ng J.P. Laurel. Sinabi naman ng Ilang saksi na lumiko sila sa Arlegui at narating ang Legarda kung saan sumakay sila ng isang taksi papauwi sa kanilang tahanan. Hindi sila nananghalian sa Malacañang.

Biglaan ring lumisan si Information Minister Gregorio Cendaña matapos ang inagurasyon. Hindi rin siya kumain ng tanghalian.

Kahit ang mga kasapi ng Malacañang press corps, o pangkat ng mamamahayag na nakabase sa Palasyo, ay hindi rin kumain.

Naging tampulan ng masakit na biro ng mga mamamahayag ang pagkawala ni Cendana sa araw na iyon.

Pagkatapos ng panunumpa, ipinagpatuloy ng unang pamilya ang pag-iimpake ng kanilang mga gamit sa isang paglalakbay na nararamdaman nila sa mga panahong iyon.

Hindi nagkatotoo ang napipintong paglusob ng mga rebelde. Bagkus, naging abala si Marcos sa paghahanda para sa kanilang paglisan.

Kausap niya si Ambassador Bosworth upang humingi ng ilang helikopter na magdadala sa kanila sa isang destinasyon na hindi binabanggit.

Sa mga oras na iyon, tumakas na rin ang mga piloto ng pangulo sa Palasyo.

Nagsuot naman ng damit sibilyan ang ilang kasapi ng Presidential Security Command at nangawala ng hindi nagpapaalam.

Kahit si Ver ay nagpaalam na sa kaniyang mga opisyan bagaman hindi malinaw ang dahilan ng kaniyang pamamaalam.

Hindi malinaw kung ano ang plano sa unang oras ng gabi ng Pebrero 25.

Nais ni Marcos na umuwi sa kaniyang tahanan sa Paoay, Ilocos Norte. Ngunit matigas si Cory Aquino sa kaniyang pasya na dapat siyang pumunta at manatili bilang destierro (exile) sa Estados Unidos.

Naging isang matinding biro sa mga Filipino na hindi ganap na naunawaan ng pilotong Amerikano ang kahilingan ni Marcos na dalhin sila sa Paoay. Sa halip, dinala sila sa Hawaii.

Pagsapit ng alas-diyes ng gabi, ilang helikopter ang sinakyan ng mga pamilya ni Marcos at Ver sa Malacañang at dinala sila Clark Air Base in Pampanga. Mula doon, isang eroplano naman ng Estados Unidos ang nagdala sa kanila sa Hawaii.

Ginugol ni Marcos ang kaniyang huling araw bilang isang sakitin at pulitikong laos. Namatay siya sa Hawaii noong 1989.

Samantala, isang bagong pamahalaan ang nanungkulan at inumpisahan ang napakahirap at nakakatureteng paglalakbay upang ibalik ang demokrsasya sa bansa.

(Orihinal na inilimbag sa wikang Ingles sa CNN Philippines website noong June 17, 2015.)

EDSA REVOLUTION ON ITS THIRD DAY: MORAL CRISIS RESOLUTION

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

N. B.: Since the day the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution broke out, I did not have sufficient sleep. I slept three hours at the most. Chronicling EDSA Revolution was a backbreaking job. But it was fulfilling too, knowing that I occupied a front seat at that particular juncture in history. 

Later, I would regal friends, particularly post-EDSA journalists, with stories about the EDSA Revolution. To be the "bangka" (or narrator-in-chief) of those discussions brings enormous satisfaction for a journalist like me. 

Please care to read.

ALMOST everybody confronted the EDSA Revolution as a moral crisis of sort. Hundreds of thousands of citizens - rich and poor, young and old, men and women - went to EDSA to answer a long lingering urge that the oppressive Marcos dictatorship had to go.

They did it because their conscience told them to do so.

Those military officers, who were caught between their loyalty to dictator Ferdinand Marcos and the military rebels led by Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos, found themselves in a moral dilemma, as they were no longer fencesitters.

They grappled with their conscience and did what they had to do in the final day of reckoning . Even coup plotters, led by Col. Gregorio Honasan, realized that going against Marcos and his dictatorship was a moral issue.

The EDSA Revolution and its antecedents were no different from the situation when the Nazis, led by Adolf Hitler plunged Germany into a war of attrition with major world powers.

Seeing the futility of the war and realizing that Hitler would not surrender despite losing men and resources, a coterie of well meaning civilian and military leaders took their chances and launched the July 20, 1944 coup.

Col. Klaus von Stauffenberg, a Catholic monarchist and upright military leader, followed what his conscience dictated and planted the bomb at Hitler's lair in Poland. 

Because Hitler survived the attack and their coup failed, Stauffenberg paid the supreme sacrifice, which was his life. But he never wavered until the end. There was no indication that he ever regretted it.

