PERSECUTED CRONY?

 

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

 RODOLFO Cuenca’s authorized biography book "Builder of Bridges: The Rudy Cuenca Story," which is reluctantly written by Jose "Butch" Dalisay Jr. and Antonette Reyes, contains details, which were mostly unknown to the public until it came out. These details were mostly on the dynamics of the relationship among cronies of dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the height of the infamous and detested martial law regime. Rudy Cuenca is best remembered as the guy who led what could be perceived the meteroic rise of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), which became the country’s biggest and leading construction firm in the 1970s and 1980s.

Let us be forewarned that any authorized biography is no different from an autobiography. It contains feats worthy of records, conversations and associations with famous people, or some weird experiences that could be humorous, poignant, or striking. Any authorized biography could only contain what the subject of a biography wishes to divulge. Omissions and commissions are the likely aftermath of the written works.

According to Cuenca, CDCP was created in 1966 by an odd mixture of construction and banking guys. It was their response to the call of Ferdinand Marcos in his first year in office to strengthen the construction industry so that the country could pursue an ambitious infrastructure program. CDCP rose to the occasion, as it built over the succeeding years NLEX and SLEX, LRT-1, San Juanico Bridge and the 3000-hectare reclamation of the Manila Bay. It also diversified into other areas including construction projects in the Middle East, mining (CDCP Mining which later became Basay Mines), shipping (Galleon Shipping), labor subcontracting, among others. At its prime, CDCP had 38 subsidiaries. It was ranked as one of the biggest construction firms in the world.

Nearly 20 years after it was formed, CDCP fell flat on the ground, a victim of its own ambition and faulty finances. Rudy Cuenca, while busy to conclude contracts with the foreign and the Marcos governments, failed to check its own finances. Because of over-extension, it had failed to collect payments of its projects, leading to severe liquidity issues. According to Cuenca, CDCP was busy pursuing projects and spending for their completion, but could hardly collect payments so that it did not have sufficient funds to finance its operations. The mismatch was something it could not handle.

For a while, CDCP resorted to short-term borrowings, or through issuance of commercial papers, which was then a common practice during those days. They were quite exorbitant because they carried short repayment periods and high interest rates. CDCP kept on rolling those maturing commercial debts , but there was a limit for those loan rollovers. In the end, it collapsed because of its own weight. Its debts were so huge to the point it could not service them.

The authors did not discuss the major financial antecedents that led to CDCP’s liquidity issues. There was omission of the Dewey Dee affair. Dewey Dee was a Chinoy businessmen, who absconded over P600 million in debts. The Dewey Dee caper led to drastic reforms in the local financial system, including a tight squeeze and control on the issuance of commercial papers. Hence, it came to the point when CDCP could not issue new commercial papers. Hence, it could no longer roll over its maturing debts.

Moreover, the book did not discuss CDCP’s ownership – beneficial, or whatever. While the authors named Rudy Cuenca and his business associates as among its owners, they did not in any way indicate if Ferdinand Marcos was among the owners. Knowing the insatiable greed of dictator Ferdinand Marcos, it is inconceivable that Marcos did not own a big part of it. The manner how it cornered big ticket projects during the days of the dictatorship showed Marcos somehow favored from it. The authors did not discuss why Marcos did not help Rudy Cuenca to save CDCP, but instead allow its corporate demise.

Also, the book did not discuss Rudy Cuenca's failure at length. This is to be expected. While the book was brutally frank, it was written to serve Rudy Cuenca’s purpose and interest. Authorized biographies are essentially self-serving. Re his debacle and downfall, Rudy Cuenca laid the blame squarely on three major characters, whom he claimed to have ganged up on him. He did not use the word "conspiracy," but Roberto Ongpin and siblings Imelda and Kokoy Romualdez did everything that he would lose everything.

Roberto Ongpin, the fourth most powerful man during those days after Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, and Cesar Virata, served as Marcos’s hatchet man. Roberto Ongpin readily accepted Rudy Cuenca’s invitation to become chairman of the CDCP board. Rudy Cuenca could not help but felt bitter because instead of helping CDCP in his capacity as its board chairman, he led in CDCP’s slaughter. The government took over CDCP as government debts were converted into equities. It has been renamed the PNCC or Philippine National Construction Corporation.

