By Philip M. Lustre Jr.
SOMEBODY asked me last Friday about my views on China’s claim of ownership over the vast South China Sea, of which the West Philippine Sea is part, and, of the course, the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision dismissing China's ownership claim.
I am happy to oblige to a legitimate request to express my views and post it on social media. I must express my gratitude to the netizen-friend for the request.
Allow me to provide a historical perspective on China's claim of ownership on almost the entire South China Sea. I once worked in the Manila bureau of Jiji Press, a Japanese news agency. This work experience has afforded me some insights about the issue.
Soviet concern
I remember very vividly way back in early 1981, or 35 years ago, when Alexei Petrov, the Manila-based correspondent of Tass, the official news agency of the then Soviet Union, asked then Foreign Affairs Minister Carlos P. Romulo about his views on the "various concepts" on the proposed settlement of the Spratlys issue. I had a vague idea of the Spratlys issue during those days, but somehow I could sense the deep interest of the Soviet journalists in Manila.
At that time, the Philippine foreign media, as represented by the Foreign Correspondents' Association of the Philippines, or FOCAP, had three Soviet journalists: one worked for Tass; another one for Pravda, the newspaper of the now defunct Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and another for Novosti, a Soviet agency features.
During those days, Western media had hyped the Spratlys, or the tiny specks of uninhabited islands in the middle of the South China Sea, as the next flashpoint of conflict in Asia. Western media was quite prophetic, as indicated by current developments. Incidentally, several countries, including the Philippines, have made claims over that part of the world, triggering tension among claimant-nations.
Western media could not help but describe the Spratlys as a tinderbox mainly because of the 1974 violent clash between the navies of China and Vietnam over the Paracels, another group of uninhabited islands in the South China Sea. The Paracels should not be confused with the Spratlys, which are nearer the Philippines. The Paracels are nearer China and Vietnam; they have conflicting claims on these islands, which, just like the Spratlys, have turtles and seabirds inhabitants.
I could only surmise at the Soviet's interest on the Spratlys issue. At that time, China had not made clear assertions of whatever rights they held on those specks of land, mostly barren rocks in the middle of the vast high seas south of China. China was then trying its best to become a progressive country under the direction of Deng Xiao Ping's leadership.
In 1978, Deng launched the Four Modernizations, a program that sought to rejuvenate the Chinese economy to put China at par with its neighbors. By the 1980s, China was busy strengthening its domestic economy. It was not yet strong. It could not compete yet, but it was determined to learn from other countries to strengthen its domestic front.
At that time, China was locked in a bitter struggle with its neighbor, the Soviet Union, which at that time was composed of 15 republics. It posed a danger to China because it had bitter border issues with Russia, the biggest and strongest republic in the old Soviet Union.
At that time, the world witnessed too the conflict between two superpowers - the old Soviet Union and the United States in what was then termed the "Cold War." They were bitterly locked in an arms race in a bipolar struggle. The old Soviet Union jealously watched the moves of China, which by then had somehow a modus vivendi with the US..
Over the next ten years, not much had happened on the conflicting claims on the Spratlys. The anticipated tension and turmoil did not happen though; it was basically the status quo. In brief, the tension had remained latent in the entire 1980s.
China trip
Let's fast forward to late 1991. I was part of the three-man delegation of Filipino journalists, which the Chinese government had invited for a two-week tour of China's five cities - Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Wu Yi City, Nanping, and Beijing. I was then a senior reporter of the Philippine Daily Globe and political writer of the revived Philippine Free Press, sister publication of the Globe. The other two journalists were the late Chit Estella of the Malaya and Sammy Santos of the Philippine Star. Sammy is now the head of the Senate press office.
By that time, the Four Modernizations, which Deng had launched 13 years earlier, had taken roots and gained momentum. It was in full swing. It could not be denied that China was on the right path. China was making unparalleled and dramatic changes, as indicated by its high annual growth rates.