Although the third day of the EDSA Revolution fell on a Monday, many offices did not require their workers to report for work. 

But it was a day of final attack for the loyalist forces under Fabian Ver and Major-General Josephus Ramas, the Army commanding general, who was assigned by Ver to handle the dispersal operations against the masses of people who trooped to EDSA to protect the Enrile-Ramos faction.

Initially at 5 am, a composite group of soldiers and police personnel, led by Brig. Gen. Ruben Escarcha, went to disperse the crowd with teargas and truncheons along EDSA near Santolan but the winds changed its course and the teargas went to the law enforcers instead. 

At the end, they saw it fit to join the people.

Escarcha had to pick up the pieces, as Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas Jr. and Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim refused to follow the dictator's order to disperse the crowd.

Col. Braulio Balbas went to Camp Aguinaldo with a Philippine Marines contingent to launch mortar and rocket attacks on the early morning to Camp Crame, where the rebel forces were holed in. 

But he never carried his order to attack and instead produced tons of lies and alibis at every turn to Ver and Ramas just to delay any attack on the hapless sea of humanity that gathered on EDSA.

By lunchtime, an exasperated Ramas ordered Balbas and his contingent to return to Fort Bonifacio, as nothing had happened. 

Balbas could not countenance the idea of killing thousands of civilians, who were to be killed in the crossfire if ever he would carry out the order.

But what provided the turning point of the fateful military uprising was the decision of Col. Antonio Sotelo and his men not to use their helicopter gunships against Camp Crame and the massing civilians there.

Instead, they landed on parade grounds and defected to the rebel forces. 

Sotelo did it because it was the dictate of his conscience. It was a moral issue, which he resolved by not using their superior forces against the people. He did it because he felt he had to be "on the right side of history."

Being on the right side of history is always a ticklish question. No one, for sure, could say whether his decisions could launch him on what could be described the right side of history.

Even on its fundamental terms, staying on the right side of history is essentially grappling moral issues in the most honest way. 

It is answering the dictates of one's conscience; it is adhering to his set of moral values and personal convictions.

It is not having a perplexed conscience, but a working conscience that provides a functioning brake system to refrain from pursuing something that is essentially evil and immoral.

From day one, the loyalist camp had a myriad of chances to pulverize (please read: pulverize) the Enrile-Ramos forces either in Camp Aguinaldo or Camp Crame. But it did not happen.

Somehow, orders to disperse those throngs of humanity that gathered along EDSA and the other thoroughfares surrounding the two camps fell on deaf ears.

Without those dispersal operations, the planned attacks against the rebel forces did not materialize. Nothing would happen though.

We could see divine intervention for a prayerful nation like ours. 

But we do not lose sight of the fact that the men, who were supposed to carry out the orders to annihilate the rebel forces at the expense of the people, saw the light and listen to the dictates of their conscience. Nobody wanted to be known as "the butcher of EDSA."
This makes EDSA Revolution a model of quiet, bloodless, but effective uprising for the entire world to see and observe. This is our source of pride.

It was exactly on the third day of EDSA Revolution that the balance of power tilted to favor the rebel forces. Many military officers, tired of the excesses of the Marcos regime and the favoritism and corrupt ways in the defense and military establishment, defected to the rebel forces.

To neutralize any orders to attack Camp Crame, two jet planes, manned by pilots who had defected to the rebel camp, fired six rockets that injured at least ten persons and caused damages to Malacanang.

Several helicopter gunships, now with the rebel forces, disabled other helicopters at Nichols to stop further any loyalist attacks. 

It showed that the rebel camp had air power, while the loyalist forces did not have it anymore. By twilight, Ramos had to announce that the rebel forces had 75 percent of the entire Armed Forces.

Also, the political issues were resolved on the third day. 

In their meeting, Cory Aquino, Enrile and Ramos agreed that Cory would be installed as president. 

No, the EDSA Revolution would not give rise to any military junta, although the canceled coup, led by Col. Gregorio Honasan, stipulated that a seven-man joint civilian-military junta, to be headed by Cory, would be created to replace the Marcos dictatorship.

Also, it was agreed that Cory would take her oath as president the following day, February 25, at a neutral place, which was Club Filipino in Greenhills, San Juan, and not in Camp Crame, which was earlier proposed.

The culmination of the EDSA Revolution was about to happen.

THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF EDSA REVOLUTION

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

Nota Bene: Five years ago, I wrote the original version of my historical recollections of the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. Since then, new bits of pieces of information have kept on coming out, prompting me to revise the original version to include new details.

The broadened version however enables me to enhance my personal understanding of the EDSA People Power Revolution. No, I don’t buy the argument that we have to romanticize EDSA. There’s no need.

The EDSA People Power Revolution can stand on its own. It is a single major political upheaval that showed our people (or the Filipino people) at our best. There is no need to prove it.

