By Philip M. Lustre Jr.
After the historic 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, the fundamental question: Should the reform movement in the Armed Forces continue or should it cease its existence?
Two schools of thought dominated the military establishment. The military leadership under then Gen. Fidel Ramos, the AFP chief of staff after deposed Gen. Fabian Ver, wanted an end not just to the reform movement, but also to other fraternity organizations within the AFP.
But the younger officers wanted a continuation of the reform movement. They even believed that Ramos should head it, although the latter politely rejected their overtures.
A commission, which President Cory Aquino formed in 1990 to study the series of military coups and rebels under her government, said that many officers belonging to the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) believed that RAM should be dismantled because its objectives had been achieved after the EDSA Revolution.
But the commission headed by Hilarion Davide Jr., who later became the Supreme Court chief justice, also found out a faction of reformist solders, led by Col. Gregorio Honasan, wanted to continue the movement, giving rise to the RAM-Honasan faction.
The policy differences between Cory Aquino and defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile became public. Enrile kept on criticizing the Aquino government’s initiatives to start peace talks with the National Democratic Front (NDF), the political arm of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Enrile also assailed publicly what he perceived as kid glove treatment to communist rebels.
In what appeared to be her way to appease a subordinate, Cory Aquino even had a dialog with Enrile at the house of a common friend, University of the Philippines president Edgardo Angara, at Dasmarinas Village, which happens to be a stone’s throw away from Enrile’s.
The dialog, which was widely chronicled by journalists and scholars, resulted in JPE’s enumeration of what looked like the grievances of his faction and their demands: a hardline counterinsurgency policy; dismissal of alleged left-wing members of the Aquino Cabinet, including Joker Arroyo and his faction composed of Augusto Sanchez, Teodoro Locsin Jr., Rene Saguisag, among others; the termination of the “Freedom Constitution” that governed the Aquino’s “revolutionary government” and the drafting of a new constitution to replace the 1973 Constitution; and the dismissal of “incompetent” nd "undeserving" officers-in-charge (OICs), who replaced local officials under the Ferdinand Marcos regime.
Although Cory Aquino took recognition of those demands, it took her several months before she acted on them. The long wait took its toll on the reformist bloc, which, at that time, was being transformed into a putchist faction. It joined Enrile, becoming his virtual military arm, or private army, depending on which point of view.
The series of 1986 meetings among leaders of the reformist bloc, reputedly led by Enrile’s security men at the Ministry of National Defense, culminated on the crystallization of a military putsch, codenamed “God Save the Queen,” a reputed “surgical operation” to cleanse the Aquino government of what they considered left-leaning elements.
Enrile was reportedly among its leaders. Maj. General Rodolfo Canieso reported to the Davide Commission that no less than Enrile told him that something had to happen “to take back the power of the presidency the military gave her.” This was the Enrile's "monster attitude," which was widely criticized even within the military establishment.
But what was unique about the God Save the Queen coup was that the leaders treated it casually. Even Enrile announced that it would be launched on Nov. 11, 1986 in a manner as if he was announcing the next twinbill PBA basketball games at Ultra Gym, or a beauty contest in a barangay.
A week before its launch, Enrile met several military generals, including the heads of the four major commands, and sweet talked them to join the coup plot, but the generals merely said they would stay neutral. It was their way to rebuff him.
It was also learned that the Enrile faction had forged a tactical alliance with the military faction identified with Marcos and Ver, raising speculations that the two factions would raise joint attacks against major government installations and media outfits.
Although Enrile failed to get their support, his faction continued to float that the coup was rescheduled to take place on Nov. 23. As casual as that, raising criticisms even from other military leaders like Philippine Military Academy superintendent Brig. Gen. Rodolfo Biazon that such “surgical operations” would lead the country to nowhere but to heightened fratricidal war among Filipinos.