Our visit there enabled us to converse with Chinese officials about their developmental strategies. They impressed on us China's avowed goal of reaching out to the outside world and become a responsible member of the community of nations.
At that time, I understood that China's development program is premised on peace, not war. That China could reach its development objectives to become a progressive nation through peaceful means was beyond any shadow of doubt.
One Chinese official, ostensibly a ranking member of the Communist Party, told us that a peaceful and stable China was Beijing's contribution to world peace. At first, I did not fully grasp the meaning of his statement. But minutes later, when I was alone in my hotel room, I began to understand the dimensions and implications of his statement.
My mind wandered and some random thoughts immediately came. What if those development initiatives failed and China became unstable? What if a civil strife reared its ugly head on China? I would not be surprised to see the grim scenario of a million or two Chinese refugees landing on Philippine shores. I could only shudder at the idea.
Hence, China's development strategies should be fully supported by the community of nations. The global community would be adversely affected by an unstable China.
The 1990s were quite uneventful too. China did not push its claim ownership over the particular decade. It was not that powerful yet, although the so-called "nine-dash line" is already in existence since 1947 as a basis for saying that it owns a bigger part of the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, Paracels, Pratas Islands, and Scarborough Shoal.
Incidentally, the nine-dash line was originally the "eleven-dash line," which the Guomintang government had advanced in 1947. The Communist Party-led Beijing government had reduced it to nine-dash line upon endorsement by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En lai. Beijing did not give any reason for the reduction, although it has been observed by maritime experts said the nine-dash line claim lies on unstable ground.
Hawkish faction
China's rise to become a regional power in Asia and eventually a global power could be the reason for its decision to assert its ownership claim on a big part of the South China Sea, including the West Philippine Sea, on the basis of historic rights over the areas covered by the nine-dash line in the South China Sea.
While it was economically and politically weak in the 1980s and 1990s, it chose to stay away from any potential trouble with other countries, opting to wait until it became stronger and more prepared in the 2000s.
Two years ago, Chito Sto. Romana, a keen watcher China, told a media forum that the rise of the militarist faction within China's ruling Communist Party could be the reason for its recent decision to assert its ownership claim over the South China Sea. The militarist faction could have probably thought that China did not face thorough opposition from other countries by the 2000s.
The United States did not take an active role in Asia after it dismantled its military bases in the Philippines. It further took a low profile when it got embroiled in 2005 in a controversy with the GMA administration, which chose to support a Filipino contract worker instead of following Washington's appeal to boycott certain Middle East countries that did not follow the US line on certain Middle East issues .
By the 2010s, China, as its way to assert its claim over the vast South China Sea, has started to establish military presence in the Spratlys by sending its navy vessels there, performing reclamation projects, and constructing airstrips and docks for use of military jets and naval vessels to fortify China's military presence there.
China's military presence and its assertion of "complete sovereignty" over the entire South China, not just the Spratlys and Paracels the way Western media had portrayed the territorial disputes in the 1980s and 1990s, has been a game changing developments in the 2010s that have threatened political stability in the area.
The Philippines's answer to China's muscle flexing was there to bring the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague-based international non-governmental body that resolves territorial disputes among nations. The Philippines won its case against China when the body handed its decision on July 16 this year. But Beijing has chosen to reject the decision.
Legal setback
The key findings of the Permanent Court of Arbitration:
· The so-called "nine-dash line" is invalid: "The Tribunal concluded that there was no legal basis for China's claim to historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the nine-dash line".
· Reclaimed islands have no exclusive economic zone: "The Tribunal noted that the current presence of official personnel on many of the features is dependent on outside support and not reflective of the number of features ... (and) .... that none the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones.
· "The Tribunal found that it could - without delimiting a boundary - declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China."
· China has behaved unlawfully. "China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law-enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine vessels."
· Beijing has damaged the environment: China's large-scale land reclamation has "caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems."