What a Filipino – whether he is a millennial or not – has to do is to understand and accept that Filipinos are capable of transcending their differences to topple a detested dictatorship.

Maj. Gen. Rodolfo Canieso, the affable but complete soldier who took over the Philippine Army immediately after the downfall of the Marcos regime, once told me in an interview that it only required a single shot to convert the ongoing EDSA Revolution into a mayhem. It did not happen for so many reasons; divine intervention could be one.

In the late 1980s, a ranking military officer, in a published commentary on the defunct Philippine Daily Globe newspaper suggested that had the powers-that-be in Malacanang used helicopters to drop tons of stolen money to the throngs of humanity that gathered in EDSA, the result could have been different. It did not happen because the Marcoses were deeply attached to their loot, he said.

Many scenarios were concocted by several minds, including mischievous ones. Historical imagination has been their favorite past time, as they keep on conjuring one image after another. Their sentences usually start with the words "had," "but," and "if only."

My notes about the EDSA Revolution are still with me. I managed to get some glimpses. I also read some existing literature about the EDSA lore. 

I am writing this piece for my new friends, who did not have the chance to read my previous posts and the young people, who hardly know what the EDSA Revolution mean for older guys like me.

My account:

THE EDSA People Power Revolution, according to San Jose Mercury's Lew Simons, an American journalist, was precipitated by what he described as a "half -truth."

Lew Simons was correct. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and his band of RAMboys, led by his chief security, Col. Greg Honasan, had hatched a plan to stage a coup d'etat against the Marcos dictatorship.

On Feb. 19, 1986, the leadership of the Reform the Armed Forces, or RAM, had decided to launch it on the early morning of Feb. 23, which fell on a Sunday.

But when the security men of Trade and Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin were arrested in the early morning of Feb. 22, 1986, Enrile and his group felt that their plan was compromised and uncovered by dictator Ferdinand Marcos and AFP chief of staff Gen. Fabian Ver.

It was time to alter what they had earlier decided.

Enrile and his group had a reason to be apprehensive. Three of the arrested 18 military men comprising Ongpin's security detail were reputedly RAM members.

Upon learning their arrest, Ongpin frantically called up Enrile, who was then sipping coffee with friends at Atrium's lobby in Makati to complain to Enrile that he felt "naked" without his security detail. He claimed he could not leave his house.

Enrile took it differently. He felt Ver and his men had uncovered the details of the planned coup and immediately sounded the alarm to get the coup plotters.

The RAMboys had at least two options: disperse and go their separate ways and later get arrested one by one by Marcos minions; or stage a last defense at the Ministry of National Defense building, where Marcos and his men could kill them.

Whichever way, the options appeared bleak. They cancelled the planned coup and decided to stage the holdout at the MND building inside Camp Aguinaldo.

Earlier, at around 4 or 5 am, Enrile discussed with his key people the contents of a speech which they prepared for him to read by noon time of Feb. 23.

If the coup succeeded with dictator Ferdinand Marcos either killed or captured, the plan was to create the National Council for Reconciliation, which would serve as the ruling junta.

There was originally no plan to put Cory Aquino as president. There was only a plan to invite her as one of the members of the ruling junta. 

Of course, Enrile would head it. To be invited to join the junta were prominent people, including the influential Manila Prelate Jaime Cardinal Sin.

Later accounts said Ongpin's security men, who were then jogging inside Fort Bonifacio, were arrested not because of the planned coup.

It was largely because they ventured into a restricted area there. They were caught scaling the fence of the house of Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, a Marcos loyalist general who headed the Philippine Marines.

Even Ver denied later they were arrested. But in some accounts, the cpatured Ongpin's men planned to kill Tadiar.

Ver said they were being “confined” for what he described a briefing about the security areas in Fort Bonifacio. In brief, Enrile and other coup plotters overreacted. They panicked.

Even Ver had his share of blame too. While Honasan and company were fortifying the MND building for what they expected an attack by Marcos forces, Ver did not know what was taking place during the fateful afternoon of February 22, 1986.

He and first lady Imelda Marcos took their own sweet time and attended as principal sponsors of the wedding of Philip Piccio, son of Air Force chief Gen. Vicente Piccio at the Villamor Air Base chapel.

The wedding and its reception overextended, even as developments were fast cascading during that fateful afternoon.

Even though they knew it, Ver's men did not have the courage to tell their boss about the anticipated breakaway of the Enrile-Ramos faction in the defense and military establishment.

Ver later learned it when JPE and Ramos were already holding the historic press conference, where they jointly announced their withdrawal of support from the Marcos regime. That prompted him to leave Pasay City to meet Marcos in Malacanang.