The authors did not mention any fallout between Ferdinand Marcos and Rodolfo Cuenca. Why Ferdinand allowed its slaughter and used Ongpin as the hatchet man of its financial demise is worthy of future investigation. But the CDCP affairs also pointed to the dynamics among the people in power during those days.

Rudy Cuenca claimed that Imelda Marcos was apparently envious or jealous of Rudy Cuenca’s access to husband Ferdinand. Rudy Cuenca avoided to get closed to Imelda during those days. He bypassed her. He did not see it fit to pay obeisance to her. He felt he could go directly to Marcos. Rudy Cuenca apparently misunderstood that Imelda was the other half of the conjugal dictatorship during those days. Imelda resented his antics. He misread the situation.

Rudy Cuenca claimed he gained Kokoy Romauldez’s enmity after CDCP bagged the contract to reclaim 3,000 hectares of sea in the Manila Bay area. Rudy Cuenca claimed his firm bested Kokoy’s construction firm, which he did not identify, in the bidding.

Rudy Cuenca is still alive at 94. It’s interesting how those powerful guys slit each other’s throat during the heady days of the Marcos dictatorship. #

WILL IT BE SARA OR BONG GO?

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

LET’S leave temporarily the issue of the pandemic brought by the China-Duterte Virus. Let’s talk about the 2022 presidential elections – and its dynamics.

Frequent questions: Whom will the Davao Group field in 2022? Will it be Bong Go or Sara Duterte?

It has been observed that the Davao Group has been posturing as if it owns the Philippines and the ruling coalition. It believes and behaves as if everybody would listen and follow what it says down the line. Its monster attitude could be felt in the political scene.

But this issue would depend on the presidential health. If Rodrigo Duterte’s illness turns for the worst and dies before 2022 and Vice President Leni Robredo takes over, this issue could be out of the question. Neither Bong Go nor Sara would not run for the presidency.

But if everything turns well, which means no Duterte death, no RevGov, no federal shift, no military junta by coup or self-coup, or no major political cataclysm, and a relatively quiet political transition happens through the electoral process, we could expect the Davao Group to field its presidential candidate to perpetuate itself in power.

Political opinion differs on who has the better chance. Although both are dumb and could not be expected to provide any sense of political vision and direction, it is important to understand the Davao Group has almost limitless campaign funds to slug it out in 2022. The funds could come from legal and illegal means, or even from China, which has an increasing stake in the Philippines.

Nonetheless, they are substantial and could be expected to push either Sara or Bong Go to throw his hat into the political ring.

Anointment by Rodrigo Duterte is important. Sick and mad (this is shown by the fact he is programmed to curse and spew expletives every time he goes public), Rodrigo Duterte appears non-committal on whom to anoint. Publicly, he says he discourages Sara to run for president, but privately, he is said to be pushing her. Sara’s biggest problem is her political naivete.

Political operators, in search of doleouts, would congregate around her, but this is no assurance she stands a chance to win. Hr father could opt fo Bong Go because he has the perfect reputation for being an indispensable political operator, or fixer. Besides, China appears to favor him. He has been the perfect go-between to Duterte. China feels it has to reward the fixer.

The Davao Group may have the resources or the candidate in Sara ang Bong Go, but it has to understand that the political mood could change drastically in the run-up to 2022. The political pendulum may swing drastically to the other side.

Because of the gargantuan failure of the Davao Group and the ruling coalition to handle the pandemic, the economic recession has happened. The economic recession could lead to a thorough change in the public perception of the Davao Group.

Hence, the change could favor the candidate from Luzon or the Visayas, or from the ranks of the democratic forces. Besides, Mindanao is not a viable political base and the Davao Group could be adversely affected by the change of the political pendeulum.

Moreover, the Davao Group does not dominate the Mindanao Bloc. Other blocs could secede from the Davao Group and coalesce with political coalitions from Luzon and the Visayas.

Will it be Sara Duterte or Bong Go?

As neither looks politically viable, it could be said this question is totally irrelevant. Fielding either Bong Go or Sara is political suicide. It is best to forget it.