COUNTERREVOLUTION AND TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

By Philip M. Lustre Jr.

WHEN he took his oath four years ago as 17th president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte has launched a bloody war against illegal drugs that has later transformed into a counterrevolution against the historic 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution mainly to overthrow the liberal democratic government it has restored.

The 1986 EDSA Revolution ousted dictator Ferdinand Marcos, dismantled the dictatorship that bled the country, and sent into exile the Marcoses and cronies who raided the national coffers. Corazon Aquino, leader of the democratic forces that destroyed the Marcos kleptocracy, worked for the 1987 Constitution and restored the constitutional democratic government to replace the dictatorship.

The Duterte presidency, in its first act of a burgeoning counterrevolution, has allied with two political families: the Marcoses and the Arroyos to form MAD (Marcos-Arroyo-Duterte axis). Mr. Duterte is uncomfortable with the 1986 EDSA Revolution and its 2001 sequel, the so-called “EDSA 2,” where the Armed Forces of the Philippines withdrew support from President Joseph Estrada, forcing him to resign and leave Malacanang.

Mr. Duterte’s agenda has been to prove the two revolutions have failed to uplift the country and the overthrow of the constitutional government by what could be regarded a self-coup and its replacement by a populist, albeit authoritarian, regime could save the country. He wants to stage his own revolution to overthrow the constitutional system that has put him in power.

His agenda includes a pivot of its foreign policy to discard the U.S., the nation's traditional ally, and embrace China to the extreme to yield a part of its territory to Chinese military and soften its political victory in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas. He has allowed China to take a foothold in power distribution and telecommunications.

Mr. Duterte’s counterrevolution has led to the murder of over 30,000 smalltime drug peddlers, users, and supporters, but not bigtime druglords, in a bloody crackdown against illegal drugs. Since 2016, his counterrevolution has expanded to include assaults on democratic institutions - Supreme Court, Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Elections, Office of the Ombudsman, among others. His counterrevolution weakens democratic traditions - adherence to human rights, rule of law, and due process.

Mr. Duterte and his minions have surreptitiously conspired to jail Senator Leila de Lima on trumped up charges, remove Ma. Lourdes Sereno as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on the bases of unconstitutional means, and convict journalist Maria Ressa of cyberlibel charges. They have intimidated state critics, marginalizing them to the sidelines.

Overall, the political objective is to reinstall a new dictatorship, enabling Mr. Duterte, or any of his handpicked successor - Ferdinand “BongBong” Marcos Jr., a recent survivor of Covid-19, flunkey Christopher Go, now a senator, or daughter Sara Duterte, mayor of Davao City - to rule beyond end of his term in 2022. It remains a big political issue on how they could prolong their stay in power since Mr. Duterte’s state of health is uncertain because of several ailments.

The coalition of authoritarian forces led by Mr. Duterte and composed of the Marcoses, Arroyos, and other key political families have tried but failed to pursue their counterrevolution through two political routes: declaring  a revolutionary government, or RevGov, to jettison the 1987 Constitution; or amending the Constitution by shifting to the federal government to replace the current unitary government. The proposed shift to federal form contained a transitory provision that would make Mr. Duterte a virtual dictator for at least ten years.

His plan to establish RevGov did not gain steam as many sectors turned wary of his plan to discard the 1987 Constitution, which serves as anchor of the thirty-two years of restored democracy. The democratic ideals and traditions embodied in the 1987 Constitution have tied his hands, frustrating his attempts to cut corners. Moreover, his RevGov did not generate support because it was perceived to have largely arbitrary and whimsical.

His proposed RevGov did not gain ground, as major sectors, including the dominant Roman Catholic Church and even the Minority Church, the defense and military establishment, and the business sector have sent cold signals, rejecting his RevGov in favor of the restored democracy. His plan to shift to a federal government fell flat on his face, as lawmakers did not appear enthusiastic to amend the Constitution with Mr. Duterte as the virtual dictator in the envisioned ten-year transition to a federal state from the current unitary government. There was hardly popular support.

Two conflicting themes dominate the Philippine postwar political experience: democracy and authoritarianism. This dichotomy of political themes is evident over the past seven decades. Pro-democracy forces want the democratic institutions and structures to thrive and the democratic processes to flourish. They believe in pluralism, where various belief systems, world views, and advocacy have spaces for coexistence and growth.

Pro-democracy forces are represented by middle elements that supported two people power revolutions (EDSA 1 and EDSA 2), political parties and organizations adhering to rule of law, and institutions like Majority Church, or the Roman Catholic Church, and Minority Church, or Christian and non-Christian denominations, their clergy, and various Church-based organizations. They are dubbed as the “Yellow Forces” since they helped to catapult Corazon and Benigno Aquino III into the presidency.