· Island building should have stopped during the dispute process: The panel said it had no jurisdiction over military standoff and Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese and Philippine military and law enforcement vessels are locked in confrontation.
· However, "China's recent large-scale reclamation and construction of artificial islands was incompatible with the obligations on a state during the dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as China has ... destroyed evidence of the condition of the natural features of the South China Sea that formed part of the parties' dispute. "
I personally maintain that the biggest implication of the arbitration tribunal's decision is to stop perceived initiatives of the Duterte administration to shift the Philippine foreign policy from effective deterrence to appeasement on China's hegemony.
It binds Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr., a greenhorn in foreign policy, to follow the 513-page decision, which clearly explains China's baseless claim of ownership over the South China Sea.
Hence, the decision does not support any collaborative direction for Philippine foreign policy towards what could be regarded China's expansionist designs over the West Philippine Sea.
It would be extremely difficult for the administration to ignore the arbitration tribunal's decision and veer towards appeasing China without courting serious political repercussions in the domestic front and the international community.
China is bent to ignore the historic decision but not without becoming a pariah in the international community, a development, which does not favor its ongoing initiatives to become a global economic power.
In addressing China's hegemony over the West Philippine Sea, the erstwhile Aquino administration has taken a foreign policy that has been largely characterized by effective deterrence, employing the multilateral approach, where the issue of China's claim of historic rights over the West Philippine Sea was brought to the arbitration tribunal for appropriate decision.
Amid threats and intimidation by Beijing, which has rejected the multilateral approach, the administration rejected Beijing's preference to settle the contentious issue through bilateral discussions between the two countries.
In what could be considered a display of cowardice and acquiescence, the new administration, unmindful of the existing foreign policy initiatives and dismissive of the Aquino administration's inroads, has been seeking ways to transform the current foreign policy into appeasement in exchange for certain foreign assistance for infrastructure projects in the country.
Critics have described the Duterte administration's mindset as mendicancy, plain and simple, and a virtual surrender of its moral high ground to what has been described a rogue state, which is China.
The overwhelming criticisms on the Duterte administration's lack of vigor in its interpretation and pursuit of existing foreign policy has led it to rethink its position and sing a new song to indicate a change its direction. No less than Yasay had indicated the change when he addressed the Asia-Europe meeting in Ulaanbator, Mongolia two days ago.
Hence, the new administration could not ignore the Permanent Court of Arbitration's decision, which is virtually written on stone. Although China has rejected it, Beijing can not ignore it either without courting serious political repercussions in its standing in the international community.
If it insists on its rejection, China could end up a pariah in the world community, as it loses its clout and influence in the community of nations.
Second Tiananmen
Chito Sto. Romana described the arbitration tribunal's decision as an earthshaking decision that could isolate China from the rest of the world, if it ignores and defies it.
If it chooses to reject it, China will meet a new situation that could run parallel or similar to the 1989 Tiananmien Square massacre, where scores of Chinese activists died as a result of the government crackdown on pro-democracy protests there.
The monumental embarrassment that Beijing suffered from that incident was global; China, for sure, does not want it to happen again. China suffered severe isolation and moral sanctions the international community had unleashed on her.
But China could still recover because of indications that it could taking some face saving mode. This is because Beijing would not allow itself to squander the gains it has cultivated over the last 30 years, Sto. Romana told this blogger in an interview.
Despite the heavy polemics spouted by some high ranking Chinese leaders on Beijing's rejection of the arbitration tribunal's verdict, the Duterte administration should evolve new foreign policy initiatives that would help Beijing to find a face-saving exit mechanism on the issue. There are many creative ways to do it. Beijing and Manila could work on moves to demilitarize the area, which in many ways could lessen the tension in that part of the world.
Still, it's Beijing ball game. The ball is in its court. It has to take with grace its legal defeat. The fact is that China was still looking for a gentle way out, where it would not lose face before the international community.
I tend to believe that China would take foreign policy initiatives by its lonesome self to avoid global humiliation and embarrassment.
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