Marcos, for the first time, only had a solid idea about the coup plot, when the Presidential Security Command men arrested Capt. Ricardo Morales, one of the close-in security men of Imelda Marcos, in the early evening of Feb. 22.

Morales was arrested after he tried to spirit out firearms and ammunition from the PSC armory. They were for use by the coup plotters.

Under the coup plan, Honasan and his group were supposed to attack and take over Malacanang and kidnap the first couple and their children. Morales was among the PSC men, who were recruited to join the coup.

Morales, upon interrogation, gave details of the coup plot. An irate Col. Arturo Aruiza, Marcos's military aide de camp, nearly shot him.

It appeared that Morales did not know that the coup plot was earlier cancelled when RAM leaders knew that the plan was compromised.

During those days, they relied on the erratic landline telephone system for communications, as mobile cell phones came much later.

It was an issue of discomfiture for scholars and observers the issues behind Marcos's inability to launch an early attack on Emrile-Ramos forces, who took their last stand at the MND building.

His inability had enabled JPE and Ramos to bid their time and muster multisectoral support that gave rise to what was originally called "People Power."

Ver could not be described as dumb and incompetent either because he was among the first to urge Marcos to give a go-signal for an attack.

But Marcos never approved any attack, as he kept on hoping that Enrile and Ramos, whom he knew very closely, would give up after some cajoling. A political settlement would be a better choice than a military solution.

Even journalists, who stayed at the MND building after the fateful press conference, were told that they could stay at their own peril.

They (or “we” because I was among those journalists who were told about the dangers) were told that they should find ways for their escape because the attack could be lethal.

In fact, we were told that Honasan and his group would fight to the last man down. To their pleasant surprise, many journalists, including foreign mediamen, decided to stay. They were the first to provide the civilian support for the JPE-FVR group.

The Catholic Church-run Radio Veritas covered the press conference in its entirety. It did not stop its coverage henceforth. Many people listened, including the political opposition.

Cory Aquino was in Cebu City to launch the civil disobedience campaign there. She was supposed to go to Davao City the following day, but she had cancelled it upon learning the breakaway in Manila.

Cory stayed in the Carmelite Convent for security reasons. Even Cory was wary of Enrile's intentions until she talked to him over the phone.

Enrile pledged support for her, telling her that he believed she was the legitimate winner in the 1986 "snap" presidential elections.

Manila Prelate Jaime Cardinal Sin went twice to talk over Radio Veritas, urging all Filipinos of various faiths to support Enrile and Ramos, whom he described as "our friends."

Civil society leader Agapito "Butz" Aquino, who later became a senator, spoke over Radio Veritas to rally members of the August 21 Movement (ATOM) to support Enrile-Ramos group.

They were among the first people to arrive at Camp Aguinaldo to form the unprecedented human barricade to protect the military rebel forces.

Resignations followed. Postmaster General Roilo Golez resigned. Supreme Court associate justice Nestor Alampay also resigned. A number of active and retired military officials came to Camp Aguinaldo to express support.

It extended until the early morning of Feb. 23.

Marcos dilly dallied. He refused to order an attack, until it was discovered that no less than US President Ronald Reagan, through various channels at first and himself later on Feb. 23, warned him that any violent attack on those military rebels would lead to Washington's withdrawal of recognition from his government.

Marcos was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. He was in between the dog and the fire hydrant.

Some military and police officials toyed with Ver, as they quietly disobeyed his orders for them to disperse the groups of people, who later became a multitude around Camp Aguinaldo.

The dispersal orders were given on the early morning of Feb. 23.

Metrocom chief Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas had his disappearing act. Northern Police District chief Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim said yes but did nothing.

The military rebels later transferred to Camp Crame from Camp Aguinaldo, which they felt was too big to control and defend.

They only had 300 soldiers during the early hours of the breakaway.

Ver organized his crisis management team with Army chief Gen. Josephus Ramas as head. Philippine Marines chief Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar disliked Ramas's appointment because of the latter's lack of combat experience.

"Anong gagawin niya (what would he do)?" he loudly protested to Ver.

In the afternoon of Feb. 23, Tadiar led a Marines contingent to attack Camp Crame, but they were stopped by nuns with rosaries in their hands, and people, who gave them flowers, sandwiches, and bottles of soda drinks.

They retreated. No violent confrontation happened.

Meanwhile, Reagan made it known he was against any violent resolution of the impasse, virtually tying Marcos hands for any attack.

More military men defected to the military forces. The likes of ISAFP chief Brig. Gen. Fidel Singson, Phil. Navy Commodore Tagumpay Jardiniano, among others, found themselves in the rebel camp.

At that point, the Radio Veritas was successfully giving an account of the political crisis. Ver was already thinking to destroy Radio Veritas.

The order came to the lap of Brig. Gen. Antonio Palafox, a notorious Marcos loyalist general. He had to gather the men to implement the order.