Despite the widespread public perception that the Enrile military faction were up for something big, Cory Aquino continued her trip to Japan, a four-day state visit which was earlier planned to fix the Philippine-Japan bilateral relations adversely affected by the Marcos dictatorial rule. She left Manila on Nov. 10, 1986 but with the statement that she would deal with any “military action by the misguided elements.”
I was a young reporter, who had rejoined the local media after the EDSA Revolution. I joined the Cory Aquino state visit as part of her media party. I covered her state visit for the ill-fated Philippine Tribune, which was set up jointly in March, 1986 by Pat Gonzales, who used to work in the Bulletin Today of Gen. Hans Menzi, and Neal Cruz, who worked in the Roberto Benedicto-owned Daily Express.
It was a successful trip as Cory Aquino succeeded in the rescheduling of the repayment of the country's overdue foreign debts with Japan and their eventual restructuring. Also, she succeeded to get new loan packages and bilateral assistance in what appeared to be Tokyo's way to establish rapport with her new government.
While in Tokyo, the media team could feel the coup jitters, although Cory Aquino’s media handlers kept on advising us on a daily basis that the situation in Manila was under control, as the President kept in touch on a daily basis with her Cabinet. We returned home on Nov. 15 without any untoward incident.
Days after her return from Tokyo, the country was shocked when it learned that the lifeless body of leftwing labor leader Rolando Olalia was dumped in Antipolo. Initial suspects were certain RAM members. It was later alleged that Olalia was a victim of torture and summary execution. His death was part of the perceived destabilization plan of the Enrile military faction, which did not like Mrs. Aquino’s initiatives.
It was on the night of Nov. 22, 1986 that the God Save the Queen plot was about to reach its climax. The military leadership under Gen. Ramos had monitored what it described as unauthorized troop movements from some parts of Luzon, prompting the military leaders to meet to take last-minute steps to defuse the tension.
The first group that was neutralized was the Guardian Brotherhood, Inc., a military fraternity organization that was reportedly involved in the earlier but comical Manila Hotel occupation. Ramos sought Enrile but he was unreachable on that night, prompting him to send PC-INP chief Lt. Gen. Renato de Villa to seek out for Col. Gregorio Honasan and his alleged co-conspirators for a dialog.
But when de Villa sensed, in his meeting on the early morning of Nov. 23 with Navy Captain Felix Turingan and Major Noe Wong, the RAM-Marcos loyalist factions would proceed with the planned God Save the Queen plot, Ramos took his ace in his sleeve and send the pivotal radio message that forever changed the complexity of the military establishment. Shortly before 2 am, which was supposed to be jumpoff point, Ramos said:
“The New AFP stands behind the present government of President Aquino having been elected and installed by the people and whose government is recognized by the international community. The Joint Staff and four Major Service Commanders and INP are together with General Ramos in this undertaking. We must not betray our country and people. Inform your governors and local executives to help maintain calm and stability in your [area of responsibility]. Disregard any orders from MND or Col. Honasan and MND staff.”
Ramos’s directive broke the impasse. Up to the last minute, Enrile was hoping Ramos and the military commanders would join him and his faction in the planned God Save the Queen plot. Ramos, on the other hand, was hoping that Enrile and his group would change their mind and rejoin the coalition. But up to the last minute, the two main players in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution did not know they would soon part ways.
Ramos effectively shackled the coup plotters, as those military leaders, who were supposed to join the coup, failed to leave their camps to implement their plans. In brief, the military units, which were to join the coup, did not arrive, leaving Honasan and his group with no military units to deploy.
By 3 am, the military units returned to their barracks. As a result of this plot, Cory Aquino fired Enrile as defense chief and replaced him with Rafael Ileto, a veteran soldier who created the elite Scout Rangers unit of the Philippine Army. Ileto later dissolved the MND security unit and transferred its leaders to various parts of the country.
But it was a temporary victory for the Aquino government. With Enrile and Ramos out of the picture, the coup plotters had to recast their plan. It was a totally different ball game for the next series of military coups against the fledgling Aquino government.