The authoritarian forces live in the past, as shown by persistence to revise history to erase the dictatorial rule of Marcos and his ilk and its ill effects, treat the two people power uprisings (EDSA 1 and EDSA 2) as historical flukes, and re-impose the failed authoritarian system. The modern-day populism appears to be their ideological anchor.

Mr. Duterte’s remarks, showing a heavy tilt towards suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law – either in Mindanao or nationwide, and the establishment of RevGov, have fanned widespread anxiety and fear on a return of authoritarianism. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana had indicated the Armed Forces of the Philippines would not support his RevGov, showing contempt of the officers' corps on this concept.

Although Philippine postwar liberal democratic system was put in place in 1946, Ferdinand Marcos, elected popularly in 1965 and reelected in 1969, touched the nerve of history by declaring martial law on September 21, 1972, plunging the country in a political experiment on “constitutional authoritarianism” or dictatorship. He was to step down on December 30, 1973, but he prolonged his stay in power by 12 years when he took advantage of a loophole in the 1935 Constitution.

By a stroke of a pen, Marcos write finis to the country’s democratic traditions and destroyed its democratic structures. He abolished Congress, closed mass media outfits, arrested and jailed without charges tens of thousands of journalists, activists, labor and peasant leaders, religious workers, and opposition stalwarts. He invoked the national security doctrine for martial rule, saying he wanted “to save” the country from the “conspiracy of the oligarchs and the communist rebels.”

After declaring Martial Law in 1972, Marcos ruled for another 13 years, but brought the following: first, centralized corruption, where he earned under-the-table commissions from big ticket state projects and deposited proceeds in foreign banks; second, crony capitalism, where his cronies cornered fat state projects, formed agricultural monopolies, and grabbed monopoly contracts in the services sector; and third, wanton human rights violations, where tens of thousands of anti-Marcos elements were arrested and imprisoned without charges, tortured, and summarily executed, and disappeared involuntarily without trace.

In 1986, the Filipino people, in their exercise of sovereign power, kicked the Marcoses out of Malacanang, toppled his dictatorship, and sent them to a five-year exile in the U.S. But it happened not without leaving a country destroyed by kleptocracy, or the use of political power to plunder and accumulate ill-gotten wealth estimated at between $5 billion to $10 billion.

Despite his frustrating overtures to declare a revolutionary government or shift to federal form of government, Mr. Duterte has signed on July 3 into law the controversial anti-terrorism bill, sowing fears of a crackdown in the democratic forces. He signed it, even as the Philippines breached the 40,000 level for Covid-19 cases and recorded the highest single-day total of 1,531 new cases. From all indications, the Republic Act No 11479, or the Anti-Terrorism, is the fitting alternative to Mr. Duterte’s earlier failure to stage his counterrevolution.

The new anti-terrorism law replaces the Human Security Act of 2007 which, according to legal luminaries, was largely unused because of the heavy fines provided against law enforcers, who violated its safeguards. It adopts a policy against terrorism and seeks to defend the country against it. It defines terrorism, penalizes acts of terrorism and proposals to commit it, and other activity like terrorist training, funding and recruitment activities and membership in terrorist organizations. It covers foreign terrorist activities that have links to the Philippines.

RA 11479 creates an Anti-Terrorism Council composed of officials of the Executive Department, the job of whom is to oversee its implementation. It provides an elaborate system of surveillance including wiretapping by State agents of suspected terrorists upon directive or permission from the Anti-Terrorism Council with the approval of the Court of Appeals, for a period of 60 days extendable for another 30 days. It allows arrests without judicial warrants and detention without filing of charges in court for a period of 14 days that could be extended by another 10 days. It removes heavy fines on law enforcers if they transgress the law’s safeguards and instead provides for imprisonment of up to 12 years.

According to retired Supreme Court Justice Adolf Azcuna, the new law is under heavy scrutiny and criticisms because the definition of terrorism is vague and too broad so it violates the right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the charges against him or her; Also, it violates the provision of the Constitution that says that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by a judge, Azcuna said.

Furthermore, Azcuna said it allows arbitrary detentions without charges for an unreasonable length of time in violation of a person’s fundamental right and grants the State law enforcers the right to determine that something is terrorism and one is guilty of it without ones being heard thus violating the fundamental requirement of due process. It makes peaceful assembly and protest to criticize government a dangerous activity that could easily be deemed as constituting terrorism by State agents acting without the safeguard of requiring court authority;

“Granted that there is a need for an honest to goodness Anti-Terrorism Law, one should be adopted after broad consultation with all affected sectors, unlike this law which was hastily passed by both House of Representatives and the Senate, Azcuna said.

He said: “The law is liable to be weaponized and used to suppress legitimate criticism and put a chilling effect on peaceful dissent, a necessary ingredient of a democratic society. The law is a divisive one that detracts from the unity needed now to fight the pressing specter of the pandemic while saving our economy and ensuring the people’s survival.”

Truly, evolving counterrevolution could be gleaned from the new law, even as its proponents could not defend it adequately.